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ABSTRACT 
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy Regimes and Population Health: Assessing 
Causal Loops 
 
Stephanie J. Frisbee, M.Sc, M.A. 
Tobacco products remain among the most controversial consumer products of all time:  
cigarettes are the only legal product that, when used as intended, are lethal.  The global and 
individual burden attributable to the primary use of tobacco, or secondary or tertiary exposure to 
cigarette smoke, whether measured by morbidity, mortality, or economic costs, is substantial.  
With the combined efforts of scientific research, public health and policy advocates, the image 
and use of tobacco products has undergone profound change.  However, while much has been 
achieved regarding the attitudinal, behavioral, and policy changes needed to diminish the 
individual, social, and economic costs of tobacco use, much remains to be yet accomplished if 
these adverse tobacco use impacts are to be further curtailed.  There is considerable evidence 
that tobacco use is becoming highly concentrated in lower socio-economic groups and that the 
rate of decline in smoking is slowing.  Further, as the tobacco epidemic emerges in the 
developing world, there is considerable interest ine applying the lessons learned in 
industrialized countries to developing countries, thereby truncating the tobacco epidemic and 
forgoing some of the enormous costs in countries least able to absorb such costs.   
The unifying theme of the present work is an integration of the public health and political 
science perspectives on tobacco control so as to establish a more comprehensive framework of 
the underlying factors and elements interrelating tobacco use and tobacco control policy.  A 
substantial challenge in developing such a framework is the complexity of the relationship 
between the two primary outcomes of interest.  The relationships, including interdependencies 
and feedback mechanisms, are much more accurately characterized by a causal loop.  This 
work presents an overview of the tobacco epidemic, a review of two very different literatures 
with different perspectives on the tobacco epidemic (public health literature and political and 
policy science), an empirical policy history analysis integrating the political and policy science 
viewpoint with the public health perspective on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic, and two 
quantitative analyses alternately supporting the interdependence and complex temporal 
relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population health outcomes as well as 
the importance of societally-derived factors.  An integrated conceptual model based on the 
causal loops of tobacco control policy and tobacco-related population health is then presented 
 [iii] 
 
that incorporates the realms of population, governmental, judicial, public health, tobacco 
industry and other subsystems, and scientific communities.  However, while this framework 
does assimilate the key elements and forces elucidated during the course of this work and 
integrates the political and policy science with the public health perspective, in truth this 
framework likely elicits more questions than it answers.  The research questions and agendas 
and metrics proposed highlight both the strengths and deficiencies of the two perspectives.   
 
  
 [iv] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my Jefferson, Nathaniel, and Amelia. 
May I always be worthy of your unwavering love and support. 
  
 [v] 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am sincerely grateful for all those who have supported me in this endeavor.  Thank you to my 
many professors and instructors who have guided and, at times, pushed my academic 
development.  I am also sincerely grateful to the members of my committee, Drs. Duval, 
Hendryx, Hunter, Kilwein, and Studlar, for their assistance and guidance both throughout my 
doctoral studies but also in the preparation of my dissertation.  I also wish to acknowledge and 
thank Dr. Worsham for his counsel during my studies.   
In particular, I wish to acknowledge and sincerely thank Dr. Studlar, my doctoral advisor and 
mentor.  I consider myself to have been most fortunate to have met and worked with Dr. Studlar.  
He has encouraged, and then required and supported, my development, as a good mentor 
should.  Much sincere thanks, Dr. Studlar, for all of your assistance, as well as your wisdom and 
humor.  I aspire to develop into a worthy academic colleague.   
 
  
 [vi] 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... xiii 
1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1  Purpose and Outline of the Present Work ...................................................................... 8 
2  AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC ................................................................ 12 
2.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................... 12 
2.2  Models for Characterizing the Tobacco Epidemic in the Industrialized World .............. 12 
2.2.1  The Phases of Tobacco Control Model ................................................................. 12 
2.2.2  The Tobacco Epidemic Model ............................................................................... 14 
2.3  The Tobacco Epidemic in the United States ................................................................ 16 
2.3.1  A Brief History of the Evolution of the Tobacco Epidemic in the United States ..... 16 
2.3.2  Current Estimates of Smoking Related Population Health .................................... 20 
2.3.3  Current Domestic Policy ........................................................................................ 23 
3  LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVE ........................................................................................................................... 33 
3.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................... 33 
3.2  Tobacco Control Policy Best Practices ......................................................................... 33 
3.2.1  Individual Policy Instruments ................................................................................. 33 
3.2.2  Comprehensive Tobacco Control and Tobacco Control Policy Regimes .............. 37 
3.2.3  Evidence of the Effectiveness of State-Level Tobacco Control Policy Regimes ... 45 
3.2.4  International Cooperative Efforts to Enact Tobacco Control Policies .................... 48 
3.3  Universal Challenges to Enacting Tobacco Control Policies ........................................ 55 
3.3.1  A “Right” to Tobacco Control or a “Right” to Smoke? ............................................ 56 
3.3.2  Debates about the Economic Rationale for Tobacco Control Policies .................. 60 
3.3.3  Final Comments on “Rights” in Light of Health Disparities and Social Justice ...... 64 
3.3.4  The Universal and Ubiquitous Anti- Anti-Tobacco Arguments .............................. 65 
3.4  Looming Challenges ..................................................................................................... 69 
3.4.1  Specially Targeted Populations ............................................................................. 69 
 [vii] 
 
3.4.2  Alternative and Smokeless Tobacco Products and the Harm Reduction Debate . 70 
3.4.3  The Tobacco Harm Reduction Debate .................................................................. 72 
3.4.4  Globalization .......................................................................................................... 72 
3.4.5  Tobacco-Control Challenges in the United States ................................................ 73 
3.5  Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 74 
4  LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE POLITICAL AND 
POLICY SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................ 76 
4.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................... 76 
4.2  Multiple Streams Framework ........................................................................................ 76 
4.2.1  An Overview of the Multiple Streams Framework ................................................. 76 
4.2.2  Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to Tobacco Control Policy .......... 77 
4.3  Punctuated Equilibrium Theory .................................................................................... 78 
4.3.1  An Overview of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory .................................................... 78 
4.3.2  Application of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to Tobacco Control Policy ....... 80 
4.4  Advocacy Coalition Framework .................................................................................... 81 
4.4.1  An Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework ............................................. 81 
4.4.2  Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Tobacco Control Policy ...... 81 
4.5  Policy Typologies .......................................................................................................... 82 
4.5.1  An Overview of Policy Typologies ......................................................................... 82 
4.5.2  De-normalization, Morality Policy, and Tobacco Control Policy ............................ 83 
4.6  Institutions and Institutionalism ..................................................................................... 85 
4.6.1  An Overview of the Role of Institutions and Institutionalism in Public Policy ......... 85 
4.6.2  Institutions, Institutionalism, and Tobacco Control Policy...................................... 87 
4.7  Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence ............................................... 90 
4.7.1  An Overview of Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence in Public 
Policy 90 
4.7.2  Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, Convergence, and Tobacco Control Policy . 92 
4.8  Social Change and Social Movements ......................................................................... 92 
4.8.1  An Overview of Social Change in Public Policy .................................................... 92 
 [viii] 
 
4.8.2  Tobacco Control Policy Adoption as a Social Movement ...................................... 94 
4.9  Science and Expert Communities ................................................................................ 94 
4.9.1  An Overview of Science and Expert Communities in Public Policy ....................... 94 
4.9.2  Science and Expert Communities in Tobacco Control Policy................................ 96 
4.10  The Judiciary ................................................................................................................ 96 
4.10.1  An Overview of the Role of the Judiciary in Public Policy ..................................... 96 
4.10.2  The Judiciary and Tobacco Control Policy ............................................................ 98 
4.11  The Political and Policy Science Perspective on Networks .......................................... 99 
4.12  Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 101 
5  AN INTEGRATED POLICY HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE TOBACCO 
EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE LENS OF IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND 
INSTITUTIONS ......................................................................................................................... 102 
5.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................. 102 
5.2  Ideas, Interests, and Institutions ................................................................................. 103 
5.3  Ideas ........................................................................................................................... 104 
5.4  Interests ...................................................................................................................... 110 
5.4.1  Tobacco Industry Interests .................................................................................. 111 
5.4.2  Public Health and State Advocacy Interests ....................................................... 115 
5.5  Institutions .................................................................................................................. 118 
5.6  Ideas, Interests, and Institutions and Policy Change .................................................. 121 
5.6.1  Focusing Events & Policy Entrepreneurs ............................................................ 121 
5.6.2  Policy Windows ................................................................................................... 128 
5.7  Chapter Summary & Contribution ............................................................................... 133 
6  ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND 
POPULATION TOBACCO-RELATED HEALTH IN THE U.S. STATES ................................... 134 
6.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................. 134 
6.2  Background ................................................................................................................ 134 
6.3  Materials and Methods ............................................................................................... 138 
6.4  Results ........................................................................................................................ 140 
6.5  Discussion .................................................................................................................. 141 
6.6  Chapter Summary & Contribution ............................................................................... 142 
 [ix] 
 
7  TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY AND RELATED POPULATION HEALTH OUTCOMES IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF E.U. ACCESSION ON 
POPULATION HEALTH ............................................................................................................ 149 
7.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................. 149 
7.2  Background ................................................................................................................ 149 
7.3  Materials and Methods ............................................................................................... 152 
7.4  Results ........................................................................................................................ 154 
7.5  Discussion .................................................................................................................. 156 
7.6  Chapter Summary & Contribution ............................................................................... 159 
8  CONCLUSION (AND A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING TOBACCO 
CONTROL POLICY AND TOBACCO-RELATED POPULATION HEALTH) ............................. 166 
8.1  Chapter Introduction & Purpose ................................................................................. 166 
8.2  An Conceptual Model for Integrating the Social and Political Forces Affecting Policy 
Adoption and Population Health: A Causal Loop .................................................................. 167 
8.3  Elements of the Causal Loop Diagram ....................................................................... 167 
8.3.1  Population (Social System) ................................................................................. 167 
8.3.2  Government (Policy System) ............................................................................... 168 
8.3.3  Judiciary .............................................................................................................. 169 
8.3.4  Tobacco Control and Public Health Infrastructure vs. Tobacco Industry 
(Competing Coalitions) ...................................................................................................... 170 
8.3.5  Scientific, Expert, and Epistemic Communities ................................................... 170 
8.4  Conclusions: Submissions to Political and Policy Science, and Public Health ........... 170 
9  LIST OF APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 172 
Summary of Key Legal Cases and Events ............................................................................ 172 
Curriculum Vitæ (Frisbee, Stephanie J) ................................................................................ 172 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 173 
10  APPENDIX 1:  SUMMARY OF KEY LEGAL CASES AND EVENTS ............................. 206 
10.1  Introduction ................................................................................................................. 206 
10.2  Suits with Individual Plaintiffs Claiming Personal Harm .............................................. 207 
10.2.1  Engle and Engle Progeny Cases ........................................................................ 208 
10.2.2  Summary ............................................................................................................. 208 
10.3  Class Action Suits Claiming Personal Harm ............................................................... 209 
 [x] 
 
10.4  Suits Claiming Harm from Exposure to Secondhand or Environmental Tobacco Smoke
 209 
10.4.1  Individually-Based Suits ...................................................................................... 209 
10.4.2  Class-Action Suits ............................................................................................... 210 
10.4.3  Summary ............................................................................................................. 210 
10.5  Suits Seeking Reimbursement for Tobacco-Attributable Expenses ........................... 210 
10.5.1  The States Attorneys’ General and the Master Settlement Agreement ............... 211 
10.5.2  Master Settlement-Emulating Suits ..................................................................... 213 
10.5.3  Master-Settlement Agreement Interpretation and Enforcement Suits ................. 213 
10.5.4  Summary ............................................................................................................. 214 
10.6  Suits Disputing Scope of Action ................................................................................. 214 
10.6.1  Suits Brought by Tobacco Companies ................................................................ 215 
10.6.2  Suits Brought by the Government Against Tobacco Companies ........................ 226 
11  APPENDIX 2: CURRICULUM VITÆ (FRISBEE, STEPHANIE J) .................................. 229 
 
  
 [xi] 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2-1. Phases of Tobacco Control Model ............................................................................. 12 
Table 2-2. The Tobacco Epidemic Model ................................................................................... 14 
Table 2-3. Federal Tobacco-Related Legislation, Enacted ......................................................... 17 
Table 2-5. Federal Regulations Affecting Tobacco Products and Use ....................................... 18 
Table 2-4. Federally-Enacted Legislation that was a “Missed Opportunity” for or Impeded 
Tobacco Control .......................................................................................................................... 18 
Table 2-6. Federal Excise Taxes on Cigarettes .......................................................................... 19 
Table 2-7. Federal Agricultural Policies and Programs for Tobacco Farmers ............................ 20 
Table 2-8. State-Specific Smoking Prevalence and Smoking-Attributable ................................. 22 
Table 2-9. Key Provisions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
 .................................................................................................................................................... 25 
Table 2-10. Key Activities in the Inaugural Year of F.D.A. Tobacco Regulation ......................... 26 
Table 2-11. Membership of the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health....................... 30 
Table 2-12. Summary of State-Level Tobacco Excise Tax and Enacted Tobacco-Control 
Legislation ................................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 3-1. Quantitative Estimates of the Effectiveness of Individual Tobacco Control Policy 
Instruments ................................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 3-2. Summary of Policies in the MPOWER Package ........................................................ 39 
Table 3-3. CDC-Recommended Surveillance and Evaluation Metrics Based on MPOWER 
Framework .................................................................................................................................. 40 
Table 3-4. Tobacco Control Policy Regime Components ........................................................... 41 
Table 3-5. Articles of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control ...................................... 51 
Table 3-6. “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate ............................................. 66 
Table 3-7. Economic “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate ............................ 67 
Table 3-8. Libertarian Perspective on the "Myths" and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate
 .................................................................................................................................................... 68 
Table 3-9. Smokeless Tobacco Products ................................................................................... 70 
Table 4-1. Characteristics of Morality Policy ............................................................................... 83 
Table 5-1. Smoking and Tobacco-Related Reports of the U.S. Surgeon General, 1964-2007 106 
Table 5-2. Overview of the Development of Anti-Tobacco Groups and Coalitions ................... 116 
Table 5-3. Summary of Seminal Legal Cases Discussed in Appendix 1 .................................. 120 
Table 5-4. List of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation (1989-2010) .......................................... 130 
 [xii] 
 
Table 6-1. Descriptive Characterization of Tobacco Control Policies During Study Timeframes
 .................................................................................................................................................. 143 
Table 6-2. Descriptive Characterization of Continuous Variables During Study Timeframes ... 145 
Table 6-3. Univariate Association (A.N.O.V.A. Analysis) Between Smoking Prevalence and 
Tobacco Control Policy Adoption During Different Study Timeframes ..................................... 146 
Table 7-1. Comparisons and Changes in Structural and Institutional Metrics (1990/1994 to 
2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession Countries ................ 160 
Table 7-2. Comparisons and Changes in Price and Policy Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in 
Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession Countries ....................................... 161 
Table 7-3. Comparisons and Changes in Population Health Outcome Metrics (1990/1994 to 
2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession Countries ................ 162 
Table 7-4. Results for Regression Analysis .............................................................................. 163 
Table 10-1. Summary of Key Components of the Master Settlement Agreement .................... 211 
 
  
 [xiii] 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1. Population Smoking Prevalence in OECD Countries, 1960-2009 .............................. 2 
Figure 1-2. Initial Conceptualization of a Comprehensive Framework Illustrating a Causal-Loop 
Relationship Between the Social and Political Factors of Tobacco Control .................................. 9 
Figure 2-1. Trend in Prevalence of Current Smokers, Adults and High School Students, 1965-
2007 ............................................................................................................................................ 16 
Figure 2-2. Adult Smoking Prevalence, United States, 2008 ...................................................... 20 
Figure 2-3. Smoking Prevalence in OECD Countries, 2004-2006 .............................................. 23 
Figure 2-4. Schematic Representation of the National Tobacco Control Program ..................... 29 
Figure 4-1. Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram ......................................................... 82 
Figure 4-2. Three-Tiered Institutional Typology .......................................................................... 86 
Figure 5-1. Overview of Results Regarding Knowledge and Attitudes about the Harmful Effects 
of Smoking ................................................................................................................................ 107 
Figure 5-2. Schematic Representation of Current Anti-Tobacco Coalition Networks ............... 117 
Figure 7-1. Range of the Percent Change in Smoking Prevalence from 1990-94 to 2000-04 in 
Individual Existing and Accession E.U. Countries .................................................................... 164 
Figure 7-2. Comparison of Existing E.U., Accession E.U., and European-Neighborhood 
Countries on Key Indicators ...................................................................................................... 165 
Figure 8-1. Causal Loop Diagram ............................................................................................. 167 
 
 
 [1] 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Tobacco products remain among the most controversial consumer products of all time.  
As many others have previously highlighted, cigarettes are the only legal product that, when 
used as intended, are lethal.  Alternately stated, there is no safe level of exposure to tobacco, 
tobacco smoke, or tobacco smoke particles. [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Surgeon General, 2006]  Further, the global and individual burden attributable to 
the primary use of tobacco, or secondary or tertiary exposure to cigarette smoke, whether 
measured by morbidity, mortality, or economic costs, is substantial.  Smoking has been causally 
linked to multiple cancers, coronary heart disease, stroke, obstructive lung diseases, infertility, 
and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  
Exposure to secondhand smoke, also called “passive smoking” or environmental tobacco 
smoke, is causally linked to heart disease and cancer, and, in children, ear infections, 
exacerbation of asthma and other respiratory symptoms and infections, and increased risk for 
SIDS. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]  Additionally, recent reports have 
documented that residual tobacco smoke on surfaces, including clothing, furniture, vehicle 
surfaces, and skin, reacts with ambient nitrous acid to form carcinogenic substances, resulting 
in yet another exposure route, a “third-hand” route, to the deleterious effects of tobacco 
products. [Sleiman, Gundel, Pankow, Jacob, Singer, & Destaillats, 2010]  In the United States, it 
is estimated that each pack of cigarettes sold represents a $10.47 loss in direct (medical care) 
and indirect (productivity) costs and that there are 5.1 million years of potential life lost annually 
due to cigarette smoking. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  From 2000-2004, 
the total economic losses in the United States attributable to cigarette smoking were $193 billion 
($96 billion direct medical expenses, and $97 billion in indirect lost productivity). [Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  Further, annual mortality in the United States 
attributable to smoking is estimated at 443,000, including almost 50,000 deaths annually from 
secondhand smoke. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  Globally, the World 
Health Organization estimates that tobacco causes 5 million deaths annually and, by 2030, the 
annual tobacco-attributable mortality will climb to 8 million annually, resulting in one billion 
cumulative deaths in the 21st century. [World Health Organization, 2008]  More notably, of the 
1.1 billion people worldwide who currently smoke, 80% live in low- and middle-income countries 
and these same low- and middle-income countries are projected to experience more than 70% 
of the predicted one billion 21st century cigarette-related deaths. [Jha, 2009]  Thus, tobacco is 
amongst the leaders in global all-cause mortality, is most assuredly the leading cause of 
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preventable death [World Health Organization, 2008], and is increasingly a barrier to 
overcoming health disparities both within and between countries.   
The nature and magnitude of the adverse health, economic, and societal effects of 
tobacco have emerged through the efforts of almost a century of scientific research.  Combined 
with the efforts of public health and policy advocates, the image and use of tobacco products 
has undergone profound change.  Starting with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the U.S. 
government (Department of Agriculture) provided price supports for tobacco farmers in 
exchange for agreed-upon acreage and production quotas.  Further, in a practice that started in 
World War I and continued until the 1975, the U.S. military distributed cigarettes as part of 
rations for military personnel (formal military tobacco control efforts did not begin until 1986). 
[Smith & Malone, 2009]  Thus, in the 1950s tobacco in general and cigarettes specifically were 
widely used and accepted products, promoted and endorsed by physicians and the government 
alike.  However, there has been a monumental paradigm shift in the perception, regulation, and 
use of these products in the last half century such that these products have become 
marginalized, if not de-normalized.  While comparative data prior to 1960 are difficult to obtain, 
Figure 1-1 demonstrates the substantial decline in smoking prevalence in OECD countries since 
the middle of the 20th century.  Whereas in many countries half or almost half of their population 
were daily smokers in 1960, by the start of the 21st century the vast majority of OECD countries 
Figure 1-1. Population Smoking Prevalence in OECD Countries, 1960-2009 
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had halved that – i.e., ≤25% of the total population were daily smokers – and the prevalence of 
daily smokers continues to decline.  Further, though also with the caveat that comparative or 
standardized data are not readily available, surveys from the Gallup., Inc.® have reported that in 
1999, 92% of Americans believed that smoking caused lung cancer [Morales, L; Gallup, Inc., 
2008], that 56% of adults in 2008 thought that secondhand smoke was harmful compared to 
36% in 1995 [Morales, L; Gallup, Inc., 2008], and that 54% of adults in 2005 supported smoking 
bans in restaurants compared to 17% in 1987. [Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005].  Further still, 
the United States has developed and implemented what is regarded as one of the most 
restrictive tobacco control policy regimes in the world today. [Studlar, 2010] 
This paradigm shift in attitudes, behavior, and policy has been achieved through multi-
disciplinary efforts sustained over multiple generations.  Basic and population (epidemiology) 
sciences have identified the causal biologic mechanisms for tobacco-related morbidity and 
mortality as well as the social burden of tobacco use.  Public health scientists, including health 
economists, have developed and quantified the effectiveness of various tobacco prevention and 
abatement strategies.  Psychologists and medical professionals have contributed to the 
understanding of effective strategies to change individual attitudes and behaviors, including the 
treatment of nicotine addiction.  Sociologists have documented changes in the social dynamics 
and perceptions of smoking, the tobacco industry, and the responsibility of government to 
delineate and protect the rights of individuals from the harmful effects of tobacco.  And finally, 
political scientists have studied and reported on how various political structures, forces, and 
dynamics shape and affect the adoption of tobacco control policies.  That is, this sustained, 
multidisciplinary effort has been, though perhaps unintentionally, Heclo’s “CODA” – the 
combination of both case study and programmatic analysis contributing to analytic realism. 
[Heclo, 1972]  
However, while much has been achieved in the United States and other industrialized 
countries regarding the attitudinal, behavioral, and policy changes needed to diminish the 
individual, social, and economic costs of tobacco use, much remains to be yet accomplished if 
these adverse tobacco use impacts are to be further curtailed.  The fact remains that, despite 
decades of effort and advocacy, tobacco use still places an enormous burden on societies.  The 
most recent estimates from the CDC attest to this: 46.6 million Americans are current smokers 
and an additional 88 million, including 54% of children 3-11 years of age, are exposed to 
secondhand smoke; and there continue to be approximately 443,000 tobacco-attributable 
deaths and 8.6 million tobacco-related illnesses annually. [Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on 
Smoking and Health, 2010]  Additionally, estimates have suggested that smoking-attributable 
expenses averaged 11% of state Medicaid expenditures, or a total of $22 billion nationwide, in 
2004 [Armour, Finkelstein, & Fielbelkorn, 2009], and that between 1995–2015 tobacco-related 
Medicare expenses will be $800 billion. [Department of Health and Human Serivces, Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2010]  Further, there is considerable evidence that tobacco 
use is becoming highly concentrated in lower socio-economic groups (smoking prevalence is 
approximately 25% in those with a high school education or less, or 50% of all current smokers, 
compared to 6% in those with a graduate degree), and that the rate of decline in smoking is 
slowing (the smoking prevalence in the U.S. was estimated at 20.9% in 2005 and 20.6% in 
2009; in high school students, between 1999-2003 smoking prevalence declined from 36% to 
22%, but between 2003-2009 declined from 22% to 20%), both of which are disquieting trends. 
[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention 
and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health, 2010]  Stated more starkly, it is likely that 
the next 10% of smoking prevalence will be more difficult and intransigent to eliminate than the 
previous 10% of population smoking prevalence as tobacco use becomes socially and politically 
entrenched in socioeconomic and geo-demographic clusters that are traditionally more difficult 
to reach and less responsive to conventional health promotion and health education messages 
and public health policy arguments.  Counter-acting the decline in the gains from public health 
advocacy and policy change efforts will require an increase in the efficiency of these efforts – 
not necessarily of the endorsed programmatic or policy solutions themselves, but of the efforts 
to enact these evidence-based programs and policies.  Thus, increasing the efficiency of these 
programmatic and policy enactment efforts will implicitly require a much clearer and more 
precise understanding of the factors that will facilitate (or impede) a given jurisdiction in the 
adoption of strategies to reduce smoking prevalence and consumption, including the 
implementation of comprehensive tobacco control policies.   
Neither the changing nature of the challenge [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on 
Smoking and Health, 2010], [Tynan, et al., 2010], [Mendez, 2010] nor the need to adjust the 
approach to policy change have gone unnoticed by the public health community.  In particular, 
two approaches are being advanced within the public health community: the need to take a 
more systems-based approach to tobacco control; and the need to develop a more 
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sophisticated understanding of (and approach to) the political side of tobacco control policy 
enactment.   
“Systems” approaches are not new.  In political science, for example, David Easton, 
whose scholarship began in the 1950s, is generally regarded as a pioneer in the development of 
a comprehensive (“systems”) approach to the study of political systems. (E.g., [Easton, 1957])  
The application of such systematic approaches is, however, relatively recent in the biomedical 
sciences, including public health, disciplines which, by their nature and tradition, tend towards 
focus on hypothesis-driven, reductionist research questions designed to identify specific 
mechanisms (or risks).  In public health, with its close relationship to and shared origin with 
epidemiology, such an approach has often (though not always) translated into research and 
policy solutions targeted at changing individual behavior.  However, in a post-epidemiologic 
transition era where societal burdens of disease increasingly come from chronic, not acute, 
illnesses, individually-based methods, particularly when absent consideration of the 
environments in which such individual behaviors are occurring, have much less impact on 
improving the public’s health. [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000]  As a recent editorial in the American 
Journal of Public Health observed,  
“Systems modeling has been gaining increasing acceptance among the 
public health community, which is recognizing its value in addressing the 
complex nature of problems that affect the health of the population.”  
From: [Mendez, 2010] 
In tobacco control, a concerted – and federally (NIH) initiated -- effort to develop a 
focused research effort on systems approaches to tobacco control was prompted by the 
“Initiative on the Study and Implementation of Systems”, and particularly the National Cancer 
Institute publication Greater than the Sum: Systems Thinking in Tobacco Control in 2007. [Best, 
et al., 2006], [National Cancer Institute, 2007]  The stated purpose of these efforts have been to 
identify feedback loops between components within the system [Mabry, Marcus, Clark, 
Leischow, & Mendez, 2010], and  
“Is it possible to understand the interplay of factors that both sustain and 
potentially disrupt tobacco use?” and “What structures and functions are 
essential for both understanding that complexity and improving our efforts 
in tobacco control?”  
From: [Marcus, Leischow, Mabry, & Clark, 2010] 
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In further support of the effort to encourage a systems-based approach to tobacco 
control policy research, the full issue of the July 2010 American Journal of Public Health was 
dedicated to studies using a systems framework to investigate various aspects of tobacco 
control including adolescent smoking, cessation, diffusion of policies and adoption of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and social networks among others.  Episodes such 
as these federally-sponsored initiatives and editorial foci highlight the growing recognition of the 
importance of and need for systematic approaches to understanding the elements and factors, 
and how they relate and interact, that affect both tobacco use and tobacco control policy.   
 The second of the approaches being advanced as necessary to improve the efficiency of 
tobacco control efforts is the development of a more sophisticated command of the political side 
of tobacco control policy enactment.  The public health community has been criticized by 
members of its own as well as the policy science establishment for what is interpreted as a 
deficient understanding, acknowledgment, or willingness to work within (or a combination of all 
three) the political system that ultimately enacts policy.  From within the public health 
community, the failure of the McCain Bill in 1998 has been forwarded as an exemplary 
illustration of these deficiencies in the public health community. [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000], 
[McKinlay & Marceau, 2000]  It is not unreasonable to postulate that some of this perceived 
inability to master the political aspects of tobacco control stems from elementary principles of 
the discipline of public health, particularly the emphasis of and reliance on science and scientific 
evidence for the development of evidence-based policies.  In contrast, the political system and 
the policy process has been described as,  
“…the culture of politics where policy development is not linear but highly 
contingent, often unpredictable, and dependent upon convincing people to 
recognize the existence of a problem and the best way to resolve it.  
Outcomes result from building majorities, not from scientific expertise.”  
From: [Rudder & Fritschler, 2009]   
As alternately stated by others, public health is ultimately a political issue:  
“Science can identify solutions to pressing health problems, but only 
politics can turn most of those solutions into reality.” 
From: [Oliver, 2006]   
That the “best” (“evidence-based”) policy solutions become compromised during the policy – 
and political – process is often viewed with disbelief in the public health community, and 
antithetical to the rationally-based scientific process at the core of much of public health.  As has 
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been previously described, the response from the public health community to the long delays in 
enacting evidence-based policy, or outright policy failures (e.g., the McCain Bill defeat by Motion 
of Cloture in 1998) has not been to engage in the compromising, bargaining, or power-sharing 
aspect of the political process, but rather to re-frame the issue into starkly “good” vs. “evil” terms 
and as a “war” against the tobacco industry with smokers (and those exposed to secondhand 
smoke) its victims. [Larsen, 2008]  An archetypal example of this stance is articulated in the 
recent Government of Ontario’s 2011-2016 tobacco control strategy which, in addition to having 
as its vision “a tobacco-free Ontario by 2030”, states,  
“Treating the tobacco as a “normal” legitimate industry undermines the 
efforts by the government and health organizations to safeguard the health 
of Ontarians from tobacco products….The tobacco industry should not be 
considered either normal or legitimate.  The government of Ontario’s new 
strategy needs to incorporate a plan of action for de-normalization and de-
legitimizing the industry.”   
From: [Ontario Tobacco Strategy Advisory Group, 2010] 
And, 
“The tobacco industry tries to frame the problem of tobacco use as “a 
consumer choice.”  This could not be further from the truth.  The addiction 
to tobacco takes away any choice the consumer has to not use tobacco 
products.”   
From: [Ontario Tobacco Strategy Advisory Group, 2010]   
This strategy has been characterized by some as being anti-political – beyond the scope of 
normal politics because one of the participants is corrupt, illegitimate, or beyond moral reach – 
implying that the public health community, by its choice of framing of tobacco use and the 
tobacco industry, is necessarily disqualifying the democratic process itself and the possibility 
that, 
“…they can ignore how citizens might want to set the limits of public health 
intervention.”  
From: [Larsen, 2008]   
That is, despite calls from within the public health community itself to develop competencies and 
strategies so as to engage the democratic, political process [McKinlay & Marceau, 2000], [Milio, 
1985], [Oliver, 2006], the public health community continues with a strategy that likely so 
precludes such engagement.    
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Thus, in synthesizing these two lines of reasoning, a framework that combines the social 
process of tobacco use as well as the political and policy processes of tobacco control and 
policy implementation is sought.  A comprehensive – “systematic” – framework must necessarily 
combine the public health perspective, with its focus on in science-based arguments and 
development of evidence-base policies and emphasis on the outcome of reductions in smoking 
prevalence, and the political science perspective, with its focus on understanding the elements 
of the policy process and using policy process theories to explain the policy adoption and 
emphasis on the outcome of policy adoption.  Interestingly, despite the longstanding tobacco 
control efforts, it has been observed that, 
“…it is remarkable how underdeveloped the interaction between the two 
regimes really is.” 
From: [Larsen, 2008]  
That is, this is an area ripe for both conceptual and quantitative development which the present 
work, in parts, attempts to address.   
1.1 Purpose and Outline of the Present Work 
The unifying theme of the present work is an integration of the public health and political 
science perspectives on tobacco control so as to establish a more comprehensive framework of 
the underlying factors and elements interrelating tobacco use (outcome of prevalence) and 
tobacco control policy (outcome of policy adoption).  A substantial challenge in developing such 
a comprehensive framework, however, it is the complexity of the relationship between the two 
primary outcomes of interest – tobacco use (prevalence) and policy adoption.  There is both 
conceptual [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] and quantitative [Chaloupka & Saffer, 1992] evidence 
that the causal relationship between these two outcomes is neither unidirectional nor linear.   
“Factors other than government policy – especially shifts in social norms – 
have influenced that decline, but those norms have themselves been 
directly and indirectly influenced by government policies.  In short, tobacco 
consumption has become, in part, a political outcome….These respective 
tobacco-control regimes emerge as largely consistent with broader public 
attitudes about the importance of health and “well-being,” but we have less 
confidence about whether such attitudes influence the development of 
control legislation, or if the direction of causation is reversed.” 
From: [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004] 
That is, the relationships, including interdependencies and feedback mechanisms, are much 
more accurately characterized by a causal loop.     
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As a starting point, then, a comprehensive framework can initially be conceptualized as 
shown in Figure 1-2.  What remains is identifying the elements within this causal loop and 
establishing a better understanding of the nature of these causal loop associations between the 
social and political forces influencing tobacco control.  Thus, the conceptualization represented 
in Figure 1-2 will be re-visited at the end of the present work after an examination of the tobacco 
epidemic from both the public health and political science perspectives, and primary 
investigations into the nature of the associations between elements of this causal loop diagram.   
Broadly, then, the research questions posed by the present work are: 
R1:  What are the fundamental elements that are part of this causal loop diagram? 
R2:  What is the nature of the relationship between tobacco control policies and tobacco 
control policy regimes and tobacco-related population health?  
R3:  What are the research questions that arise from this causal loop model?   
While central-level tobacco use and tobacco control policy in the United States is the primary 
focus of the current work, it would be detrimental to exclude valuable information from state-
level and / or international (mostly industrialized countries) activities and studies, and thus these 
will be included as appropriate to increase both the rigor and generalizability of the current work.  
To address these research questions, the present study will follow the course of study outlined 
below.  
Government
(Policy System)
Population
(Social System)
Policy Process
Social Process
Figure 1-2. Initial Conceptualization of a Comprehensive Framework Illustrating a Causal-Loop Relationship
Between the Social and Political Factors of Tobacco Control 
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• The tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world will be described in overview.  
Specifically, two models that describe the tobacco epidemic model will be detailed.  
The current state of the tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policies in the United 
States will also be described, including both the current smoking prevalence as well 
as the current, relevant tobacco control policies.  
• The tobacco control literature will be reviewed from the public health perspective.  
This review will include: defining tobacco control policies and tobacco control policy 
regimes; the current understanding of “best practices”, or “evidence-based, in 
tobacco control policies; a description of ongoing coordinated, international efforts to 
combat the global tobacco epidemic and enact these “best practices” tobacco control 
policies; and the universal and emerging challenges facing tobacco control activities 
will be identified and briefly discussed. 
• The tobacco control literature will be reviewed from the policy science perspective.  
This review will include: how theories of the policy process, especially the agenda-
setting theories (Multiple Streams Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, and 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework), have been applied to explain tobacco control 
policy adoption and evolution; tobacco control policy adoption as explained by 
theories of policy learning, diffusion, transfer, conversion, and networks; the impact 
of social change, including elements of issue framing, on tobacco control policy 
adoption; the importance of policy type (typology) on tobacco control policy; the 
influence of institutions and institutionalism on tobacco control policy adoption; the 
role of scientific communities and experts in the development and adoption of 
tobacco control policy; and, finally, how the courts and legal proceedings have 
influenced on tobacco control policy.   
• An investigative policy history analysis will be conducted on the evolution of tobacco 
control policy in the United States.  This policy analysis will use Heclo’s ideas-
interests-institutions framework. [Heclo H. , 1994]   
• Two quantitative investigations will be presented, one based on the U.S. states and 
the second in the European Union, interrogating factors influencing tobacco control 
policy adoption.   
• Finally, the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1-2 will be re-visited.  The 
findings from the previous chapters, both the reviews of literature and the empirical 
chapters, will be integrated and the elements of the framework expanded and the 
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framework itself refined.  Subsequent research questions arising from this framework 
will be discussed. 
Acquiring a better understanding the elements of and relationship between the elements in 
this causal loop is important, from the political and policy science perspective, because of how 
this knowledge will broaden a generalizable understanding of the policy process in other policy 
areas.  From the public health perspective, acquiring a better understanding the elements of 
and relationship between the elements in this causal loop is important if efforts to combat the 
tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world are to become more efficient.  Of additional 
importance though not the direct purpose of the present work, if the lessons learned about 
combating the tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world are to be efficiently and effectively 
transferred to the developing world thereby averting much of the tobacco epidemic, which is the 
implicit focus of public health efforts such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
among others, a more precisely calibrated understanding of the factors causally affecting 
tobacco control policy adoption is needed.  
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC 
2.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to simply provide an overview of the tobacco epidemic in the 
industrialized world.  Two models that describe the tobacco epidemic model will be detailed.  
Additionally, the current state of the tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policies in the United 
States will be described, including both the current smoking prevalence as well as the current, 
relevant tobacco control policies.  
2.2 Models for Characterizing the Tobacco Epidemic in the Industrialized World  
 The tobacco epidemic in the industrialized world has evolved over the last 60+ years, 
during which time tobacco evolved from a widely used and little regulated product to one that is 
now used by less than a quarter of the American population and is highly regulated.  It is not 
surprising, then, that models developed to characterize the tobacco epidemic have developed 
stages based on chronologic demarcations in public health parameters and policy approaches.  
Two models based on the historic evolution of the tobacco epidemic in the United States and 
other industrialized countries, the Phases of Tobacco Control model and the Tobacco Epidemic 
Model, are described below.   
2.2.1 The Phases of Tobacco Control Model 
The Phases of Tobacco Control is a six-stage model that demarcates the tobacco 
epidemic based on the type of tobacco control policy regime. [Studlar, 2002], [Studlar, 2008]  
The six phases are outlined in Table 1-2.   
In Phase I, cigarettes in particular evolved rapidly from a niche product to a much more 
widely used consumer product due to the development of the automatic cigarette making 
machine and its subsequent widespread use by James B. Duke, the portable safety match, 
reliable packaging, and extensive advertising.  The U.S. federal government did not pursue any 
restrictive policies, rather deferring action, if any, to the states.  Tobacco products were the 
Table 2-1. Phases of Tobacco Control Model 
Phase Timeframe Title/Description
Phase I 1884-1914 Consolodation of the Cigarette Industry and Early Controversies
Phase II 1914-1950 Era of Good Feeling; Cigarettes Promoted by Governments
Phase III 1950-1964 The Gathering Storm of Health Concerns
Phase IV 1964-1984 Regulatory Hesitancy
Phase V 1984-2008 Tobacco as Social Menace
Phase VI The Future Neoprohibitionism versus harm reduction?
Source: [Studlar, 2008] 
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target of some temperance movements and some states enacted product bans, though most 
states did not implement any restrictive policies.   
The second phase, encompassing both World Wars, marked a substantial expansion in 
the use of cigarettes.  Cigarettes were regarded as the lesser of three moral sins available to 
troops (the other two being alcohol and prostitution) and so their use was promoted by the 
government.  Thus, cigarettes acquired a de facto image of being patriotic and socially 
acceptable.   
In the third phase, credible scientific evidence began to emerge that raised concern 
about deleterious health effects, particularly lung cancer.  Some popular media outlets began to 
cover these stories and additional research was supported by private organizations such as the 
American Cancer Society.  Despite the mounting evidence however, government policy 
remained lax, with few restrictions and some, but not substantial, taxation.   
In the fourth phase, a series of government-sponsored reports were published from 
multiple countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada, and culminated in the 1964 U.S. 
Surgeon General’s Report. [U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964] These 
reports served to review the scientific evidence linking tobacco to adverse health outcomes and 
then to affirm and endorse that tobacco caused various diseases and even mortality.  Thus, 
while the tobacco industry could discredit and so deflect the conclusions of individual studies, 
this task became much more difficult when it was the position of multiple governments that the 
cumulative evidence supported that tobacco caused cancer, among other diseases (though this 
did not deter them from so trying).  Despite these now-endorsed scientifically-based positions, 
government policy to reduce tobacco consumption and smoking prevalence remained largely 
impotent.  While some package labeling requirements were enacted, lax federal taxation 
policies (which were not increased between 1951 and 1982) resulted in cigarettes becoming 
more affordable over time.  It was not until the early 1980s and the publication of several 
exposé-type books and articles in the popular media that the course in both public opinion and 
policy finally began to change.   
In the fifth phase, scientific evidence regarding the health hazards of secondhand smoke 
as well as the addictiveness of nicotine changed the tone of the public and policy discourse.  
More, increasingly restrictive tobacco control policies were enacted and social attitudes toward 
both smoking and the tobacco industry became increasingly negative.  This phase also saw 
multiple, additional Surgeon General’s reports, increased legal activity directed against tobacco 
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companies, including that by the state Attorneys General, and the Master Settlement 
Agreement.   
The sixth and final phase, with yet to be determined activities and results, foreshadows 
the looming challenge for tobacco control activists pursuant to alternate and so called “reduced 
risk” tobacco products, products that tobacco companies are increasingly developing as 
smoking prevalence (and industry revenues) in industrialized countries continue to decline.    
2.2.2 The Tobacco Epidemic Model  
 The Tobacco Epidemic Model was proposed based on the study of the historic patterns 
in five key metrics of the tobacco epidemic (smoking prevalence, cigarette consumption, lung 
cancer rates, smoking attributable death, and tobacco control activities) in industrialized 
countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. [Lopez, Collishaw, & 
Piha, 1994]  The characteristics of each stage of the Tobacco Epidemic model, based on these 
five metrics, are described in Table 2-2.   
In Stage I, male and female smoking prevalence starts at very low levels but begins to rise 
rapidly though few, if any, tobacco related deaths are evident.  In Stage II, male smoking 
Stage I Stage II Stage III Stage IV
General 
Characterization
The beginning Expansion to w idespread use Beginning of both abatement and the 
"real" health consequences
Decline and denormalization
Prevalence (Male) Low  (<15%) in early stage but rising 
rapidly in atter stage
May reach 50%-80% Peaks in early stage (often at ≈60%) 
then declines in latter stage to ≈40%
Continues to decline, though slow ly
Prevalence (Female) Very low  due to traditional socio-
cultural factors (<5%-10%)
Lags male prevalence, but rises 
rapidly
Peaks in mid-stage (often at ≈35%-
45%) and then decreases to a period 
of long plateau; distribution of female 
smoking typically highly skew ed,w ith 
much higher prevalence in younger 
w omen (often ≈40%-50%) but much 
low er in older w omen (often <10%)
Continues to decline, though slow ly
Consumption Low  (<500 cigs/person/year) 1000-3000 cigs/person/year 3000-4000 cigs/person/year in males 
and 1000-2000 cigs/person/year in 
females
Not specified
Lung Cancer  Rate 
(Male)
Rare Rapid rise from 5/100,000 to 
50/100,000
Peak in latter stage at ≈110-
120/100,000
Rates decline, possibly as much as 
20% from their peak
Lung Cancer Rate 
(Female)
Rare ≈8-10/100,000 25-30/100,000 Not specified
Smoking Mortality 
(Male)
Not yet evident in early stage, but a 
few  cases emerging tow ard the latter 
stage
By latter stage, ≈10% of all-cause 
mortality is attributable to smoking
Rapid rise to latter stage w hen 25%-
30% of all-cause mortality is 
attributable to smoking
Peaks early in stage often at ≈30%-
35% of all-cause mortality, then 
progressively declines
Smoking Mortality 
(Female)
Not yet evident Still very low Low  but rising to latter stage w hen 
≈5% of all-cause mortality is 
attributable to smoking
Rises rapidly during this stage, though 
its eventual peak depends upon the 
peak in female smoking prevalence; 2-
3 decades into stage the eventual 
peak could reach ≈20%-25% of all-
cause mortality then begin to decline
Policy No control policies; agricultural 
support policies likely
Control activities sporadic and not w ell 
developed; lack of public and political 
support in part due to yet poorly 
understood risks
Conditions for control policies become 
more favorable; smoke free public 
places and transportation are among 
the first enacted but smoke-free 
w orkplaces not yet common; media 
important in enacting policies; smoking 
is becoming socially not as acceptable
Increased "demand" for legislation that 
provides for smoke-free personal 
environments; policies needed to 
support nicotine-addicted smokers 
w ho w ant to quit; social differences in 
smoking prevalence persist; continued 
changes in social climate need to be 
supported
Duration ≈20 years ≈20-30 years ≈20-30 years 20+ years
Table 2-2. The Tobacco Epidemic Model 
Source: [Lopez, Collishaw, & Piha, 1994] 
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prevalence rises rapidly and reaches levels far higher than that for females, reaching as high as 
50%-80% of the male population.  By the end of this stage, tobacco-attributable illness and 
deaths rise rapidly, accounting for 10% of all male deaths. Tobacco control activities in this 
stage are poorly developed, if present at all, and cessation and cessation support activities are 
uncommon.  In Stage III, the prevalence of male smoking peaks and then begins to decline.  
The prevalence of female smoking plateaus later in this stage and then also begins to decline, 
though smoking prevalence among younger women can reach levels close to that of males.  
Knowledge of smoking health hazards becomes more widespread, yet because of the latency 
between exposure and tobacco-related illness and death, during this stage the incidence and 
prevalence of tobacco-attributable disease continues to rise rapidly and peaks at 25%-30% of 
male mortality, with tobacco-proportionate mortality even higher in the middle-age groups.  
However, as knowledge of smoking hazards spreads, the receptivity for tobacco control 
increases and such activities become more organized and successful, and tobacco control 
policies become more comprehensive.  In Stage IV, the final stage of this epidemic model, 
smoking prevalence for both genders continues to decline at slow but similar rates, but 
smoking-attributable death rates remain high – 30%-35% of all female deaths and 40%-45% of 
male deaths in middle age.  While smoking-attributable male death rates begin to decline at the 
latter phases of this stage, smoking-attributable female death rates continue to rise, reflective of 
female smoking prevalence peaking after that for males.  An important focus of tobacco control 
activities becomes ensuring smoke-free environments, including smoke-free workplaces. 
Likewise, smoking cessation efforts expand, though socio-economic differences in smoking 
prevalence and smoking-attributable death continue. 
Both the Phases of Tobacco Control and the Tobacco Epidemic Model are natural history 
models based on the unfolding of the tobacco epidemic in the United States and Canada (the 
former model, which, since its original introduction, has been updated to include most 
industrialized democracies – see [Studlar, 2005], [Studlar, 2009]) and, more broadly, 
industrialized countries that included the United States (the latter model).  While the models 
have a slightly different emphasis as the basis for differentiating between the different phases of 
the epidemic, both models span the 100+ years over which the tobacco epidemic has unfolded 
in industrialized countries.  Additionally, both models have in common that tobacco control 
activities do not begin in earnest for at least 75 years after the beginning of the epidemic, a time 
after which male smoking prevalence in particular has already peaked, often at more than half 
of the male population, and thus when the consequences of decades of expanding and 
unchecked smoking and subsequent lung cancer and other morbidities and smoking-attributable 
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mortality are first being felt.  That is, in both models, tobacco control policies are enacted too 
late to avoid the substantial individual and societal costs attributable to tobacco use.  Avoiding 
these costs, then, is contingent upon earlier enactment of tobacco control policies to shorten the 
duration of model stages or avoid them altogether.  Thus, the success of policy diffusion efforts 
from the industrialized countries to developing countries, many of which are still early in the first 
stages of the tobacco epidemic will be paramount if the enormous societal costs of tobacco use 
in the developing countries, arguably those countries least able to absorb such avoidable costs, 
are to be evaded.   
2.3 The Tobacco Epidemic in the United States 
2.3.1 A Brief History of the Evolution of the Tobacco Epidemic in the United States 
The history of smoking prevalence in the United States is succinctly described in Figure 
2-1.  While smoking prevalence was not routinely and systematically prior to 1960 as it is now 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, it is estimated that smoking prevalence in 
the United States was at or near 50% during the middle of the 20th century.  As shown in Figure 
2-1, smoking prevalence has steadily declined though it is noted that neither the proportion of 
adult smokers or high school students reached the desired goals established as part of the 
C.D.C.’s Healthy People 2010 initiative.   
Figure 2-1. Trend in Prevalence of Current Smokers, Adults and High School Students, 1965-2007 
Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] 
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With regard to the development of tobacco control policies, the competing interests and 
balances in these policies have been those of the tobacco industry, including tobacco farmers 
and others in hospitality industries, who have wanted as few restrictions as possible on the sale 
and distribution of cigarettes and the indefinite continuation of agricultural supports for tobacco 
farmers and international trade promotion for their products, and public health advocates, who 
have wanted if not the outright ban of tobacco products, then substantial restrictions and 
regulations on the sale, advertisement, and distribution of tobacco products with the objective  
being the abatement of current and prevention of future societal harm and costs due to the 
consumption of tobacco.  In the U.S. federalist system, tobacco control policies have been part 
of the decision agenda and implemented at multiple venues, including at the federal-, state-, 
and local- levels.  Central-level policy making can be grouped into four categories: legislation 
Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010] 
Table 2-3. Federal Tobacco-Related Legislation, Enacted  
Year Title / Authority Summary 
1914  Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) Act of 1914 
• Provided provisions to prevent unfair and deceptive practices in commerce 
• Act used multiple times to curtail misleading advertising and claims, especially on cigarette 
packages 
• Amended 1938 
1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965 
• Required a package warning label (“Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health”; other text/warning prohibited) but not a warning label on advertisement 
• Required that the FTC and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to report to Congress 
annually on cigarette advertising and promotion practices and the health consequences of 
smoking, respectively
1969 Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969 
• Required new package warning (“Caution: The Surgeon General Has Determined that 
Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health”; other text/warning prohibited) 
• Prohibited cigarette advertising on television and radio 
• Preempted states and localities from regulating or prohibiting cigarette advertising or promotion 
for health reasons 
1973 Little Cigar Act of 1973 • Banned little cigar advertising on television and radio 
1984 Comprehensive Smoking 
Education Act of 1984 
• Required rotating health warning labels on cigarette packages and advertisements (“Surgeon 
General’s Warning: Smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may 
complicate pregnancy”; “Surgeon General’s Warning: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces 
serious risks to your health”; “Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking by pregnant women may 
result in fetal injury, premature birth, and low birth weight:; “Surgeon General’s Warning: 
Cigarette smoke contains carbon monoxide”) 
• Other text/warning labels were preempted 
• Required DHHS to submit biennial reports on smoking and health 
• Created the Federal Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health 
• Required cigarette manufacturers to provide a brand-specific, confidential list of ingredients
1984 Cigarette Safety Act of 1984 • Designed to determine the feasibility of developing cigarettes less likely to ignite upholstery and 
mattresses
1986 Comprehensive Smokeless 
Tobacco Health Education Act 
of 1986 
• Required three rotating health warning labels and advertisements (“This product may cause 
gum disease and tooth loss”; “This product may cause mouth cancer”; “This product is not a 
safe alternative to cigarettes” 
• Preempted other text/warning labels 
• Prohibited advertising on television and radio 
• Required DHHS and FTC to submit reports to Congress 
• Required companies to submit a brand-specific, confidential list of ingredients, including 
nicotine content 
• Required DHHS to conduct a public information campaign on the health hazards of smokeless 
tobacco
1987 Public Law 100-202 • Banned smoking on domestic air flights of 2 hours or less 
1989 Public Law 101-164 • Banned smoking on domestic air flights of 6 hours or less 
1992 Synar Amendment to the 
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and 
Mental Health Administration 
(ADAMHA) Reorganization Act 
of 1992 
• Required all states to adopt and enforce restrictions on sales of tobacco to minors 
1994 Pro-Children Act of 1994 • Required all federally-funded children’s services to become smoke-free 
2009 Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act of 
• Granted FDA authority to regulate tobacco products 
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affecting the sale, distribution, or marketing of tobacco products; regulation affecting the sale, 
distribution, or marketing of tobacco products; excise taxes on tobacco products; and policies 
and programs affecting tobacco farmers.  In Tables 2-3 & 2-4, seminal federal legislation 
affecting tobacco control is summarized.  In Table 2-3, it can be seen that while there was some 
limited-scope activity immediately following the 1964 Surgeon General’s report, it was not until 
1984 that the first comprehensive, federal legislation was enacted.  Further, it was not until 1992 
with the Synar Amendment that there was a central-level policy to restrict tobacco sales to 
children.   
The information in Table 2-4 summarizes central-level legislation that either could have 
been or was intentionally not extended to cigarettes or tobacco products resulting in “missed 
opportunities” for tobacco control.  This information thus represents governmental “non-
Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010] 
Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] 
Year Title / Authority Summary 
1967 FCC • Fairness Doctrine – attempted to ensure that coverage of controversial issues (in this case 
cigarettes) by a broadcast station was balances and fair; required that stations broadcasting 
cigarette commercials donate air time to anti-smoking messages 
1971 FCC • Under the Fairness Doctrine, anti-smoking messages ended when cigarette advertising ended 
1973 Civil Aeronautics Board • Required no-smoking sections on all commercial air flights 
1975 Department of Defense • Discontinued cigarettes in K- and C-rations for soldiers and sailors 
1987 DHHS • Established smoke-free environment at all facilities 
1992 FTC • First enforcement action against Pinkerton Tobacco (under Comprehensive Smokeless 
Tobacco Health Education Act) claiming that the Pinkerton logo appeared illegally during a 
television broadcast 
1993 WIC (Congress) • Smoke-free environment at all facilities 
1993 EPA • Classified environmental tobacco smoke as a Class A carcinogen (known human carcinogen) 
1994 OSHA • Announced proposed legislation to prohibit smoking in workplaces, except in designated, 
separately ventilated rooms 
1994 Department of Defense • Established smoke-free environment at all facilities 
1995 President Clinton / FDA • Announced planned regulations (by FDA) to restrict the sale, distribution, and marketing of 
tobacco products, especially to minors 
1997 President Clinton/Executive 
Order 
• Established smoke-free environments at all federal facilities 
Year Title / Authority Summary 
1960 Federal Hazardous 
Substances Labeling Act 
(FHSA) of 1960 
• Authorized FDA to regulate hazardous substances 
• In 1963, the FDA set forth its interpretation that tobacco did not meet criteria for “hazardous” 
under the Act, pending the 1964 Surgeon General’s report
1970 Controlled Substances Act of 
1970 
• Designed to prevent abuse of drugs, narcotics, and other addictive substances 
• Specifically excluded tobacco from the definition of a “controlled substance” 
1972 Consumer Product Safety Act 
of 1972 
• Transferred authority granted FDA under FHSA to the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) 
• Did not include tobacco or tobacco products in the definition of “consumer products” 
1976 Amendment to the Federal 
Hazardous Substances 
Labeling Act of 1960 
• In response to a petition from the American Public Health Association to the CPSC requesting a 
maximum level of tar in cigarettes (21 mg), Congress amended the FHSA to specifically 
exclude tobacco and tobacco products being considered a “hazardous substance” 
1976 Toxic Substances Act of 1976 • Act to “regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury 
to health or the environment” 
• Tobacco or tobacco products not included in definition of “chemical substances” 
Table 2-4. Federal Regulations Affecting Tobacco Products and Use 
Table 2-5. Federally-Enacted Legislation that was a “Missed Opportunity” for or Impeded Tobacco Control 
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decisions” in tobacco control policy. 
Central-level regulations governing specific aspects of tobacco products or use are 
summarized in Table 2-5.  Of particular note is the Fairness Doctrine by the F.C.C., used to both 
broadcast and then stop broadcasting anti-smoking messages on network television.  Also, it 
was not until 1997 that federal workplaces were declared to be smoke-free environments.   
 Federal excise taxes on cigarettes are summarized in Table 2-6.  Since 1950, federal 
excise taxes have undergone long periods of inactivity (no increases) resulting in extended time 
during which the real price of cigarettes fell.  There was a 30-year lag between the 1951 levy 
and the subsequent increase in 1982 and, since then, federal excise taxes on cigarette have 
been increased approximately every 10 years.  The most recent increase, signed by President 
Obama in 2009, raised the federal tax on a pack of cigarettes to $1.01.  Combined with the most 
recent information on state excise taxes [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010], 
which in 2009 averaged $1.37 per pack, the “average” combined federal and state excise tax for 
cigarettes in the United States is $2.38.  As a comparison, in 2009 the Canadian federal excise 
tax for cigarettes was CDN$1.70 per pack and an average provincial excise tax of CDN$3.43, 
resulting an “average” combined federal and provincial excise tax of CDN$5.13 per pack. [Tran, 
2009]   
Finally, federal agricultural support programs for tobacco farmers are summarized in 
Table 2-7.  A comprehensive set of support programs including price supports, crop insurance, 
and crop research and marketing began in 1933 under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 
[Womach, 2005]  With the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004, these agricultural 
support programs were discontinued and the Tobacco Transition Payment Program, created by 
the 2004 Act, was implemented to support tobacco farmers in transition to a free market system 
and will continue until 2014. [Farm Service Agency, 2005] 
Year Title / Authority Summary 
1951 Revenue Act of 1951 • 8¢ per pack (from 7¢ per pack with the justification to help fund the Korean War) 
1982 Tax Equity and  Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 
(P.L. 97-248) 
• Increased to 16¢ per pack 
1990 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 
1990 (P.L. 101-508) 
• Two-stage increase: on Jan. 1/1991 to 20¢ per pack and an additional 4¢ per pack increase (to 
a total of 24¢ per pack) on Jan 1/1993
1997 Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
(P.L. 105-33) 
• Two stage increase: on Jan 1/2000 by 10¢ per pack to 34¢ per pack and an additional 5¢ per 
pack to 39¢ per pack on Jan 1/2002
2009 Insurance Reauthorization Act 
of 2009 
• Increase to $1.01 (from 39¢) per pack 
• Revenue to be used to fund SCHIP health insurance program 
• Increase originally proposed (to 84¢ per pack) to fund the 2007 reauthorization of the SCHIP 
program, but the initial bill (HR 976) was vetoed by President Bush.  The final bill (P.L. 110-173) 
did re-authorize SCHIP but without an increase in tobacco taxes. 
Table 2-6. Federal Excise Taxes on Cigarettes 
Source: [Talley, 2002] 
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2.3.2 Current Estimates of Smoking Related Population Health 
Estimates from the C.D.C.’s National Health Interview Survey project that 20.6% of 
adults were current smokers in 2008. [Dube, Asman, Malarcher, & Carabollo, 2009]  As shown 
in Figure 2-2, more men than women smoke and a socioeconomic gradient is apparent, with 
substantially higher rates of smoking in those with fewer years of education compared to those 
with graduate education, and those below the poverty line compared to those above the poverty 
line.  In youth, results from the C.D.C.’s 2007 Youth Risk Behavior Survey estimated that 8.1% 
of high school students were current frequent smokers (smoked cigarettes on at least twenty of 
the last thirty days), 20.0% were current smokers (smoked cigarettes on at least one of the last 
thirty days), and 50.3% had ever tried cigarettes. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Office on Smoking and Health, Division of Adolescent and School Health, National Center for 
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion , 2008]  As previously shown in Figure 2-1 
Figure 2-2. Adult Smoking Prevalence, United States, 2008  
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Year Title / Authority Summary 
1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 
• Administered through the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency 
• In exchange for adhering to production quotas, tobacco farmers received price supports, 
nonrecourse loans through the Commodity Credit Corporation 
• Additional elements of support included federal crop insurance, tobacco inspection and grading, 
tobacco research, and extension education among others
2004 Fair and Equitable Tobacco 
Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
357) 
• Ended the tobacco support program (from the 1933 act) 
• Quota owners and farm operators compensated for capital losses and loss of future support 
(funded by a $9.6 billion over 10 years funded via an assessment on tobacco manufacturers 
and importers 
Table 2-7. Federal Agricultural Policies and Programs for Tobacco Farmers 
Source: [Womach, 2005], [Farm Service Agency, 2005] 
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and discussed in the Introduction, while adult smoking prevalence decreased from 42.4% in 
1964 to 19.8% in 2007 and smoking in high school students decreased to 20% in 2007, the rate 
of decline in smoking prevalence has slowed and neither rates are projected to reach the 
Healthy People 2010 goals of 12% and 16% respectively. [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009]    
 Current adult and youth smoking prevalence and adult smoking-attributable mortality 
rates for individual states are presented in Table 2-8. [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2010]  Utah (9.3%) followed by California (14.0%), New Jersey (14.8%), and 
Maryland (14.9%) had the lowest proportion of adult current smokers in 2008 while Missouri 
(25.0%), Kentucky (25.2%), Indiana (26.0%), and West Virginia (26.5%) has the highest 
proportion of adult current smokers with West Virginia having almost 3-times (2.85) the 
proportion of adult smokers compared to Utah.  Utah also had the lowest proportion of youth 
current smokers (6.5%) followed by Hawaii (6.8%), California (6.9%), and the District of 
Columbia (7.2%).  Oklahoma (13.3%), Arkansas (14.5%), Wyoming (14.9%), and Kentucky 
(15.9%) had the highest proportion of youth current smokers with Kentucky having almost 2.5-
times (2.45) the proportion of youth smokers compared to Utah.  Similarly, Utah also had the 
lowest smoking-attributable adult mortality rate (138.3 per 100,000) followed by Hawaii (167.6), 
Minnesota (215.1), and North Dakota (225.0) while the highest levels of smoking-attributable 
adult mortality rates were observed in Mississippi (333.6 per 100,000), Nevada (343.7), West 
Virginia (344.3), and Kentucky (370.6) with Kentucky again having almost 3-times (2.68) the 
smoking-attributable mortality rate of Utah. 
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 To provide comparison and international perspective, the smoking prevalence in 
O.E.C.D. countries, averaged over 2004-2006 where data were available, is shown in Figure 2-
3.  During this time period, only Sweden had a lower proportion of its population aged 15+ years 
who smoked daily – 15.5% in Sweden compared to 16.9% in the United States.  Six of twenty-
seven countries reported that less than 20% of their population were daily smokers, and sixteen 
of twenty-seven reported that less than 25% of their population were daily smokers.  
State Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, 2008 
Youth Smoking 
Prevalence, 2006-2007 
Adult Smoking-Attributable 
Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 
Alabama 22.1 12.0 317.5 
Alaska 21.5 9.7 270.4 
Arizona 15.9 10.6 247.4 
Arkansas 22.3 14.5 323.7 
California 14.0 6.9 235.0 
Colorado 17.6 10.3 237.6 
Connecticut 15.9 9.8 238.3 
Delaware 17.8 9.3 280.9 
District of Columbia 16.2 7.2 249.9 
Florida 17.5 9.5 258.8 
Georgia 19.5 10.0 299.4 
Hawaii 15.4 6.8 167.6 
Idaho 16.9 8.9 237.4 
Illinois 21.3 10.2 263.1 
Indiana 26.0 11.8 308.9 
Iowa 18.8 11.7 248.0 
Kansas 17.9 11.9 262.7 
Kentucky 25.2 15.9 370.6 
Louisiana 20.5 11.0 299.8 
Maine 18.2 11.4 289.8 
Maryland 14.9 8.8 261.9 
Massachusetts 16.1 9.5 249.4 
Michigan 20.5 10.7 281.9 
Minnesota 17.6 11.7 215.1 
Mississippi 22.7 9.4 333.6 
Missouri 25.0 11.8 307.8 
Montana 18.5 12.2 276.0 
Nebraska 18.4 11.0 235.8 
Nevada 22.2 10.2 343.7 
New Hampshire 17.1 9.8 272.4 
New Jersey 14.8 9.1 239.5 
New Mexico 19.4 11.8 234.0 
New York 16.8 8.2 246.1 
North Carolina 20.9 10.8 298.4 
North Dakota 18.1 12.4 225.6 
Ohio 20.1 12.9 299.1 
Oklahoma 24.7 13.3 332.1 
Oregon 16.3 9.7 263.3 
Pennsylvania 21.3 11.8 259.0 
Rhode Island 17.4 11.3 266.8 
South Carolina 20.0 11.8 293.4 
South Dakota 17.5 12.5 239.2 
Tennessee 23.1 13.0 325.0 
Texas 18.5 9.5 273.1 
Utah 9.3 6.5 138.3 
Vermont 16.8 11.3 247.5 
Virginia 16.4 11.0 267.0 
Washington 15.7 9.7 261.0 
West Virginia 26.5 12.6 344.3 
Wisconsin 19.9 12.2 244.2 
Wyoming 19.4 14.9 283.1 
Table 2-8. State-Specific Smoking Prevalence and Smoking-Attributable  
Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010] 
 [23] 
 
2.3.3 Current Domestic Policy 
There are three components to the current U.S. tobacco control policy at the central-
level: taxation, enacted legislation, and bureaucratic infrastructure.   
2.3.3.1 Central-Level Taxation 
As part of Children’s Health Insurance Program (C.H.I.P.) Reauthorization Act of 2009 
(Public Law No. 111-3), the central-level tobacco excise tax was raised to $1.01, a $0.62 
increase from the previous excise tax of $0.39.  The excise-tax increase was included as a 
revenue provision of the bill, meaning that the excise tax was “paying for” the CHIP 
reauthorization and program expansion.  Per the provisions in the Bill, the excise tax covers 
cigars, cigarettes, cigarette papers and tubes, smokeless tobacco, pipe tobacco, roll-your-own 
tobacco, and also taxes floor stocks of tobacco products.  The Bill, and tax increase, was 
effective April 1, 2009. 
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2.3.3.2  Legislation 
The current central-level tobacco control legislation is the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (Public Law No. 111-31).  The Act represents the most 
comprehensive single piece of tobacco control legislation enacted at the central-level in the 
United States and creates a new regulatory scheme for tobacco products within the F.D.A.; 
thus, this Act represents the culmination of regulatory and legislative attempts begun in 1995 
(and the subsequent 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule).  Very similar versions of this Act were introduced 
in the 108th Congress, passed by the Senate in 2004, and passed by the House in 2008. 
[Redhead & Burrows, 2009]  The current Act, sponsored by Rep. Waxman (D-CA), was passed 
by the House on April 2, 2009 (H.R. 1256; H.Rept. 111-58, part 1 and 2), by the Senate on May 
20, 2009 (S. 982), and signed by President Obama on June 22, 2009. [Redhead & Burrows, 
2009], [Congressional Research Service, 2009]  
A central function of this Act was to amend the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to 
provide the Secretary of Health and Human Services, through the F.D.A., the jurisdiction and 
responsibility to regulate tobacco products, which the F.D.A. originally asserted in 1996 but was 
overturned by the Supreme Court in F.D.A. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.  The key 
provisions of the Act are summarized in Table 2-9.  While the F.D.A. is prohibited from banning 
nicotine in tobacco products or the products themselves, they were authorized with a broad 
scope of authority to develop regulations for the manufacture, distribution, sale, and marketing 
of tobacco products subject to the consideration of both individual and population health.  
Components of the Act were implemented in September 2009 and, as required in the Act, the 
F.D.A. issued “Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents” which became effective on June 22, 2010. [U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, 2010]  However, this 2010 Final Rule did not include the 
restrictions on outdoor advertising included in the 1996 Final Rule in order to permit additional 
study and public comment in light of the Supreme Court Ruling in Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. 
Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596. [U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2010]  As was anticipated, this Act has already been challenged in court 
(Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
et al. Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL). 
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Finally, in June 2010 the F.D.A. issued a review reporting on the first year of activities 
pursuant to the implementation of the Act in June 2009.  Key among these activities was the 
creation of the National Center for Tobacco Products which identifies its mission as the 
Topic Description
Allowable Scope of Activity Secretary/FDA may: 
• Restrict sale or distribution of products to protect public health 
• Restrict advertising and promotion consistent with the First Amendment 
• Alter label requirements to promote better understanding of risk of use of tobacco products 
• Adopt product standards that reduce the yield of nicotine and reduce or eliminate other product components 
• Conduct product testing 
• Can recall or ban a product that poses unreasonable risk of substantial harm 
Disallowed Scope of Activity Secretary/FDA may not: 
• Ban cigarettes/tobacco products 
• Require reduction of nicotine content to zero 
• Require written or oral prescription to obtain products 
• Prohibit face-to-face sales in retail outlets 
• Establish a minimum purchase age older than 18 years 
• Publicly disclose trade secrets or other confidential information 
Infrastructure Secretary/FDA must create: 
• Center for Tobacco Products to implement Act 
• Technical support office for small manufacturers 
• Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee 
• Expert Panel 
Preemption • Federal agencies, states, political subdivisions, Indian tribes etc., may enact additional or stricter measures, 
including excise taxes, except for those relating to product manufacturing standards, adulteration and labeling, 
and modified risk tobacco products 
• States and localities can impose specific bans on the time, place, or manner of advertising or promotion but not 
the content of such advertisements 
Product and Manufacturing 
Standards 
Requires that tobacco manufacturers: 
• Submit a list of ingredients (and quantity) for each product  
• Submit the form and content of nicotine in each product 
• Submit a list of “harmful constituents” (as defined by the Secretary/FDA) in each product 
• Submit all documents that relate to health, toxicologic, physiologic, or behavioral effects of tobacco products, 
additives, or components 
• Register annually with the Secretary/FDA 
• Comply with manufacturing standards, including uniform standard for ingredients, to be established by the 
Secretary/FDA 
• Foreign/tobacco importers must register with the Secretary/FDA and reasonably comply with requirements to 
establish that product content and manufacture conform with standards to be set by the Secretary/FDA 
New Products • Pre-market approval for all new products 
• The Secretary/FDA must develop a pre-market approval process that includes health information 
Amendment of Previous Acts • Amends the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act such that labeling requirements are those developed 
by the Secretary/FDA 
• Amends the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Act of 1986 such that labeling requirements for 
smokeless tobacco products are the same as those developed by the Secretary/FDA for cigarettes 
Re-issue of 1996 FDA Final 
Rule 
The Secretary/FDA is required to re-issue the Final Rule as issued by the FDA in 1996 with some minor revisions.  The 
rule requires: 
• Ban on sales of tobacco products to those <18 years of age 
• Ban on packs with <20 cigarettes 
• Significant limitations on sales from vending machines or self-service displays 
• Bans free samples of cigarettes; limits distribution of smokeless tobacco 
• Bans brand-name sponsorship for sporting, musical, or cultural events or sponsorship of any team or group 
participating therein 
• Bans gifts of cigarettes/tobacco products or gifts for buying cigarettes/tobacco products 
• Bans use of music in audio ads (i.e., words only) 
• Bans sale or distribution of branded non-tobacco products (e.g., hats, t-shirts) 
• Restricts advertising, bans outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of schools 
Modified Risk Tobacco Products • A modified risk product may be commercially marketed if: 1) it significantly reduces tobacco-related harm for 
tobacco users; and 2) have population benefits for both smokers and non-smokers when evaluated as actually 
used by consumers 
• A product not labeled or marketed as a modified risk product may be sold for five years if: 1) it would promote 
public health; and 2) the product is expected to benefit the health of the population 
• Post-market surveillance is to be conducted on all reduced risk products with reports annually 
Specific Requirements -- 
Additives 
• All flavorings, natural or artificial, such as vanilla, clove, orange etc., are banned with the exception of menthol  
Required Action – Further Study 
Mandated 
• Expert Panel shall study health implications of raising minimum age to purchase tobacco products 
• Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee shall study and report on: 1) the effects of altering nicotine 
content including whether there is a point at which dependence / addiction is not induced;  2) the health impact on 
the use of menthol; 3) the nature and health impact of dissolvable tobacco products 
Required Action – Public 
Disclosure 
• The Secretary/FDA must publish annually a list of harmful or potentially harmful products in each tobacco product 
Miscellaneous Stipulations • Tobacco manufacturers may not in any way use FDA regulation to construe that tobacco products are safe 
• Secretary/FDA required to issue regulations mandating use of color graphic health warning labels 
Table 2-9. Key Provisions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
Source: [Congressional Research Service, 2009] 
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protection of “public health by issuing and enforcing tobacco product regulations and educating 
the public about the dangers of tobacco use”. [U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010]  
Additional key activities in the first year of F.D.A. jurisdiction in tobacco control are listed in 
Table 2-10 and include the issuance of multiple rules and final guidance as well as the 
development of the infrastructure and networks the F.D.A. will need to fully implement all 
provisions of the 2009 Act.    
2.3.3.3 The Tobacco Control Bureaucracy – Structural Support for Tobacco Control  
With the implementation of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of 
2009, the United States now has three central-level formal, bureaucratic agencies responsible 
for tobacco control and prevention policies.  The F.D.A., through the National Center for 
Tobacco Products, is responsible for developing, forwarding, and enforcing, through provisions 
Table 2-10. Key Activities in the Inaugural Year of F.D.A. Tobacco Regulation 
Source: [U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010]
Area Activities
Protecting Kids • Announced and enforced ban on flavored cigarettes (9/2009) 
• Re-issued 1996 Final Rule (3/2010).  Provisions included: 
• National minimum age of 18 to purchase tobacco products 
• Banned sales of packs <20 cigarettes 
• Banned distribution of free samples of tobacco products 
• Banned event sponsorship 
• Banned vending machine sales in all but adult-only facilities
Establishing a Science 
Base 
• Issued guidance for industry on registration and product listing for owners and operators of 
domestic tobacco establishments (11/2009) 
• Issued guidance for industry on listing of ingredients for tobacco products (11/2009) 
• Established Tobacco Products Scientific Advistory Committee (TPSAC) (11/2009) with first 
meeting in 3/2010.  Members of the TPSAC are: JM Samet (Chair) and CL Stark (Acting 
Designated Federal Official), NL Benowitz, MS Clanton, DK Hatsukami, JD Heck, PN 
Henderson, GN Connolly, KL DeLeeuw, LA Hamm Jr., JE Henningfield, JH Lauterbach, M 
Wakefield 
• Appointed Cpt. D Ashley as Director, Office of Science (6/2010)
Regulating Tobacco 
Products 
• Announced ban on flavored and candy-like tobacco products (9/2009). Warning letters issued to 
multiple companies in violation of ban. 
• Issued final guidance regarding requirements for submission of product ingredients and 
additives 
• Issued final guidance regarding registration requirements for tobacco product manufacturers 
and tobacco products 
• Issued final guidance regarding requirement that manufacturers and importers submit 
documents relating to health, toxicological, behavioral, or physiologic effects of current or future 
tobacco products, and their contents (ingredients, components, additives of products and 
smoke) 
• Issued letters to industry requesting information about  perception and use of dissolvable 
tobacco products 
• Issued draft guidance regarding enforcement for regulations restricting sale and distribution of 
tobacco products to youth. Regulation became enforceable on 6/22/.2009. 
• Began review of industry plans to comply with rotating package warning labels for smokeless 
tobacco products. Regulation that package and advertising warning labels rotate quarterly 
became enforceable on 6/22//2009. 
• Issued guidance on use of the terms “light”, “mild”, “low” etc 
• Issued guidance to solicit public comment and feedback on how FDA will develop and publish 
information on harmful or potentially harmful constituents in tobacco products 
Communication 
Stakeholders 
• Held seven listening sessions in fall 2009 
• Created Center website 
• Established small business office 
• Launched call center for consumers and stakeholders 
• Communication with tobacco journalists and publication to begin educating about Tobacco 
Control Act and FDA’s public health role 
• Opened multiple public dockets to allow public to provide information, research, ideas, feedback 
etc. 
• Presented at multiple public health, tobacco control, scientific, retailer, and tobacco industry 
conferences 
• Began retailer education campaign about advertising and sales to youth 
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in the Family Smoking Act, the manufacture, distribution, sale, and marketing of tobacco 
products.  The C.D.C., through the Office for Smoking and Health, is responsible for tobacco 
prevention and control.  The smaller Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health 
coordinates tobacco education and control activities within and between central-, state-, and 
local-level government and private agencies 
The Office for Smoking and Health, originally established in 1965, has two principle 
programmatic efforts: the National Tobacco Control Program and global tobacco control 
programs whose main collaborative effort, the Global Tobacco Surveillance System (G.T.S.S.), 
was established to facilitate the development of standardized and internationally comparative 
surveillance data on variety of tobacco issues (e.g., tobacco use, exposure to secondhand 
smoke, etc.).  These programmatic foci are supported by four units and three branches within 
the Office: Global Tobacco Control Unit; Resource Management Unit; Policy, Planning, and 
Coordination Unit which also includes a Planning Team and a Senior Policy Advisor; Health 
Communications Branch which also includes an Information Resources, Development and 
Implementation, and a Media team; Epidemiology Branch which includes an Evaluation, 
Surveillance, Research, and Data Analysis and Survey Support team; and a Program Services 
Branch which includes two program support teams. [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009]   
The National Tobacco Control Program (N.T.C.P.), created in 1999, coordinates, 
supports, and funds national and state-level prevention and control efforts.  The N.T.C.P. 
identifies the following as its goals, components, and activity areas:  
Goals: 
1. Eliminate exposure to secondhand smoke 
2. Promote quitting among adults and youth 
3. Prevent initiation among youth 
4. Identify and eliminate disparities among population groups 
Components: 
1. Population-based community interventions 
2. Counter-marketing 
3. Program policy/regulation 
4. Surveillance and evaluation 
Activity areas: 
1. Clean indoor air policy 
2. Tobacco use treatment 
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3. Access by minors 
4. Advertising and promotion 
5. Economic approaches (excise taxes) 
6. Mass media and counter-advertising 
7. Synergistic effects (changing of social norms) 
 
From: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010], [Wisotzky, 
Albuquerque, Pechacek, & Park, 2004] 
Funding for state-level tobacco control programs is provided from the National Center for 
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion at the C.D.C. to the reciprocal offices 
mirrored in state departments or bureaus for public health.  The N.T.C.P. thus functions to 
coordinate and support the activities of fifty state-level tobacco prevention and control programs, 
as well as programs in the District of Columbia, eight other U.S. territories and jurisdictions, and 
seven tribal support centers. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]  Additionally, 
the N.T.C.P. funds six national-level networks intended to target specific minority or at-risk 
communities.  Currently, the funded national networks focus on African-Americans, American 
Indians/Alaska Natives, Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics/Latinos, 
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender communities, and low socioeconomic groups and include: 
APPEAL PROMISE Network (Asian Pacific Partners for Empowerment, Advocacy, and 
Leadership); National African American Tobacco Prevention Network; National Latino Tobacco 
Control Network; The National LGBT Tobacco Control Network; Break Free Alliance; and the 
National Native Commercial Tobacco Abuse Prevention Network. [National Networks for 
Tobacco Control and Prevention]   
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The N.T.C.P. utilizes a community-based model with the goal of producing lasting 
changes in social norms for tobacco by implementing economic, regulatory, and comprehensive 
evidence-based programs projected to have the largest population impact. [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2007]  The foundation for the implementation of the N.T.C.P.’s 
community-based model is the development and support of networks of coalitions comprised, in 
turn, of myriad community-based organizations. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2007]  The benefits of a coalition structure are multifold.  Importantly, non-governmental, 
community-based organizations can engage in activities, particularly policy advocacy and 
lobbying, not allowable by government agencies.  Additional benefits of a coalition infrastructure 
include: representation of community diversity; synergy of resources and efforts; expansion of 
public support to sustain tobacco control programs; diversity in membership to propagate and 
amplify community mobilization; policy advocacy; changing social norms by advocating for and 
promoting pro-health values; membership diversity implies broad community representation and 
thus imparts credibility leading to community buy-in; broad and diverse coalition membership 
reduces duplication of effort within a community and promotes collaboration and leveraging of 
Figure 2-4. Schematic Representation of the National Tobacco Control Program 
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talents and capital, both economic and human; and more effectual efforts to counter-act tobacco 
industry practices. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007]  Thus, the N.T.C.P. is 
hierarchical in nature with the Office for Smoking and Health and the N.T.C.P. providing 
strategic, organizational, technical, and scientific support as well as funding to state agencies.  
The state agencies subsequently function similarly for the coalitions of community-based 
organizations.  This structure, including the functions of each organization level, is depicted in 
Figure 2-4.  The community-based model of coalitions thus results in overlapping networks 
community-based organizations that collaborate and coordinate resources to implement the 
N.T.C.P. recommended interventions, programs, and policies.     
 Finally, the last and smallest component of the central-level tobacco control and 
prevention structure is the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health.  Created as part of 
the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, the Committee consists of representatives 
from multiple agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services as well as other 
central-level government departments (full membership of the Committee is specified in Table 
2-11). [Centers for Diseaes Control and Prevention, 2009]  The Interagency Committee serves 
to advise the Secretary for Health and Human Services on the coordination of tobacco research 
and educational programs, and other tobacco-related activities with other central-, state-, and 
local-level government and private agencies. [Centers for Diseaes Control and Prevention, 
2009]  Specifically, the Committee is accountable to the Secretary for Health and Human 
Services through the Director of the C.D.C. and is required report biennially to Congress on 
educational efforts by both central-level government and private agencies to improve public 
knowledge about the tobacco-related health effects and the effects of such efforts (i.e., the 
public’s level of knowledge thereof). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007]  
• Members appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services from institutes and 
agencies deemed appropriate by the Secretary and may include: 
• National Cancer Institute 
• National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
• National Institute for Child Health and Human Development 
• National Institute on Drug Abuse 
• Health Resources and Services Administration 
• Department of Veterans Affairs 
• Veterans Health Administration 
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
• At least one member from: 
• Federal Trade Commission 
• Department of Education 
• Department of Labor 
• Any other Federal agency selected by the Secretary 
• Five members from physicians and scientists from private entities engaged in tobacco-related health effects
educational efforts 
• Members serve for four-year overlapping terms with a Chair appointed by the Secretary
Source: (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007) 
Table 2-11. Membership of the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health 
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2.3.3.4 State-Level Taxation and Legislation 
In addition to central-level policies, states also establish tobacco control policies which 
are summarized in Table 2-12. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]  As of 
December 31, 2009, 58.8% of states had smoke-free workplace laws, 54.9% had smoke-free 
restaurant statutes, and 43.1% required smoke-free bars.  In 2007, 49.0% of state Medicaid 
programs covered pharmaceutical nicotine replacement therapy for all enrollees and another 
25.5% of states covered such therapies for some enrollees; 17.6% of states did not cover any 
pharmaceutical nicotine replacement therapy.  In 2009, approximately 25% of states had some 
form of preemption for advertising and promotion, meaning that local jurisdictions were not 
allowed to enact stricter regulations than those enacted at the state-level.  Also, by December 
31, 2009, almost half – 49.0% -- of states had minimum price laws.  At the same point in time, 
the average state excise tax was $1.33±$0.12 (SE), ranging from $0.07 in South Carolina to 
$3.46 in Rhode Island; 25% of states had excise taxes equal to or in excess of $2.00.  Finally, 
using the recommended expenditures established for each state by the C.D.C., total actual 
expenditures on tobacco control programs were estimated as percent of recommended 
expenditures.  In 2007, the average percent of recommended expenditures was 25.5%±3.21% 
(SE), ranging from 1.1% of recommended expenditures in Tennessee to 85.5% of 
recommended expenditures in Maine.  Fourteen states spent less than 10% of recommended 
levels with the lowest spending states being Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, Michigan, Texas.  
Only seven states spent in excess of 50% of recommended levels with the highest spending 
states being Hawaii, Alaska, Wyoming, Delaware, and Maine.  
 [32] 
 
Data Source: [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]
Table 2-12. Summary of State-Level Tobacco Excise Tax and Enacted Tobacco-Control Legislation 
State
100% Smoke-Free 
Indoor Air Laws, 
12/21/2009 
(Worksites)
100% Smoke-Free 
Indoor Air Laws, 
12/21/2009 
(Restaurants)
Medicaid FFS 
Coverage for 
Tobacco 
Dependence 
Treatments, 2007 
(Medications)
Medicaid FFS 
Coverage for 
Tobacco 
Dependence 
Treatments, 2007 
(Counseling)
Prevalence of 
Households with No-
Smoking Rules, 
2006-2007 (%)
Tobacoo Counter-
Marketing Media 
Intensity, per 
Quarter, 2008 
(TRPs - Youth)
Tobacoo Counter-
Marketing Media 
Intensity, per 
Quarter, 2008 
(GRPs - Adult 
Households)
Local Advertising 
and Promotion Laws 
Allowed, 12/31/2009 
(Display)
Local Advertising 
and Promotion Laws 
Allowed, 12/31/2009 
(Promotion)
State Cigarette 
Excise Tax per 
Pack, 12.31/2009
Percentage of 
Recommended 
Tobacco Control 
Investment, 2007
Minimum Price 
Law for 
Cigarettes, 
12/31/2009
Alabama No No No No 73.8 0 0 Yes Yes 0.425 3.7 No
Alaska No No Some All 79.5 Yes Yes 2 70.7 Yes
Arizona Yes Yes No Pregnant Only 82.6 23 111 Yes Yes 2 38.2 No
Arkansas Yes No Some All 65.1 49 52 Yes Yes 1.15 44.3 Yes
California No No All No 87.6 138 670 Yes Yes 0.87 19.2 No
Colorado Yes Yes All Pregnant Only 82.6 118 344 Yes Yes 0.84 48.7 No
Connecticut No No No No 79.5 50 59 Yes Yes 3 7 Yes
Delaware Yes Yes All No 77.5 Yes Yes 1.6 79.4 Yes
District of Columbia Yes Yes All No 73.7 20 118 Yes Yes 2.5 10 Yes
Florida Yes Yes Some No 84 321 1183 Yes Yes 1.339 3.1 No
Georgia No No No No 79.2 0 0 Yes Yes 0.37 2.7 No
Hawaii Yes Yes All No 83.7 134 1003 Yes Yes 2.6 66.6 No
Idaho No Yes All No 87.3 14 99 Yes Yes 0.57 12.8 No
Illinois Yes Yes All No 73.8 14 146 Yes Yes 0.98 6.3 No
Indiana No No All All 66.2 266 722 No No 0.995 15.3 Yes
Iowa Yes Yes Some Pregnant Only 72.4 249 969 Yes Yes 1.36 21 Yes
Kansas No No Some No 75.5 29 138 Yes Yes 0.79 7.5 No
Kentucky No No No Pregnant Only 60.9 0.5 1 No No 0.6 6 Yes
Louisiana Yes Yes Some No 74.7 62 157 Yes No 0.36 17.2 Yes
Maine Yes Yes Some All 75.8 1 11 Yes Yes 2 85.5 No
Maryland Yes Yes Some All 81.5 22 171 Yes Yes 2 32.2 Yes
Massachusetts Yes Yes All All 80.3 76 433 Yes Yes 2.51 11.4 Yes
Michigan No No Some All 70.9 37 151 No Yes 2 2.1 No
Minnesota Yes Yes All All 79.3 15 67 Yes Yes 1.23 39.2 Yes
Mississippi No No All Pregnant Only 72.7 0 0 No No 0.68 1.4 Yes
Missouri No No No No 69.5 2 8 Yes Yes 0.17 1.7 No
Montana Yes Yes All No 79.4 Yes Yes 1.7 57.3 Yes
Nebraska Yes Yes No No 76.7 106 631 Yes Yes 0.64 20.3 Yes
Nevada Yes Yes All No 81.7 4 18 No No 0.8 14.6 No
New Hampshire No Yes All Pregnant Only 80.7 Yes Yes 1.78 5.9 No
New Jersey Yes Yes All No 82 Yes Yes 2.7 10.4 Yes
New Mexico Yes Yes All All 76.7 80 253 Yes Yes 0.91 38.9 No
New York Yes Yes Some No 75.3 395 2389 Yes Yes 2.75 34.8 Yes
North Carolina No No All No 73.1 308 549 No No 0.45 16 No
North Dakota Yes No Some All 74.8 0 0 Yes Yes 0.44 47.1 No
Ohio Yes Yes All No 66.7 11 26 Yes Yes 1.25 32.1 Yes
Oklahoma No No All All 71 2 37 No No 1.03 25.8 Yes
Oregon Yes Yes All All 84.8 60 363 Yes Yes 1.18 11.1 No
Pennsylvania Yes No All All 71.5 93 556 Yes Yes 1.6 20.5 Yes
Rhode Island Yes Yes No All 77.9 Yes Yes 3.46 14.6 Yes
South Carolina No No All No 75 6 105 No No 0.07 5.4 No
South Dakota Yes Yes Some No 76.7 23 218 Yes No 1.53 15.7 Yes
Tennessee Yes No No No 68.9 0 1 No No 0.62 1.1 Yes
Texas No No Some No 81.3 0 0.5 Yes Yes 1.41 2.3 No
Utah Yes Yes All Pregnant Only 90.6 1070 4766 No No 0.695 35.6 No
Vermont Yes Yes All No 75.4 Yes Yes 2.24 61.8 No
Virginia No No All Pregnant Only 79.1 65 135 Yes Yes 0.3 14.1 No
Washington Yes Yes Pregnant Only Pregnant Only 87 255 575 Yes No 2.025 42.6 Yes
West Virginia No No Pregnant Only All 62.6 68 289 No Yes 0.55 24.1 No
Wisconsin No No Pregnant Only All 72.5 30 119 No No 2 17.8 Yes
Wyoming No No Pregnant Only All 70.2 Yes Yes 0.6 78.2 No
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE  
3.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the existing, scientific tobacco 
control literature from the public health perspective.  This review will include: defining tobacco 
control policies and tobacco control policy regimes; the current understanding of “best 
practices”, or “evidence-based, in tobacco control policies; a description of ongoing coordinated, 
international efforts to combat the global tobacco epidemic and enact these “best practices” 
tobacco control policies; and the universal and emerging challenges facing tobacco control 
activities will be identified and briefly discussed. 
3.2 Tobacco Control Policy Best Practices  
In both the natural history models discussed in Chapter 2, the Phases of Tobacco Control 
Model and the Tobacco Epidemic Model, tobacco control policies do not emerge until four–five 
decades after the beginning of the epidemic when the health and economic effects of tobacco 
use become patent after the prolonged latency period between [cumulative] tobacco exposure 
and disease.  Further, because of this latency between exposure and the onset of tobacco-
related disease, the delay of policy implementation until after the entrenchment of addiction to 
tobacco use results, as described in the Tobacco Epidemic Model, in sustained and substantial 
adverse societal costs despite gradual, decreasing smoking prevalence.  This section describes 
the contemporary understanding of evidence-based tobacco control policy, the evidence base 
for which has been predominantly established in industrialized countries, thus defining the terms 
“comprehensive tobacco control policy” and “tobacco control policy regime”.   
3.2.1 Individual Policy Instruments 
The evidence base for tobacco control policies has accumulated over the past 3-plus 
decades from ecologic studies, natural experiments, as well as controlled or quasi-experimental 
intervention trials at the individual, community, and population level.  Substantiation for this 
substantial body of evidence is two-fold: the Cochrane Library and population-based simulation 
models.   
The Cochrane Library is a collection of six different databases that functions as a 
repository for peer-reviewed systematic reviews based on the international evidence for myriad 
health topics.  A keyword search on “tobacco” in the Cochrane library yields more than 2,200 
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entries (53 entries in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 35 reviews of other types, 
2,037 entries in the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, 36 entries in the Cochrane 
Methodology Register, 13 entries in the Health Technology Assessment Database, and 94 
entries in the National Health Service (U.K.) Economic Evaluation Database), which 
cumulatively summarize and integrate the evidence from many thousand individual studies 
conducted in countries and for time periods according to criteria for that review. (Search 
conducted on 6/6/2010 at [The Cochrane Collaboration])   
Additionally, a sufficient body of scientific knowledge on the relative effectiveness of 
tobacco control policies is available to permit the development of at least two formal simulation 
models.  SimSmoke, developed by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation with David 
T. Levy, Ph.D. as the Senior Scientist, was originally developed with evidence from trials and 
studies conducted in the United States but more recently has been adapted for international 
application. [Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation], [Levy, Cho, Kim, Park, Suh, & Kam, 
2010]  SimSmoke uses smoking rates and smoking-attributable deaths as its primary endpoints 
and permits the projection of policy effectiveness (i.e., reduction in smoking rates) based upon 
characteristics of the population to whom the policy will be applied (e.g., baseline smoking rates, 
and relative proportions of gender, age, and ethnicity) as well as characteristics of the policy 
itself (e.g., duration of advertising campaign, magnitude of tax increase, etc.).  An alternate 
simulation model, the Tobacco Policy Model with Tammy O. Tengs, Sc.D. as the principal 
developer, uses quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as the primary endpoint.  The Tobacco 
Policy Model uses U.S. census-based data (and demographic projections), stratified by both 
age and gender, to model the effects of reductions in smoking initiation, increases in cessation, 
and reductions in relapse in different age groups and genders on QALYs gained over a 
specified time period. [Tengs, Osgood, & Lin, 2001]  Because of the use of QALYs as the 
specified endpoint, projections from this model are necessarily pre-disposed to emphasize the 
importance of prevention of initiation in younger age-groups.   
Tobacco control policies have been variously categorized, but are generally considered 
to have three principal objectives:   
• Preventing smoking initiation in youth and adolescents and smoking 
entrenchment in young adults.  Because the vast majority of smokers begin 
smoking as teenagers and the entrenchment of the habit and addiction to 
nicotine occurs between the ages of 18-24 years, policies that inhibit and 
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otherwise prevent experimentation with smoking during high school are 
paramount, though success of these policies will not noticeably impact population 
smoking prevalence for as long as 15 years (smaller proportion of the larger 
population). 
• Promoting smoking cessation in current smokers.  Most studies suggest that 
approximately 75% of current smokers want to quit and, for most smokers, 
multiple quit attempts are needed before successful cessation is achieved 
(smokers report an average of 4.1 quit attempts and former smokers report an 
average of 6.1 quit attempts). [Jones, J M; Gallup, Inc., 2006]  Thus, providing 
access to behavioral and pharmacologic-based efficacious cessation support 
treatments is key to averting the associated health and economic consequences 
of smoking, and immediately affecting population smoking prevalence. [Levy, 
Mabry, Graham, Orleans, & Abrams, 2010]  
• Protecting non-smokers from exposure to tobacco smoke or tobacco smoke 
particles.  As the scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports, exposure to 
secondhand smoke also causes multiple, negative health effects. [U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1986]  
Thus, the protection of non-smokers from involuntary exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke with smoke-free air policies has become a fundamental element 
of tobacco control programs.  
To achieve these policy objectives and counter tobacco industry activities, jurisdictions 
implement tobacco control policies broadly grouped as:  
• Taxation. Excise taxes levied at the central (national) or state level based on 
either ad valorum (added to the price based as a percentage of the value) or flat-
rate formulas. 
• Protection. Typically termed “clean air” policies, these groups of policies are 
designed to protect non-smokers from exposure to “involuntary” or 
“environmental” tobacco smoke. 
• Education. Policies and programs designed to inform the public of the 
addictiveness and health consequences of smoking and, more recently, the 
actions of the tobacco industry. 
• Regulation. Policies that affect the manufacture, sale, and distribution of tobacco 
products, including package labeling, requiring health warning labels, prohibition 
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of product sales to minors, and restriction of advertising and promotional 
practices including event sponsorship and advertisements in magazines and on 
billboards.   
• Cessation support.  Individually-based interventions to help current smokers 
break their nicotine addiction and quit smoking is increasingly recognized as both 
a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity to immediately affect 
population smoking prevalence rates. [Levy, Mabry, Graham, Orleans, & 
Abrams, 2010] 
As discussed above, there is a substantial body of scientific evidence quantifying the 
effectiveness of various policies in different jurisdictions across time periods and demographic 
strata, though a complete summary of these studies is beyond the scope and purpose of the 
present study.  For the purposes of the discussion here, the comparative, quantitative 
effectiveness of different policies will be summarized based on the foundation evidence for 
SimSmoke. [Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, 2004]  As shown in Table 3-1, taxes and clean indoor 
air laws have the largest, consistent, and quantifiable effects on smoking prevalence when 
policies are considered as individual instruments.   
Selection of policy instruments is influenced by the desired evaluation time frame.  For 
example, a recent study using SimSmoke demonstrated that a policy goal of substantial, short-
term (3-5 years) reduction in smoking prevalence requires a mix of policies designed to increase 
the quit rates in adult smokers (as opposed to policies designed to reduce initiation rates in 
adolescents and young adults), including tax increases, media campaigns, and smoke free air 
policies and must also necessarily require substantial support for cessation programs. [Levy, 
Mabry, Graham, Orleans, & Abrams, 2010]  In contrast, consideration of benefit over a longer 
(generation) timeframe results in selection of policies with more emphasis on prevention of 
smoking initiation in adolescents (when most begin smoking) and smoking entrenchment in 
young adults, in whom cumulative life-long benefit will result in greater population QALYs. 
[Tengs, Osgood, & Lin, 2001], [Tengs, Osgood, & Chen, 2001] 
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3.2.2 Comprehensive Tobacco Control and Tobacco Control Policy Regimes 
A comprehensive tobacco control program is one that consists of a combination of 
individual policy instruments.  Specifically, comprehensive tobacco control policies 
simultaneously address multiple or all of the principal objectives (prevention of initiation, 
promotion of cessation, protection from secondhand smoke) with policy instruments from 
multiple or all of the broad policy groups (taxation, clean air policies, education, regulation, 
cessation support).  For example, a jurisdiction’s comprehensive tobacco control program might 
include: effective levels of taxation (balancing initiation prevention and cessation against 
smuggling incentives); public anti-tobacco education campaigns; implementation and 
enforcement of laws preventing youth access; restrictions on tobacco advertising; widespread 
adoption of smoke-free air laws; support for cessation programs, including training of healthcare 
Table 3-1. Quantitative Estimates of the Effectiveness of Individual Tobacco Control Policy Instruments  
Policy Type Quantitative Effectiveness Summary of Evidence 
Taxes • Starting at an assumed baseline of $4.00, a $1.00 
price increase (25%) reduces smoking prevalence by 
7% in 3 years, and by up to 14% over a longer time 
period (as effects of marginally higher decreases in 
prevalence in younger, more price-sensitive smokers 
have a larger impact on estimates of population-wide 
smoking prevalence ) 
• Price elasticity estimates range from -0.3 to -0.5 
• Price effects include lower initiation rates, higher 
cessation rates, and lower consumption for those 
continuing to smoke 
• Price elasticities are generally higher in adolescents 
and young adults, and in lower income groups 
Clean Indoor Air Laws • Comprehensive bans, with strong enforcement and 
media publicity, reduce smoking prevalence by 11%, 
with 7%-8% attributable to worksite bans and 2%-3% 
attributable to restaurant bans; partial bans are 
estimated to be 50% as effective 
• Bans protect non-smokers from harmful exposure, 
reduce opportunities to smoke, and support smoke-
free social norms  
• States with comprehensive bans have 5%-20% lower 
per capita consumption and ≈10% lower prevalence 
• In companies, quit rates are 10%-15% higher in firms 
with compared to those without bans 
Advertising Restrictions • Comprehensive advertising bans reduce prevalence 
by 4% and initiation by 6%; partial bans reduce the 
effectiveness to a 2% reduction in both initiation and 
prevalence 
• Advertising bans and restrictions reduce the 
opportunities for tobacco companies to create 
attractive and favorable images of smoking  
Product Labeling • Large, graphic warning labels may reduce smoking 
prevalence by 2% and increase cessation rates by 
2% 
• Recall of the presence of content of text-based 
warning labels is low; recall increases with more 
prominent and graphic warning labels 
Mass Media Policies • Well-funded and long-term campaigns can reduce 
prevalence by up to 7% when combined with other 
policies 
• Youth-oriented campaigns can reduce youth 
prevalence by 6.5% but have a smaller impact on 
population-wide prevalence rates 
• Media campaigns are more effective when combined 
with other policies 
• Effectiveness depends upon scale and duration 
• A social marketing approach, with multiple, targeted 
and tested messages aimed at different 
sociodemographic groups 
School Education 
Programs 
• SimSmoke does not attribute any quantifiable effect 
of school education programs on population smoking 
prevalence 
• Earlier school-based programs focused on educating 
students about the harmful effects of smoking; more 
recent programs use a life-skills approach educating 
students on resisting smoking initiation as well as the 
sociopolitical culture of tobacco use 
• The CDC recommends school-based programs, 
including “booster” programs, though evidence 
regarding effectiveness is mixed 
Youth Access Enforcement • Policies with strong enforcement, strict penalties, and 
community support can reduce youth prevalence up 
to 25%, but these effects can take up to 15 years to 
be detected in adult prevalence rates  
• Many youth get tobacco from non-retail sources such 
as the “black market”, theft, older peers and siblings, 
and parents 
• Effectiveness of strict access policies thus depend 
upon the extent to which market sources are 
substituted by non-market sources 
Access to Cessation 
Treatments 
• With broad treatment coverage, cessation programs 
increase quit rates by 25% leading to a 2% reduction 
in prevalence in 5 years and a 3.5% reduction in 
prevalence in 10 years 
• Access to insurance-covered cessation programs 
increase their use, and use of cessation programs 
double-to-quadruple success rates 
Telephone Quit Lines • Telephone quit lines can be very effective for those 
who call, but detectable population-wide effects are 
minimal (participation is often <5% of all smokers) 
• Quit lines are convenient and, when used, evidence 
supports effectiveness in all age groups and gender 
• Quit lines are most effective when advertised as part 
of mass media campaign 
Source: [Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, 2004] 
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professionals and access support for individuals; and school-based prevention programs. 
[Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000]  
The evolution from a “comprehensive tobacco control program” to a “tobacco control 
policy regime” is subtle and rarely discussed in the public health literature, the regime construct 
being more familiar to the political science field.  One such study, from the political science 
tradition, defines policy regimes as the cumulative policies and programs used by governments 
to control tobacco and identifies “hands-off”, “low-control”, “moderate-control”, “high-control”, 
and “prohibitionist” regimes. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]  However, in the operationalization of 
their definition and categorization of countries included in their study, the authors conflated 
several important policy distinctions made in the public health literature and used what the 
authors termed a “rough-and-ready three-point scale”. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]  Still, it is 
entirely possible to develop a definition for a tobacco control policy regime by fusing the political 
science concept of the aggregate set of government policies and programs and the public 
health programmatic frameworks forwarded by the World Health Organization and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.   
In 2008, the World Health Organization forwarded the MPOWER Package, a set of six, 
evidence-based policies (groups of policies) regarded as the requisite foundation to effectively 
counter the tobacco epidemic. [World Health Organization, 2008]  MPOWER is the acronym for 
these groups of policies, which are described in Table 3-2.  This report emphasizes the 
implementation and enforcement of these collective policies in order to prevent smoking 
initiation and entrenchment in adolescents and young adults, assist current smokers in 
cessation, and prevent exposure in non-smokers.  The difference between “comprehensive 
policy” and the “policy regime” advanced in the MPOWER Package is the inclusion of 
surveillance and monitoring and the expectation for the simultaneous implementation of all 
policies in the MPOWER framework.  The 2008 report also highlighted, though briefly, the 
underfunding of tobacco control programs both in personnel and the financing of program 
activities.  The report estimated that for countries reporting data (n=89), 95% of global tobacco 
control spending was done in high-income countries and that global tobacco tax revenues 
exceeded by 500-times spending on tobacco control activities.  Further, while 74% of the 
countries submitting data (n=174) reported a national tobacco control agency, of the 86 
countries submitting staffing data, 55% of the 604 total, global staff were in six high-income 
countries resulting in an average of 3.4 full-time equivalent staff in 93% of the countries.  This 
underfunding, including the large disparity between high- and low-income countries, was again 
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discussed in the 2009 report along with stronger recommendations for the structure of central-
level tobacco control programs, though the report did not make minimum funding or staffing 
recommendations. [World Health Organization, 2009] 
The MPOWER Package from the World Health Organization had a global perspective 
and focused its analysis and recommendations at central-level governments.  In contrast, the 
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program, originally developed in 1999 but revised multiple 
times since, forwards a multi-level approach that includes activities at the central-, state-, and 
local-level jurisdictions. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010], [Wisotzky, 
Albuquerque, Pechacek, & Park, 2004]  The C.D.C. has also published a series of three “best 
practices” reports to disseminate the rationale and implementation for this national program: 
Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, Best Practices User Guide: 
Coalitions – State and Community Intervention, and Best Practices User Guide: Youth 
Engagement – State and Community Intervention.  [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2007], [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007], [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2010]   
Component Definition Description
M “Monitor tobacco use and prevention 
policies” 
• Track several indicators prevalence, impact of policy interventions, and 
tobacco industry activity (marketing, promotion, lobbying) 
• Data on prevalence and program effectiveness should be available based 
on age, gender, race and geographic jurisdictions 
• Effective dissemination of findings from surveillance and monitoring 
programs 
P “Protect people from tobacco smoke” • Complete ban on all indoor smoking (no “designated” indoor smoking 
areas) 
• Strong enforcement of bans, including strong penalties for violations 
• Bans are most effectively implemented in conjunction with mass media 
campaigns 
O “Offer help to quit tobacco use” • Substantial and meaningful access to evidence-based, culturally 
appropriate cessation programs for the estimated ¾ current smokers 
wishing to quit 
• Three-pronged approach to cessation support includes incorporation into 
primary care (thus must include training and support for primary healthcare 
workers), well-staffed and well advertised quit lines, and availability of low 
cost pharmacologic therapy to treat nicotine addiction (nicotine 
replacement therapy) 
W “Warn about the dangers of tobacco” • Anti-tobacco media and educational campaigns conducted by the 
government or NGOs to warn of the health hazards and addictiveness of 
tobacco use and support a socially unacceptable and negative image for 
tobacco use (campaigns conducted by the tobacco industry have been 
shown to be ineffective or to increase tobacco use) 
• Use of large, graphic warning labels on packages and advertising, which 
are more effective than text-only warnings 
E “Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship” 
• Comprehensive ban on advertising in all media formats and promotion for 
any event and at point-of-sale 
• Strict and strong enforcement, particularly of activities aimed at 
adolescents and young adults 
R “Raise taxes on tobacco” • Product-specific excise tax (i.e., in addition to any value-added tax that 
applies to broad categories of goods) that is both strictly enforced and 
regularly adjusted for inflation 
• To avoid “substitution effects”, all tobacco products should be taxed 
similarly 
Table 3-2. Summary of Policies in the MPOWER Package 
Source: [World Health Organization, 2008] 
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Considered integratively and collectively, the C.D.C.’s framework is premised on a 
central-level agency that develops and supports a state- and community-level infrastructure 
developed around coalition networks; it is these coalition networks that are the programmatic 
functional units of the tobacco control policy regime.  Compared to the MPOWER framework, 
the C.D.C.’s recommendations are far more prescriptive regarding the structure, content, and 
programmatic activities of these networks.  Further, the C.D.C. makes explicit recommendations 
for structural and programmatic funding levels for the overall and each component of the policy 
regime, estimated using formulas developed and made publicly available by the C.D.C., that 
account for: overall population demographics and demographic strata; smoking prevalence; 
population socioeconomic factors such as proportion living near the poverty level, education 
level, and the proportion receiving publicly subsidized health insurance; geographic size; the 
number of local health units; infrastructure costs such as cost of living and labor costs; and the 
cost and complexity of conducting programs (e.g., mass media campaigns) to reach target 
populations (e.g., youth, racial minorities).  As forwarded by the C.D.C., the four goals for a 
tobacco control policy regime are the prevention of tobacco use initiation in adolescents and 
young adults, the promotion and support for cessation among current smokers, the protection 
and eventual elimination from exposure to secondhand smoke, and the identification and 
elimination of tobacco-related disparities in the population, all of which are achieved through 
state and community interventions, health communication interventions, cessation interventions, 
surveillance and evaluation, and administration and management. [Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2007]  The C.D.C. has recently published a standard for central – and state-
level surveillance and evaluation programs based on the MPOWER framework, complete with 
suggested metrics (summarized in Table 3-3) for each activity area. [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2010]   
Component Recommended Metrics
“Monitor tobacco use and prevention 
policies” 
• Current smoking among adults 
• Past month cigarette use among youth 
• Smoking-attributable adult mortality 
“Protect people from tobacco smoke” • State smoke-free policy 
• Adults who reported anyone smoking in work area within past two weeks 
“Offer help to quit tobacco use” • Percent of smokers calling Quitline 
• Medicaid coverage for counseling and medications 
“Warn about the dangers of tobacco” • Households with no-smoking rules 
• Tobacco counter-marketing media intensity 
“Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship” 
• State allows local advertising and promotion laws (no preemption) 
• Retail environment tobacco licensure 
“Raise taxes on tobacco” • Amount of cigarette excise tax 
• Minimum price law 
• State funding for tobacco control 
Table 3-3. CDC-Recommended Surveillance and Evaluation Metrics Based on MPOWER Framework  
Source: (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010) 
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So, while the specifics of the C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program and its 
subsequent implementation recommendations have clearly been developed for and tailored to 
the United States, the substance of these programs and recommendations are not without 
substantial generalizability to jurisdictions beyond the United States.  Further, these 
Component Elements / Description
Structural 
Components 
Central-level • Nationally-designated lead agency (within national health bureaucracy or other appropriate agency) 
with both dedicated funding and personnel 
• National agency provides leadership for national priorities, policy and program development, and 
capacity building at sub-central levels 
• A standing, nationally representative tobacco control advisory committee that consists of both 
governmental and non-governmental agencies to facilitate the development of and implementation of a 
national tobacco control program  
 Sub-central level • Agency or bureaucracy at sub-national level of government with designated authority and responsibility 
for coordinating and implementing the national tobacco control program within that jurisdiction 
• Direct liaison with the national lead agency 
• Facilitates development of, capacity building within, and coordination between community-based 
organizations 
 Market Regulation • Regulation and monitoring of products within the market as regards content, manufacture, and product 
claims 
• Evaluation and approval of new products before introduction into the marketplace 
Functional 
Components 
Surveillance and 
Monitoring 
• Surveillance of tobacco use (prevalence), initiation (incidence), and consumption (number of sticks per 
day) with a methodological valid and reliable monitoring system; the monitoring system allows for the 
stratification of these metrics by age, gender, and key ethnic and geographic groups 
• Surveillance of population knowledge, attitudes, and intentions towards smoking and tobacco use, 
exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke, and the tobacco industry 
• Surveillance of tobacco industry activities including lobbying, advertising and promotional activities, and 
sales 
• Surveillance of tobacco control policy activities (at all stages in the policy cycle) 
• Monitoring of both agency and program effectiveness, including fiduciary responsibilities  
• Regular public reporting of results from surveillance and monitoring activities  
 Budget & Financial 
Support 
• Dedicated and stable funding for personnel and program activities at the central and sub-central levels 
• Spending goals for tobacco control activities are established for both central and sub-central 
jurisdictions based on transparent and publicly available criteria that considers baseline smoking (and 
other tobacco use) prevalence, national tobacco control objectives, and estimated costs for 
implementing program activities 
• Both estimated (goal) and actual spending on tobacco control activities are reported publicly 
• Ratio between taxation revenues and total tobacco control program spending 
Policy 
Components 
Secondhand smoke • “Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in indoor public, civic, 
and workplace venues  
• “Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in outdoor public, 
civic, and workplace venues 
• “Clean air” legislation / restriction or prohibition of smoking and other tobacco use in private venues 
(homes, vehicles)  
 Cessation • Evidence-based pharmacologic, behavioral, or combination cessation programs for all smokers 
• Individually-focused financial incentives to and supports for smokers/tobacco users to access these 
programs 
• Training of and support for primary care providers (nursing, medical, dental) to incorporate cessation 
counseling into routine care giving 
• “Quit-lines” 
 Public education 
campaigns and 
health warnings 
• Health communication strategies, interventions, and programs about the health effects of and risks 
associated with smoking and other tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke 
• Warning communications (labels) to smokers/tobacco users at point of sale, point of consumption 
(packages), and point of reach (advertising) 
• Programs and strategies targeted at youth, including school-based programs 
 Barriers to smoking 
initiation, particularly 
by youth and 
adolescents 
• Restrictions on youth access to tobacco including minimum age requirements, proof-of-age 
requirements, and sales in an unverifiable/unregulated environment (internet, vending machine, mail) 
• Regulation of where products may be purchased (including possible licensure requirements) and how 
products may be displayed in retail outlets 
• Regulations regarding advertising practices and promotional activities, including but not limited to those 
that appeal to youth, adolescents, and young adults (e.g., use of cartoons in advertising, product 
placement in movies, event sponsorship, promotional activities such as giveaways, etc.) 
 Taxation • Intentional use of taxation to decrease prevalence, incidence, and consumption of tobacco 
• Frequency of alternations in level of taxation to account for inflation 
 Ability of jurisdictions 
to enact policies 
• Preemption practices – the ability of sub-central jurisdictions to establish policies more restrictive than 
those at the central level 
Enforcement 
Component 
Enforcement and 
penalty 
• Provision for enforcement of and penalty for violation of implemented policy, including budget and 
personnel 
• Labeling and packaging provisions to deter smuggling 
• Capability for injunctive relief while disputes over compliance are resolved Public reporting of 
enforcement activities 
• Violation “tip-lines” 
Table 3-4. Tobacco Control Policy Regime Components 
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recommendations both complement and build upon the MPOWER framework.  What emerges, 
then, as a definition for a “tobacco control policy regime” is the orientation of a jurisdiction’s 
cumulative policy activity regarding the reduction and elimination of tobacco-attributable disease 
and death in the population within that jurisdiction.  The components to be considered when 
determining the type of tobacco control policy regime in a given jurisdiction at a given point in 
time are summarized in Table 3-4.  These components are advanced based on a synthesis of 
the World Health Organization’s MPOWER Package and supporting materials, as well as the 
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program and supporting materials.  Thus, these components 
are an amalgamation of the structural and policy best practices from these organizations.  As is 
seen in this table, the important distinction between “comprehensive tobacco policy” and a 
“tobacco control policy regime” is the consideration of the structural elements including central 
leadership, sub-central networks, and the support for policies and programs such as budgeting 
and surveillance and evaluation.  The intent of identifying these criteria is not to define, in a 
dichotomous manner, whether a jurisdiction does or does not have a tobacco control policy 
regime, but rather to identify the dimensions to consider when characterizing the nature of the 
tobacco control policy regime in a given jurisdiction at a given point in time.  Ideally, the nature 
of a jurisdiction’s tobacco control policy regime can be differentiated along a meaningful 
continuum, implying the need for scaling and measurement.  The quantification of tobacco 
control policy regimes is discussed in the next section.   
3.2.2.1 Quantifying Tobacco Control Policy Regimes 
As the policy solutions to combating the tobacco epidemic have evolved from single 
policy instruments to a set of policy instruments (comprehensive tobacco control policy) to 
multiple policy instruments supported by an infrastructure that includes personnel, financial, and 
surveillance and evaluation (tobacco control policy regime), a parallel problem of the 
measurement and characterization of these policy regime configurations has also emerged.  
From an administrative and research perspective, the ability to meaningfully discriminate 
between such different policy regime configurations across different jurisdictions and time 
periods requires a quantification methodology.  The approach in reports and studies to date that 
have characterized or needed to quantify policy regime configurations has typically been one of 
three possible solutions.  In the first approach, a list of policy elements is generated and 
jurisdictions are then evaluated with a series of dichotomous (yes/no or checkmarks) or nominal 
(e.g., no/minimal/moderate/complete) scores for each of the policy criteria.  These analyses 
thus approximate a compendium of a jurisdiction’s status (or that for multiple jurisdictions) on a 
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catalog of policy elements and, while some policy elements such as taxation lend themselves to 
quantification, the evaluation of most policy elements is categorical. [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2010], [World Health Organization, 2008], [World Health Organization, 
2009]  Consequently, the consideration of individual policy elements in this approach means 
that a single, cumulative score for an “overall” comparison remains elusive.  Additionally, the set 
of and definitions for the individual policy elements considered are rarely consistent across 
reports or over time, making comparisons difficult.  In the second approach, a grouping or 
grading system is created that accounts for the cumulative set of policy instruments which 
categorizes jurisdictions into similar groups or assigns a report-card-like grade. [Marmor & 
Lieberman, 2004], [American Lung Association, 2009]  However, while this approach considers 
the cumulative set of policy instruments and thus attempts to differentiate between policy 
regimes, the methodology is typically study/report-specific and so the rigor and generalizability 
of the grouping methodology is unclear.  Further, because the grouping or grading system 
remains categorical in nature, statistical analyses are limited to those accommodating such 
categorical variables and thus comparisons across time and jurisdictions are again difficult.  In 
the third approach, an attempt to establish interval quantification of policy regime configurations 
is made by developing a policy score. [Joossens & Raw, 2006], [Studlar, Christensen, & 
Frisbee, 2009], [Studlar, Christensen, & Sitasari, 2011]  While some analytic utility is gained for 
that study, the scoring methodology is typically not rigorous, and the inclusion of policy elements 
as well as the definition, point assignment, and weighting for policy elements varies between 
studies.  Thus, the challenge for all three of these commonly employed approaches is that 
comparison across and between studies and reports is very limited due to non-standardized 
approaches to the inclusion of policy elements, data sources, and scoring and weighting of 
policy elements.    
Within the existing literature, four attempts have been made to develop a standardized 
policy scoring system: the Assessment of the Comprehensiveness of Tobacco Control Laws 
Scale (A.C.T.-L.) [Klonoff, et al., 1998], the Measuring Activities of Tobacco Control (M.A.To.C.) 
score [Thyrian & John, 2006], the Tobacco Control Scale (T.C.S.) [Joossens & Raw, 2006], and 
a rating systems for youth access to tobacco laws in U.S. states [Alciati, et al., 1998], though 
these scores have not been widely applied or cited.  The A.C.T.-L. is a 55-item questionnaire 
designed to score city- and county-level anti-smoking ordinances, and the score has 
environmental tobacco, advertising, and youth access subscales.  The methodologic 
development of the A.C.T.-L. was reported in the original study, including the validity and 
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reliability, though the score was not applied to specific jurisdictions. [Klonoff, et al., 1998]  Also, 
the original report has only been cited by three other studies in PubMed, one of which was a 
non-tobacco study and a second was the study developing the M.A.To.C. score, and the score 
itself has not been applied in a study indexed in PubMed.  The M.A.To.C. score consists of the 
self-reported (by country experts) responses to a series of thirty questions, also identified and 
developed by a group of experts, and the original study reported the results of the application of 
the score to fourteen European countries. [Thyrian & John, 2006]  The M.A.To.C. score has 
been cited by two other studies in PubMed, one of which applied the reported M.A.To.C. scores 
in subsequent analysis. [Thyrian & John, 2006]  Finally, the T.C.S. score is a country-based 
expert survey, developed based on expert opinion as to policy element content and weighting, 
with an overall score (a total of 100 points) and sub-scale scores for price, public place bans, 
spending on public information campaigns, advertising bans, package health warnings, and 
cessation treatment. [Joossens & Raw, 2006]  The original report, in addition to reporting the 
methodology for the score development, also reported the T.C.S. scores for thirty European 
countries based on surveys administered in 2005 and there has been a subsequent report that 
updated these 2005 country-based scores. [Joosens & Raw, 2008]  The T.C.S. has been cited 
by nine other studies indexed in PubMed, one of which applied the reported TCS scores in 
subsequent analysis and was the same study which also cited the M.A.To.C. score. [Thyrian, 
Panagiotakos, Polychronopoulos, West, Zatonski, & John, 2008]  Finally, a rating system was 
developed to score states on youth access laws using statutes compiled in the National Cancer 
Institute’s State Cancer Legislative Database (S.C.L.D.) which was comprised of a score based 
on a five-point rating of nine different youth access-oriented policy elements. [Alciati, et al., 
1998]  However, it is unclear that this ranking system has been applied outside this National 
Cancer Institute database.  For both the M.A.To.C. and T.C.S. scores, the use of non-public 
datasets (i.e., the use of self-report surveys of selected country experts administered by the 
authors of the study) has substantially limited the applicability of the score by other researchers 
to other jurisdictions or time periods, and the reliance on country-based expert self-reporting 
raises concerns about score reliability when there is a personnel change in those country-based 
experts.   
 Thus, there remains a large gap and need in the literature.  The absence of a 
theoretically rigorous and statistically valid and reliable mechanism to quantify the nature of a 
jurisdiction’s tobacco control policy regime at a given time point has undoubtedly impeded the 
conduct of both temporal and comparative studies.  So, while such a quantification method – a 
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score – does not yet exist, it is possible to identify at least some of the ideal criteria for such a 
score.  Accordingly, it is forwarded that an ideal score would have the following characteristics: 
• Be applicable to both research and administrative (e.g., public health agencies, 
health advocacy groups) settings; 
• Have both a transparent and publicly available scoring system, and be based on 
publicly available data so that researchers and agencies alike could apply the score 
across jurisdictions and time periods; 
• Be applicable to different types of jurisdictions with equal validity and reliability (e.g., 
a country, a state or province, or a county or city), implying that the selection of and 
definitions for content (policy elements) would need to be meaningful both across 
jurisdictions and time; 
• While being theoretically, methodologically, and statistically sound, also be feasible 
and reasonable to implement and track in a wide variety of settings and jurisdictions; 
• Have both a total score, and sub-scale scores for key areas of interest such as 
advertising and youth smoking, among others 
• Selection of content (policy elements) be theoretically based, as well as the scoring 
and weighting system.  
For any scoring system, the simultaneous achievement of these criteria will not be 
without substantial challenge, in particular the last criteria of a theoretic foundation for both 
content and weighting.  Whereas much of the evidence for policy effectiveness has been 
gathered from studies of individual policies, much less is understood about interaction effects 
between individual policy elements, [Levy, Bauer, & Hye-ryeon, 2006] and the directionality of 
the causal relationship between policy and population health outcome (prevalence), particularly 
as regards temporality, is also ambiguous. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]  Regardless and 
despite these challenges, development of a method to validly and reliably quantitatively 
characterize the nature of a tobacco control policy regime remains both a significant need in the 
field and an area suitable for research and development.   
3.2.3 Evidence of the Effectiveness of State-Level Tobacco Control Policy Regimes  
In industrialized countries, where the investment has been made in policy development and 
adoption as well as well as the personnel and surveillance and evaluation to support population 
tobacco control programs, it is consistent with the above discussion to consider these states to 
have a tobacco control policy regime.  Thus, comparative evaluations can be conducted to 
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assess the relative effectiveness of these policy regimes.  Within the United States, because 
each state administers its own tobacco control program (as discussed previously, with funding 
and coordination through the N.T.C.P. at the C.D.C. and additional funding from state M.S.A. 
settlement agreements as well as taxation) and the role of the U.S. central government has 
been comparatively sluggish, each state can be considered to have its own tobacco control 
policy regime thus permitting between-state comparative studies comparing features of either 
the state tobacco control programs and / or adopted policies and measures of state population 
health (e.g., smoking prevalence).   
In the United States, California (1989) followed by Massachusetts (1993), Arizona (1994), 
Oregon (1996), and Florida (1997) were the first states to implement state-level tobacco control 
programs. [Siegel, 2002], [Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000]  Several reports, using case-study 
methodology, have reported on the results from individual state-level programs, particularly 
results for the “early adopters” – California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida.  In a 
review of published reports (scientific, peer-reviewed studies as well as state-issued reports), 
one study concluded that despite differences in program strategies and approaches, the state-
level programs were associated with a decline in adult smoking prevalence as well as a change 
in the “factors” influencing teen smoking. [Wakefield & Chaloupka, 2000]  In a review of the 
California and Massachusetts programs, another study reported a reduction in cigarette 
consumption but no measureable impact on smoking initiation by adolescents. [Siegel & Biener, 
1997]  In a follow-up study evaluating the California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and 
Florida programs, the same research group concluded that these state-level programs could be 
very effective in improving population health but that results were highly contingent upon 
sustained, adequate funding and the intensity and aggressiveness of program activities. [Siegel, 
2002]  Finally, in a more recent review of case study reports of the California, Massachusetts, 
Florida, and Sydney/Melbourne (Australia) tobacco control programs, the author concluded that 
there was strong evidence to support the effectiveness of these state-level programs, though 
the author noted the challenges of accounting for wide variation in program funding over time. 
[Pierce, 2007]  
Population-based analyses have also been undertaken.  In a study applying the S.C.L.D. 
score (described above, [Alciati, et al., 1998]), scores calculated quantifying state-level youth 
access-focused policies in 1996 were found to correlate to the state tobacco excise tax 
(positive), the proportion of the state living in rural areas (negative), leadership in the state 
legislature (negative for Republican-controlled houses), and the prevalence of teen smoking in 
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1997 as estimated by C.D.C.’s Youth Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (Y.R.B.S.). [Luke, 
Stamatakis, & Brownson, 2000]  In another study using youth smoking prevalence estimates 
from the Monitoring the Futures Project collected as part of the Institute for Social Research at 
the University of Michigan, state-level per capita tobacco control expenditures were found to be 
negatively associated with smoking prevalence and consumption. [Tauras, et al., 2005]  In a 
study using a quasi-experimental design, similar results were reported in adults: per capita 
expenditures on state-level tobacco control programs were negatively associated with adult 
smoking prevalence. [Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008]  Finally, in another study 
utilizing data from the Monitoring the Futures Project, cigarette price was found to be positively 
associated with cessation in teens as were youth access laws. [Tworek, et al., 2010] 
The body of literature quantitatively documenting the effectiveness of these state-level 
tobacco control programs (policy regimes) is not as robust and the results have been, as other 
studies have acknowledged [Tworek, et al., 2010], more equivocal than perhaps anticipated.  
This likely has myriad explanations, including the underdevelopment of both the technical 
aspects as well as the theoretical underpinnings of these studies.  As discussed previously, 
inclusion of the policy elements within the tobacco control programs is based on the 
effectiveness of these policies typically established in single-intervention trials and little is 
understood about either the interactions between individual policy elements or the temporal 
relationships between policy and a population health outcome.  Moreover, and also discussed in 
the Introduction, in these studies the directionally in the causal association is typically assumed 
to be from policy to health outcome when, in fact, that may not be accurate – or at least an 
oversimplification. [Marmor & Lieberman, 2004]  Further, because a validated quantification 
method for characterizing tobacco control policy regimes is not available (discussed above), 
these studies typically treat all state tobacco control programs similarly (“yes/no” or “yes/no” to a 
series of specific policy elements), or per capita spending is substituted as a measure of policy 
comprehensiveness or vigor.  That is, assessment of these state-level programs has generally 
not distinguished between policy adoption and aspects of implementation, spending and 
programmatic activities, or other aspects of programmatic activities such as intensity, 
aggressiveness, or structural characteristics or functional capacity.  While statistical techniques 
such as network analysis are now being applied to the evaluation of the organizational 
characteristics of state-level tobacco control programs and networks of the associated 
community-based coalitions [Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004], [Harris, Luke, Burke, & Meuller, 
2008] these analyses and the results from them are still nascent.  Thus, substantial scholarship 
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remains to develop more rigorous assessment methodologies for these state-level tobacco 
control programs so as to elucidate the most effective program structures and processes to elicit 
the best population health outcomes.   
3.2.4 International Cooperative Efforts to Enact Tobacco Control Policies  
While the gradual decline in smoking prevalence in industrialized countries has resulted 
in shrinking markets for tobacco companies (though not profitability), global trade liberalization, 
the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and dissolution of the Soviet bloc, economic unification in Europe 
(European Union), and global trade agreements have resulted in the opening of new markets for 
tobacco companies, and transnational tobacco companies have capitalized on these new 
market opportunities. [Collin, Lee, & Bissell, 2002]  As discussed in the Introduction, while 
tobacco consumption has decreased by approximately 50% in the last 20-30 years in countries 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, both prevalence and consumption 
have increased substantially in developing countries such that these countries now account for 
80% of global smokers. [Jha, 2009]  Further, whereas nearly 70% of the 100 million tobacco-
related deaths in the 20th century occurred in high-income countries, it has been forecast that 
70% of the projected 1 billion tobacco-related deaths in the 21st century will occur in low- and 
middle-income countries. [Jha, 2009]  Tobacco companies have aggressively pursued the 
emerging markets in these developing countries.  For example, research using tobacco industry 
documents on the activities of transnational tobacco companies in central and eastern 
European countries shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes has reported evidence 
for tactics such as an explosion of advertising, often targeted at women and children, in 
societies previously unaccustomed to the promotion of consumer goods and often without 
existing tobacco control policies or the capacity to quickly implement such policies. [Zatonski, 
2003], [Lipand, 2007], [Szilagyi, 2006]  Such evidence has resulted in a clear recognition that 
coordinated global tobacco control efforts are needed to counter a sophisticated, global tobacco 
industry. 
Such international tobacco control efforts began as early as the 1960s.  Specifically, the 
1967 1st World Conference on Tobacco or Health (W.C.T.O.H.) held in New York City, NY is 
often considered the inaugural event in a formal, global tobacco control effort.  These World 
Conferences have been held triennially since 1967, hosted by different countries worldwide.  
The purpose of these international forums has been and remains the facilitation of policy 
learning and diffusion, particularly by creating the structure (networks) through which such 
learning and diffusion can occur, and the promotion and dissemination of globally-focused 
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research and evidence on epidemiology, tobacco industry activities, and policy effectiveness.  
While other international forums have developed since the first W.C.T.O.H., such as the Asia-
Pacific Conferences on Tobacco or Health (A.Pa.C.T.), the European Conferences on Tobacco 
or Health (E.C.To.H.), the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco (S.R.N.T.), and the 
World Cancer Congress (U.I.C.C.), the W.C.T.O.H. remains the preeminent international 
meeting for tobacco control.  Further, while facilitation of policy implementation to combat the 
tobacco control epidemic in industrialized countries was the focus of early conferences, 
expansion to include efforts to facilitate such policy implementation in low- and middle-income 
countries has occurred over time.  As forwarded previously (Introduction), truncating or averting 
stages of the tobacco epidemic in developing countries has evolved to become the implicit, 
primary objective of international tobacco control policy efforts.  Despite the challenges in 
organizing and hosting these conferences, not limited to funding, logistics, and industry attempts 
to undermine the conferences [Muggll & Hurt, 2003], several global initiatives have developed 
as a result of these conferences, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control chief among 
them. 
The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (F.C.T.C.) 
was initially conceptualized in the 1990s by a small group of American academic researchers 
and public health advocates, with very early support from Health Canada, and was proposed as 
a resolution at the 9th World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Paris in October 1994 and 
again at the World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly in 1996. [Roemer, Taylor, & 
Lariviere, 2005]  The process from the initial proposal of using the constitutional authority of the 
World Health Organization to develop a legally binding treaty to the formal adoption of the 
F.C.T.C. spanned almost a decade and consisted of multiple working groups, intergovernmental 
negotiating bodies, draft resolutions, and negotiations and revisions to these draft resolutions. 
[World Heath Organization, 2010], [Warner, 2008]  The F.C.T.C. was adopted by the World 
Health Assembly in May 2003 and came into effect in February 2005.  The Convention had 168 
signatories (signed before June 29, 2004) representing 91.8% of the world’s population, and 
currently has 169 parties (countries legally bound to enact the provisions of the F.C.T.C.; 
signatory countries through domestic ratification, and non-signatory countries through accession 
or succession) representing 86.6% of the world’s population, and 183 participants (signatories 
and / or parties) representing 94.89% of the world’s population. [Framework Convention 
Alliance, 2010]  Of the original 168 signatory countries, fourteen have not yet ratified the treaty 
(notably, the United States being one of these countries) and of the parties to the Framework, 
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fifteen were not original signatories (i.e., became party to the Framework through accession 
(n=14) or succession (n=1)). [Framework Convention Alliance, 2010]   
As stated in Article 3 of the F.C.T.C., the objective of the Convention is: 
“The objective of this Convention and its protocols is to protect present and 
future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and 
economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco 
smoke by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be 
implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and international levels 
in order to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco 
use and exposure to tobacco smoke.” 
From: [World Health Organization, 2003] 
A complete list of the Articles of the Convention is outlined is Table 3-5.  As evidenced 
from this list, the major content areas to be addressed by F.C.T.C. include: measures to reduce 
the demand for tobacco, including taxation, education and public awareness, and advertising 
and package labeling; measures to reduce youth access to tobacco; global strategies to 
counteract smuggling; and elimination of exposure to secondhand smoke.   
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The first global initiative to address a non-communicable disease, the F.C.T.C. is often 
referenced as the first global health treaty, though it is actually not a treaty (an instrument 
explicit in its terms and required actions at the time of approval) but a framework convention (an 
instrument that identifies the overall objectives and specific content areas to be addressed and 
the process for developing the specific protocols for implementation after approval). [Warner, 
Table 3-5. Articles of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  
I: Introduction 
 Article 1 Use of Terms 
 Article 2 Relationship between this Convention and other agreements and legal 
instruments
II: Objective, guiding principles and general obligations 
 Article 3 Objective
 Article 4 Guiding Principles
 Article 5 General Obligations 
III: Measures relating to the reduction of demand for tobacco
 Article 6 Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco 
 Article 7 Non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco 
 Article 8 Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke
 Article 9 Regulation of the contents of tobacco products
 Article 10 Regulation of tobacco products disclosure 
 Article 11 Packaging and labeling of tobacco products
 Article 12 Education, communication, training and public awareness 
 Article 13 Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
 Article 14 Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation
IV: Measures relating to the reduction of the supply of tobacco
 Article 15 Illicit trade in tobacco products 
 Article 16 Sales to and by minors
 Article 17* Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities 
V: Protection of the environment 
 Article 18 Protection of the environment and health of persons
VI: Questions related to liability 
 Article 19 Liability 
VII: Scientific and technical cooperation and communication of information
 Article 20 Research, surveillance and exchange of information
 Article 21 Reporting and exchange of information 
 Article 22 Cooperation in the scientific, technical and legal fields and provision of related 
expertise
VIII: Institutional arrangements and financial resources 
 Article 23 Conference of the Parties
 Articles 24 Secretariat
 Articles 25 Relations between the Conference of the Parties and intergovernmental 
organizations
 Article 26 Financial resources
IX: Settlement of disputes 
 Article 27 Settlement of disputes
X: Development of the Convention 
 Article 28 Amendments to this Convention 
 Article 29 Adoption and amendment of annexes to this Convention 
XI: Final Provisions 
 Article 30 Reservations 
 Article 31 Withdrawal
 Article 32 Right to vote
 Article 33 Protocols 
 Article 34 Signature
 Article 35 Ratification, acceptance, approval, formal confirmation or accession 
 Article 36 Entry into force 
 Article 37 Depositary
 Article 38 Authentic texts
Source: [World Health Organization, 2003] 
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2008]  That is, by becoming party to the Convention, countries agreed to participate in the 
negotiation process and to implement the protocols developed and agreed to as part of that 
negotiation process.  The negotiation and protocol approval process is conducted under the 
auspices of the Conference of the Parties (C.O.P.), a body created by the F.C.T.C. itself and of 
which all parties to the F.C.T.C. are members with voting privileges, which has the authority to 
conduct and oversee the proscribed negotiations as well as adopt protocols and annexes to the 
Convention. [Warner, 2008]  The F.C.T.C. in general, and the negotiation and protocol adoption 
process specifically, is also supported by groups such as the Framework Convention Alliance, a 
group of non-governmental organizations and health advocacy groups that has provided 
technical and other support to the F.C.T.C. from a very early stage in the process. [Warner, 
2008]  To date, the C.O.P. has approved guidelines for Articles 5.3, 8, 11, and 13 and has 
active work groups creating guidelines for implementation for Articles 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, and 18. 
[World Health Organization, 2010]  The intent for the Article guidelines is that they form a 
“minimum standard” for tobacco control legislation which party countries must enact 
domestically. 
Because of the format as a framework convention rather than a treaty, the adoption of 
the F.C.T.C. by the World Health Organization in 2003 signified the end of one series of 
complex negotiations and the beginning of another series of international negotiations to 
establish the specific terms and protocols for global tobacco control.  As one would anticipate in 
a process with 168-183 countries each with specific circumstances and interests, the 
negotiation of the F.C.T.C. and the subsequent protocols and guidelines, domestic ratification, 
and implementation of domestic policy has been a complex and challenging process with many 
obstacles.  In the consensus-based negotiations of the F.C.T.C., multiple studies have reported 
on the ability of individual countries to weaken or otherwise influence the requirements of the 
Articles.  Of particular note have been studies of Japan’s actions to weaken F.C.T.C. language 
[Assunta & Chapman, 2005], and allusions to obstreperous tactics on the part of the United 
States and attempts to unduly influence final Convention language. [Warner, 2008], [Collin, Lee, 
& Bissell, 2002]  The World Health Organization has also not been without criticism, particularly 
stemming from perceived insufficient conflict of interest standards that have been manipulated 
and used advantageously by the tobacco industry. [Godlee, 2000] 
Predictably, the tobacco industry has been incontestably opposed to the F.C.T.C. and 
numerous studies have documented industry tactics to undermine, weaken, and otherwise 
impede F.C.T.C. negotiations, development of Convention guidelines, and implementation of 
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domestic policies in party countries.  The reported tactics to impede the development of the 
F.C.T.C. have included: lobbying and pressuring countries to either not participate in 
negotiations or advocating to weaken Convention Articles; advocating for an agreement based 
on voluntary codes of conduct rather than regulation; threatening to withdraw support for 
domestic government programs if countries participated (this tactic was particularly employed in 
developing countries, including those emerging from post-Soviet regimes, where transnational 
tobacco companies often contributed financially to, e.g., health and education budgets as a 
means of exerting influence); refusing to comply with implemented regulations; implicitly 
supporting smuggling; and exploitation of the negotiation process so as to impede progress. 
[Collin, Lee, & Bissell, 2002]  Studies have also reported on “Project Cerberus”, an effort by 
British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and Japan Tobacco International between 1999-2001, 
to develop, propose, and advocate for a global voluntary regulatory code so as to make the 
F.C.T.C. unnecessary. [Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008]  Tobacco industry tactics have 
also included a particular focus on creating and / or exploiting economic fears in countries with a 
domestic tobacco agricultural sector or those which rely on tobacco industry contributions to 
domestic (non-tobacco) programs.  To accomplish this, analysis of tobacco industry documents 
have reported on attempts to undermine economic impact estimates by the World Bank by 
commissioning industry-sponsored reports and studies [Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008] 
and creating economic fears by producing and distributing projections for the job and economic 
losses attributable to implementing the F.C.T.C. or other domestic tobacco control measures. 
[Otanez, Mamudu, & Glantz, 2009]  In the European Union and the United Kingdom, studies 
have also reported that the tobacco industry is attempting to create tension between F.C.T.C. 
guidelines, particularly Article 5.3, which proscribes tobacco industry consultation or 
involvement in negotiations except when strictly necessary, and perceptions about existing E.U. 
standards for “good governance” and “better regulation” so requiring industry participation in 
policy negotiation, with the eventual goal to substantially weaken the effectiveness of the 
F.C.T.C. [Smith, Gilmore, Fooks, Collin, & Weishaar, 2009]  
Ratification of the F.C.T.C. and implementation of subsequent domestic policy has been 
and will continue to be challenging, particularly in developing countries which often have neither 
the legal framework nor the legislative sophistication to implement the Article guidelines in a 
timely or effective fashion. [Owusu-Dabo, McNeill, Lewis, Gilmore, & Britton, 2010]  The tobacco 
industry has been adept at exploiting these vulnerabilities by influencing both legislators and the 
legislative process in developing countries to weaken the impact of the F.C.T.C., Article 
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guidelines, and domestic policy. [Samet, Wipfli, Perez-Padilla, & Yach, 2006], [Meija, Schoj, 
Barnoya, Flores, & Perez-Stable, 2008], [Albuja & Daynard, 2009]  Thus, while the process to 
establish the specific F.C.T.C. Article guidelines continues with substantial work remaining, the 
ultimate ability of the F.C.T.C. to combat the global tobacco epidemic will likely substantially 
depend upon the successful and sustained technical and strategic support for the drafting and 
implementation of meaningful domestic tobacco control policies in developing countries.   
Two other international tobacco control efforts require mention both because of their 
scope and association to the F.C.T.C.: the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation 
Project (I.T.C. Project) and the Global Tobacco Surveillance System (G.T.S.S.).  The I.T.C. 
Project was initiated in 2002 in four countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States), though it has since expanded to more than a dozen countries. [Fong, G T; 
Cummings, K M; Shopland, D R; for the ITC Collaboration, 2006]  A survey, the I.T.C. Project is 
designed to assess the psychosocial and behavioral effects of F.C.T.C. policies and is based on 
psychosocial and health communications theoretical and conceptual models. [Fong, et al., 2006]  
Further, it is designed as a parallel prospective longitudinal cohort study of adult smokers and 
non-smokers (in some countries) with a sampling plan based on a quasi-experimental design. 
[Thompson, et al., 2006]  With standardized questionnaires and implementation methodology, 
the ITC Project allows opportunities for intra-country longitudinal comparisons and inter-country 
comparisons not previously available.  To date, the I.T.C. Project has resulted in more than fifty 
studies indexed in PubMed on topics ranging from population attitudes towards specific tobacco 
control policies to intentions to and predictors of cessation.   
Finally, the G.T.S.S. began in 1998 as a collaboration between the C.D.C., the Canadian 
Public Health Association, and the World Health Organization which had recently launched its 
Tobacco Free Initiative.  The G.T.S.S. was explicitly designed to establish standardized and 
internationally comparative surveillance data on issues such as tobacco use, exposure to 
secondhand smoke, exposure to tobacco advertising or promotion, and cessation. [The GTSS 
Collaborative Group, 2006]  In order to develop such a comparative data repository, a key task 
of the G.T.S.S. has been to develop a series of standardized questionnaires, sampling 
methodologies, and field procedures implementable in the now 190+ countries that contribute 
data to the G.T.S.S. [Warren, et al., 2009], [Global Tobacco Surveillance System Collaboration 
Group, 2005].  The G.T.S.S. has developed into four modules: the Global Youth Tobacco 
Survey (G.Y.T.S., the first module implemented), the Global School Personnel Survey 
(G.S.P.S.), the Global Health Professions Student Survey (G.H.P.S.S.), and the Global Adult 
 [55] 
 
Tobacco Survey (G.A.T.S.). [Warren, et al., 2009]  The G.T.S.S. has resulted in multiple peer-
reviewed research publications as well as atlas-type compendiums and data reports with web-
based access to results. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] 
The F.C.T.C. in particular, but also companion efforts such as the I.T.C. Project and the 
G.T.S.S., are part of the emerging field of global health governance.  The origins of global 
health governance are derived from the normative expansion of human rights to include 
“health”. [Gable, 2007]  Fundamentally, it has been recognized that without health individuals 
cannot advocate for or benefit from their other human rights. [Gable, 2007]  The right to health 
was first explicitly delineated in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1948] and then expanded 
upon in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. [United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966]  Hence, efforts to advance 
global health through global health governance can be interpreted as advancing human rights 
and addressing issues of social justice by ameliorating global health disparities.  Two additional, 
important functions for global health governance, including the requisite structures and 
processes, have been identified: a mechanism to mount effective and timely responses to global 
infectious disease outbreaks such as SARS, H1N1, HIV/AIDS [Taylor, 2004], [Gostin & Hodge, 
Global health law, ethics, and policy, 2007], [Dressler & Marks, 2006]; and as a means to 
present a countervailing force against globalized economic regimes and the unequal and unjust 
distribution of economic benefits that often results from the international trade agreements that 
support such regimes. [Dressler & Marks, 2006], [Thomas & Weber, 2004]  Thus, while the 
language of the F.C.T.C. does not itself directly invoke human rights, the connection to human 
rights, global public health, reduction of global health disparities, and counteracting the effects 
of the globalization of “big tobacco” has been clearly recognized. [Dressler & Marks, 2006]   
3.3 Universal Challenges to Enacting Tobacco Control Policies  
Currently, tobacco products and their use are legal in all countries throughout the world.  
Recently, the only country to attempt to fully ban the possession and use of tobacco, Bhutan, 
reversed their 2004 ban in 2009 due to widespread difficulties in enforcement and the 
development of a black market despite what might be considered conditions advantageous to a 
successful ban (small, isolated, and mountainous country and low smoking prevalence). 
[Joosens, 2009], [Government of Bhutan, 2009]  Further, in the United States polls suggest that 
only 17% of the population supports an outright ban on tobacco products. [Jones, J M; Gallup, 
Inc., 2009]  By definition, tobacco control policies aim to decrease demand for cigarettes and 
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other tobacco products by directly influencing the behavior of current or future smokers.  As 
such, tobacco control policies also necessarily have an economic impact on those growing, 
manufacturing, distributing, or selling an otherwise legal product.  That is, the fundamental 
paradox of tobacco control policies is the ambition to ban the use of a legal product but not the 
product itself.  This paradox has resulted in debate, and often conflict, about the appropriate role 
of government, the legal and moral basis for tobacco control policy, an acceptable balance 
between individual and property rights, and even about the balance between different individual 
rights.  The issues raised in these debates will be discussed in this section.   
3.3.1 A “Right” to Tobacco Control or a “Right” to Smoke? 
In the United States, the 1938 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Carolene 
Products Company [United States v. Carolene Products Company, 1938] is often cited as the 
legal, jurisprudential basis for the regulation of tobacco products. [Byrd, Shapiro, & 
Schiedermayer, 1989]  In this ruling, the Court established different standards for the judicial 
review of legislation: regulation of economic (property) rights could be assumed to be 
constitutional provided that a sound rationale was provided by the legislature, but legislative 
regulation of civil or personal rights (e.g., life, liberty) would be subjected to a much stricter 
standard of judicial review. [Powell, 1982], [Funston, 1975]  That is, the Court effectively created 
a hierarchy of rights wherein personal or civil rights have primacy over property rights and are 
so afforded more protection.  Thus, an appeal to the protection of personal and human rights 
has evolved as a legal rationale to advance tobacco control policies. 
As discussed above, the United Nations explicitly identified a right to health as a 
fundamental human right in 1948: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 
“25.1  Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” 
From: [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 1948]  
In this Article, the instrumental value of health is clearly recognized as fundamental to achieving 
equality in the realization of human rights.  In 1966, the United Nations continued conceptual 
extension human rights to include a right to health:   
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12 
“12.1 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health. 
12.2 The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include 
those necessary for: 
a. The provision for the reduction of the still-birth rate and of 
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
b. The improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene; 
c. The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
d. The creation of conditions which would assure to all 
medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.” 
From: [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 1966] 
In Article 12.1, the right to both physical and mental health is explicitly affirmed.  Further, Article 
12.2 identifies the obligations of the State to protect and advance not only individual health but 
also public health.  In subsequent comments pursuant to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations further advanced these rights and 
obligations with increasingly prescriptive language regarding what States ought to do to protect 
these rights including, for example, necessary characteristics of health care systems (though 
ultimately this International Covenant is yet functionally unenforceable). [Kinney, 2001]    
 So, while the right to health is not an enforceable right in the realm of international law, 
within the United States (and other countries as well) the protection of health, now understood 
as a fundamental human or personal right with precedence over property rights, has been 
advanced as sound rationale, the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Carolene Products Company, for tobacco control policies.  The emergence and 
accumulation of scientific evidence establishing causal links between tobacco use and exposure 
and morbidity and mortality has given substantial credibility to the use of the human rights 
framework as the basis for this [U.S.] Court-standard of sound rationale.  Insofar as a person 
has a right to health (a human or personal and civil right) which is accorded greater 
consideration and protection than the right of another to smoke (a property right or legally 
protected interest), a hierarchy also established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Carolene Products Company, protection of non-smokers from exposure to secondhand or 
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environmental tobacco smoke, established by scientifically valid evidence as having negative 
health effects and increasing mortality risk, policies restricting or banning smoking particularly 
indoors have thus been framed as protection of human rights. [Oriola, 2009], [Katz, 2006], 
[Dressler & Marks, 2006]  The human rights framework, in conjunction with the specific rights 
and obligations advanced in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
[United Nations General Assembly, 1989], has also been applied as the foundation of rational 
basis for policies protecting children from exposure to secondhand smoke, enticement to use 
tobacco products, and employment in or exploitation (child labor) in tobacco agriculture or 
manufacturing industries. [Dressler & Marks, 2006], [World Health Organization, 2001]   
 Despite legitimate appeal to protection of the human right to health, tobacco products 
remain legal as does their use, and thus tobacco control policies necessarily limit personal 
liberty to obtain and use these legal products. [Pope, 2000]  The legal principles which serve as 
justification to limit personal freedom with a tobacco control policy, which is substantively 
distinguished from the public explanations forwarded for a given policy, are those of the limiting 
harm to others, the harm principle, or limiting the harm to oneself, the principle of either soft or 
hard paternalism. [Pope, 2000], [Oriola, 2009]  The harm principle, widely regarded as the most 
legitimate basis for governments to limit individual autonomy and with a longstanding legal and 
philosophical tradition, presupposes that an individual’s right to liberty and autonomy is 
justifiably abridged so as to prevent harm to others. [Pope, 2000]  Thus, some tobacco control 
policies that limit an individual’s liberty to use tobacco, whose use results in known negative 
(harmful) health consequences for those exposed to secondhand smoke, can clearly be justified 
with the harm principle, for example indoor smoking bans. [Oriola, 2009]  However, there must 
necessarily be limits to the harm principle, particularly in the understanding of what constitutes a 
reasonable or sufficient harm to warrant limitations on liberty, or there is a risk for a limitless, 
normative expansion in the conception of harm to include justification for virtually any 
government liberty-limiting action. [Pope, 2000]  It is possible to argue that there are some 
instances, such as transient exposure to secondhand smoke outdoors, where the harm to 
others is not of sufficient magnitude or risk to warrant limitations on liberty with the harm 
principle, and thus other justifications are sought. [Pope, 2000] 
In using the principle of paternalism, the state justifies limitations on individual liberty 
through coercive policies to protect one’s life, health, and / or safety because an individual is 
deemed to not have sufficient knowledge, maturity, or voluntary autonomy to make an informed 
and sound decision (soft paternalism), or solely to protect the individual from the harmful 
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consequences of an otherwise informed and autonomous choice (hard paternalism). [Oriola, 
2009], [Pope, 2000]  The transition in legal justification from the harm principle to the principle of 
paternalism unavoidably entails increased scrutiny and increased criticism from those 
philosophically more aligned with civil libertarianism, who regard any government liberty-limiting 
intervention defended as being in the government-deemed individual’s best interest with 
profound skepticism.  While policies justified with the principle of soft paternalism to protect 
vulnerable populations, such as tobacco control policies protecting children from secondhand 
smoke or those designed to prevent smoking initiation in children and adolescents (legal 
“minors”), and policies justified by the harm principle are generally accepted by civil libertarians 
[Hospers, 1980], paternalistic policies limiting the liberties of adults are much more 
controversial. [Hospers, 1980], [Oriola, 2009], [Pope, 2000]  The debate about the acceptability 
of paternalistic tobacco control policies, and the demarcation between tolerable and 
insupportable, is made more complex by two issues: the uniqueness of tobacco products as the 
only consumer product whose use as intended irrefutably results in harm to both the user and 
exposed non-users; and whether the decision to smoke is truly informed (and whether package 
warning labels fulfill this standard) and autonomous and, subsequently, whether continued use 
given the addictive qualities of nicotine is autonomous. [Pope, 2000]   
These debates are by no means settled, in part because the concept and understanding 
of “harm” continues to evolve in legal, political, and public spheres and tobacco control 
advocates have long understood the importance of acquiring additional, scientific evidence to 
further quantify “harm”. [Byrd, Shapiro, & Schiedermayer, 1989]  However, tobacco control 
advocates are not of uniform opinion or certainty on the utility of rights-based arguments to build 
public and political support for tobacco control policies. [Fox & Katz, 2005], [Jacobson & 
Banerjee, 2005], [Katz, 2006]  The trepidation is partially due to the tobacco industry’s 
successful framing of tobacco control advocates as “Health Nazis” who infringe upon “smokers’ 
rights” such that it is tobacco control advocates who may be perceived as being on the anti-
rights side of the debate [Katz, 2006], though it is noted that the use of “rights” in this context 
confounds, likely intentionally, common language understanding with technical definition of 
rights to obscure the difference between a fundamental human right and a legally protected 
interest. [Dressler & Marks, 2006]  The tactical challenges of using rights-based arguments vis à 
vis the tobacco industry aside, the invocation of rights as a reason to enact tobacco control 
policies necessarily raises fundamental, philosophical questions including: 
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“Who has the right to rank health in the hierarchy of social norms or goods?  
What authority, if any, is there for the state to permit or prohibit behaviors 
that will likely bear on health?  What sanctions can attach to health-
harming behavior?  What health-affecting entitlements are there, and how 
are they ensured?”   
From: [Coggon, 2009] 
How a particular country or society answers these questions is deeply rooted in 
philosophical, cultural, and political traditions, as well as constitutional and case law 
jurisprudence.  How such traditions vary between countries or change over time, and how such 
differences and changes affect the adoption of tobacco control policies is not well understood 
and remains an area needing additional research inquiry.  It seems evident, though, and 
certainly within the United States, that rationalization of tobacco control policies based solely on 
rights-based arguments is difficult and likely inadequate due to practical challenges (i.e., 
effective counter-arguments forwarded by the tobacco industry), and that rights-based 
arguments appealing to the harm principle alone likely do not meet judicial standard for sound 
rationale while rights-based arguments appealing to paternalism plausibly meet with stronger 
judicial (and political) scrutiny.  There is also an uncomfortable logical inconsistency and policy 
conundrum in rights-based justifications for tobacco control policies: if tobacco products so 
violate fundamental human rights to health, cause sufficient harm, and so interfere with 
informed and autonomous decision making, then why are these products not banned?  Hence, 
there must also be additional rationale for tobacco control policies. 
3.3.2 Debates about the Economic Rationale for Tobacco Control Policies 
Included in the normative expansion of the understanding of the harm caused by 
cigarettes have been the economic costs to society caused by the use of or exposure to 
tobacco products.  As stated previously, the C.D.C. has estimated an economic cost of $10.46 
associated with each pack of cigarettes sold, an estimate which includes direct medical 
expenses and indirect economic losses such as lost productivity. [Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2009]  Tobacco taxes thus function dually to reduce demand and to recover 
some of the tobacco-related costs, particularly those attributable to tobacco-related medical 
care.  However, neither the body of literature estimating these costs to society nor the literature 
on tobacco taxes are without controversy.   
The majority of studies estimating the economic costs to society have been conducted in 
the United States and largely estimate costs associated with primary use of cigarettes (i.e., 
costs associated with exposure to secondhand smoke or due to use of non-cigarette tobacco 
 [61] 
 
products much less common).  Further, the estimation of such costs is methodologically 
complex, and so estimates vary depending upon: the dataset; whether a prevalence or 
incidence approach is used; whether costs for only specific tobacco-related diseases are 
considered or all medical costs are included; the methods underlying the determination of the 
disease and mortality risk ratios and attributable fractions; the scope of costs considered (i.e., 
medical costs alone, or additional costs such as insurance, pension costs, or years of life lost); 
whether payment inputs as well as expenditures are considered (i.e., the considerate of so-
called “net” vs. “gross” costs); as well as statistical methodologies, which have evolved over 
time. [Max, 2001]  Most studies concur on the direction, though not on the magnitude, of the 
annual, direct smoking-attributable medical costs: smokers have higher annual medical costs 
than do never-smokers (and, in some studies, than former-smokers as well), and are estimated 
to account for anywhere from 6%-9% to 12%-14% of medical expenditures. [Max, 2001], 
[Warner, 2003], [Warner, Hodgson, & Carroll, 1999], [Hodgson, 1992], [Hayashida, et al., 2010], 
[Fellows, Trosclair, Adams, & Rivera, 2002]   
However, when the lifetime costs of smokers vs. non-smokers are considered, reported 
study results are far more equivocal.  A Swiss study first queried whether the shorter lifespan of 
smokers compensated for the higher medical costs incurred during their lifetime. [Leu & 
Schaub, 1983]  Two oft-cited American studies concluded that while smokers’ medical 
expenditures impose costs on society, these expenditures are recuperated in foregone pension 
and nursing home payments due to early mortality, resulting in a so-called “death benefit”. 
[Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss, & Wasserman, 1989], [Viscusi, 1995]  But a critique of the 
estimation methods used in these studies has focused on the costs that were and were not 
considered: while non-smokers have higher pension and nursing home costs than smokers 
(because smokers die at a younger age) that make up for or exceed their lower medical 
expenditures, these studies did not account for the larger inputs made into these systems by 
non-smokers (through taxation over a longer lifespan) which negates, according to this critique, 
any “death benefit”. [Warner, Hodgson, & Carroll, 1999]  Further, additional studies have 
indicated that the observed balance in “net” vs. “gross” lifetime expenditures (the “net” 
expenditures accounting for lower pension outlays due to shorter lifespan) is influenced by 
several methodologic considerations.  First, the importance of whether the study differentiates 
between never- vs. former- vs. current- vs. always-smokers and how the outlays and inputs for 
each are apportioned is highlighted by the observed “quitting ill” phenomenon in which the 
medical crisis that motivated cessation results in substantially elevated medical costs in these 
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individuals, who are now, though only recently, non-smokers, in the short- to medium-
timeframe. [Warner, 2003]  Second, whether the amount of smoking (i.e., packs per day) is 
considered as evidence suggests that medical expenditures increase with the amount smoked. 
[Hodgson, 1992]  Third, whether costs other than medical expenditures, such as health status or 
quality of life, are considered. [Hayashida, et al., 2010]  Finally, which disease-related costs are 
considered as attributed to smoking and whether gender and the age at time of cessation is 
considered. [Rasmussen, Prescott, Sorensen, & Sogaard, 2004], [Rasmussen, Prescott, 
Sorensen, & Sogaard, 2005]  The wide variability in methodologic approaches and findings 
suggests that this topic is not yet resolved but rather remains controversial, and conclusions 
from individual studies are highly dependent upon the aforementioned methodologic details. 
[Max, 2001], [Warner, 2003]  Finally, regardless of the questionable ethical legitimacy for doing 
so, the tobacco industry has cited results from the industry-favorable studies, while ignoring 
contrary studies and methodologic complexities, to argue against enacting tobacco control 
policies on the basis that smoking is cost-effective because of the “death benefit”. [Pellegrini, 
2001]  At a minimum, the tobacco industry has effectively created controversy around this issue. 
Taxation is a prominent and ubiquitous tobacco control policy and is justified as a means 
to recover some of the smoking-attributable medical expenditures and to affect a price-induced 
reduction in demand.  Beyond ideologically-based “no tax is a good tax” criticisms, high levels of 
tobacco taxation are contentious because of the intersection of poverty, price elasticities and 
concerns about tax regressivity.  Both within the United States and globally, there is substantial 
evidence that tobacco use is increasingly becoming a characteristic of lower socioeconomic 
classes. [World Health Organization, 2004]  In the United States, there is evidence that the 
social disparity in smoking prevalence has increased since the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement [Franks, et al., 2007], and studies have reported associations such as increased 
food insecurity in poor households with a smoker compared to poor households without a 
smoker. [Armour, Pitts, & Lee, 2008]  Given this socioeconomic gradient, any tax on tobacco 
products, a consumption good, will necessarily be regressive (a larger proportion of total income 
in lower socioeconomic strata is spent on consumption and thus any consumption tax tends to 
regressivity), which is compounded by the higher smoking prevalence in these lower 
socioeconomic strata. [Remler, 2004]  So, increasing levels of tobacco taxation could be 
understood as nevertheless beneficial if such tax increases differentially induced poorer 
smokers to quit.  However, evidence for higher price elasticity (in absolute value terms) amongst 
lower socioeconomic groups is unclear. [Regidor, Pascual, & Gutierrez-Fisac, 2007]  Evidence 
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supports that adolescent and young adult smokers are the most price elastic. [Grossman & 
Chaloupka, 1997], [Franz, 2008], [Tauras, 2004]  In adults however, observations from 
epidemiologic studies that social disparities in smoking prevalence have increased despite 
repeated price increases [Franks, et al., 2007], [Regidor, Pascual, & Gutierrez-Fisac, 2007] as 
well as from studies making direct estimates of elasticities [Gospodinov & Irvine, 2009] have 
suggested that demand may actually be more inelastic in lower socioeconomic groups.  
Reporting oppositional results, other studies have suggested higher price elasticity amongst 
lower socioeconomic strata. [Siahpush, Wakefield, Spittal, Durkin, & Scollo, 2009], [Farrelly & 
Engelen, 2008], [Thomas, et al., 2008]  It is noted that the concern is not the effectiveness of 
tobacco taxation to affect a decrease in both prevalence and consumption at the population-
level, but whether these effects are distributed evenly throughout all sociodemographic groups 
in a population; on the latter point the answer is yet uncertain.   
The varied results may, in part, be due to the time perspective taken as studies have 
demonstrated short-term price inelasticity with cross-price effects (i.e., reduced consumption or 
substitution with cheaper or “gray-market” goods) but much higher price elasticity in the long 
run. [Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994], [Hyland, et al., 2005]  A possible explanation for 
these varied observations is that the probability of cessation (calculated or interpreted as a price 
elasticity) after a tax increase is dependent upon the ability to access cessation support to assist 
in overcoming nicotine addiction.  Individuals in upper socioeconomic strata are more likely to 
be able to access such cessation supports of their own accord while individuals in lower 
socioeconomic strata are more likely to require social and/or monetary support to obtain these 
supports.  Thus, important ethical questions arise about tobacco taxation related to social equity 
and social justice, notably: 1) How must taxation policies be constructed so as to ensure 
reduction not entrenchment or exacerbation of social disparities; and 2) If provision of cessation 
support is key to minimizing social gradients in taxation effects, is it ethical for jurisdictions to 
raise taxes without providing commensurate cessation support (in extension, then, should 
Medicaid be required to provide cessation support)? [Feldman, 2001], [Feldman, 2009]  The 
importance of support for cessation in promoting social equity in tobacco use reduction, both 
within countries and globally, has been noted as a moral imperative and the absence of it as a 
mandate in the F.C.T.C. has been a source of particular criticism of the Framework. [Meier & 
Shelley, 2006], [Meier B. M., 2005]   
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Thus, as with rights-based arguments the economic rationale for and policy instruments 
used in tobacco control are not incontrovertible, and each jurisdiction must address these issues 
and debates when enacting tobacco control policies.    
3.3.3 Final Comments on “Rights” in Light of Health Disparities and Social Justice 
Appeals to and arguments about human rights and the human right to health, the harm 
principle and legal paternalism, concerns about the regressivity of taxes, and unease regarding 
the use of social stigmatization and de-normalization to promulgate tobacco control policies 
conflux when tobacco use and tobacco control policies are considered in the context of social 
disparities in health.  As has already been discussed, the use of tobacco is increasingly 
concentrating along social gradients such that, either within a country or between countries, 
tobacco users are from lower socioeconomic strata or poorer countries.  Thus, in addition to the 
arguments already presented, tobacco use and tobacco control policy debates become yet 
more complicated when social justice and related issues are considered.  Many have argued 
that comprehensive and aggressive tobacco control policies, including the F.C.T.C., are 
imperative (with some allusions to moral imperatives) to advance human rights (right to health), 
reduce social disparities, and so promote social justice.  [Wilson & Thomson, 2005], [Healton & 
Nelson, 2004], [Crow, 2005], [Crow, 2004]  But if tobacco use is concentrating along social 
gradients, it is not unreasonable to query if tobacco control policies need to be adjusted to 
account for the different needs and concerns of these socioeconomic strata.  Strategies such as 
de-normalization and social stigmatization is considered by some to aggravate rather than 
diminish health disparities and social injustice [Bell, Salmon, Bowers, Bell, & McCullough, 2010] 
and the social justice concerns about excise tax regressivity have already been discussed.  
Additional concerns include the intentional targeting of these disadvantaged social strata by 
tobacco companies [Barbeau, Leavy-Sperounis, & Balbach, 2004] as well as the structure of 
non-tax tobacco control policies.  Specifically, individuals in lower socioeconomic strata typically 
have fewer individual (human), social, and economic capital resources which affects one’s 
ability to access or effectively use cessation treatment, for example, and lower health literacy 
which affects one’s ability to read and understand package and advertising warning labels, for 
example. [Weiss & Smith-Simone, 2010], [DiClemente, Delahanty, & Fiedler, 2010]  
Accordingly, if tobacco control policy is to be used as a way to reduce health disparities, the 
perspectives and needs of individuals in of lower socioeconomic strata must be considered and 
accommodated if social justice is to be truly advanced.   
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In summary, what has been presented in these subsections is the philosophical basis for 
opposition to tobacco control policies both domestically and internationally.  While the concerns 
presented here have been framed within the context of U.S. legal standards and evidence, the 
fundamental issues of limitations on liberties, protections of human rights, and values are 
ubiquitous and so are universal challenges to implementing tobacco control policies.  These are 
also arguments and concerns that have been effectively forwarded by the tobacco industry 
worldwide as barriers to implementing tobacco control policies.  How these arguments or a 
society’s legal framework affect public or political opinion or policy adoption across jurisdictions 
or time periods is not well understood and remains an area to be explored. 
3.3.4 The Universal and Ubiquitous Anti- Anti-Tobacco Arguments 
The now decades-long debates in the political and public arenas over tobacco control 
policies have facilitated the development of a series of common arguments for and against 
these policies. As these arguments have persisted, they have become somewhat familiar and 
entrenched within the population and resistant to change.  Many of these arguments have been 
recycled again and again in different jurisdictions at different time periods in response to the 
policy debate of that time and place.  Their perseverance is likely due to their populist appeal 
and face validity, even if their premises or conclusions are not supported by fact.  Anthologies of 
these arguments have, at various times, been compiled and presented in either academic or 
popular literature.  Summaries of the arguments presented in three such publications are 
presented in Tables 3-6—3-8.  In the first publication summarized in Table 3-6, from a decidedly 
pro-tobacco control perspective, twelve anti-tobacco control “myths” are summarized and 
rebuttal arguments are given for each of these “myths”. [Frieden & Blakeman, 2005]  In the 
second publication summarized in Table 3-7, from a more neutral perspective, the “myths” 
about the economic implications of tobacco and tobacco control as argued by both the tobacco 
industry and tobacco control communities are presented along with the “reality” – i.e., the “truth” 
as supported by scientific studies – underlying the arguments. [Warner, 2000]  In the third 
publication summarized in Table 3-8, from a decidedly libertarian and anti-tobacco control 
perspective, common arguments against the need or justification for tobacco control are 
presented. [Sullum, 1998] 
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Table 3-6. “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate  
Source: [Frieden & Blakeman, 2005] 
“Myth” “Reality” / Rebuttal
“People have free choice whether or not 
to smoke” 
• Free will is subverted by advertising and nicotine addiction 
• In 2002, tobacco industry spent $12.5 billion on advertising and promotion in the 
US (>18X spending on tobacco control) 
• Nicotine is highly addictive, a fact known and manipulated by tobacco companies 
• Most smokers want to quit but cannot do so easily due to addiction 
• Children, below the legal age of consent, are not legally competent to make 
informed and rational decisions about whether to smoke 
“Everyone knows how bad smoking is” • There is a general awareness that smoking isn’t healthy, but there is much less 
knowledge about specific risks beyond lung cancer (e.g., heart disease, gender-
specific risks) 
• Evidence that knowledge of risks varies from country to country and even within a 
country across different population strata (e.g., rural vs. urban) 
“Just a few cigarettes a day can’t hurt” • Relationship between tobacco use and lung cancer is relatively linear 
• But, relationship between exposure and cardiovascular disease is not, and 
negative health effects start at very low doses and rise rapidly 
“’Light’ cigarettes are less harmful” • There is no standard definition to what “light” means 
• Tobacco companies insist that the term is intended to refer to perceived taste and 
not to tar or nicotine content 
• Any meaningful difference between regular and “light” cigarettes is lost due to 
compensatory behaviors 
“It is easy to stop smoking: if people 
want to quit they will” 
• Nicotine addiction makes cessation difficult 
• Nicotine has been likened to opium, heroin, cocaine and alcohol in terms of 
addictive potential 
• Most smokers attempt quitting annually 
• Only 7% of smokers who attempt quitting without assistance succeed 
“Cessation medications don’t work” • Pharmacologic therapy double the chances of success, and combination therapy 
can increase change of success beyond that
“Once a smoker always a smoker” • More than 50% of Americans who have smoked have quit 
“Smokers may die earlier, but all they 
lose are a couple of bad years at the end 
of life” 
• Average smokers loses 14 years of life, 95% of that time in non-smokers is spent 
without disability 
“Environmental tobacco smoke may be a 
nuisance, but it isn’t deadly” 
• The negative health effects of exposure to secondhand smoke as been well 
documented, including substantial increased risk for both respiratory and lung 
disease 
“Tobacco is good for the economy” • As supported by analyses done by the World Bank, a complete evaluation of both 
the costs and benefits of tobacco in the economy shows that the net effect of 
tobacco on the economy 
• For example, analysis in the US shows that elimination of tobacco from the 
economy would result in a net increase of 130,000 jobs 
“We’ve already solved the tobacco 
problem” 
• While smoking prevalence is and has been declining in the developed world, about 
20% of the population in developed countries still smoke and globally and 
estimated 1 billion people will die this century from smoking related causes
“The tobacco industry no longer markets 
to kids or undermines public health 
efforts” 
• The fiduciary responsibility of the tobacco companies – to preserve and expand 
profits – is orthogonal to being supportive of and compliant with tobacco control 
policies 
• Magazine ads for the 3 most popular brands reach 80% of children in the US 
• Adolescents 12-17 are twice as likely as adults to have been exposed to tobacco 
advertising 
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Table 3-7. Economic “Myths” and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate  
“Myth” “Reality” / Rebuttal
Tobacco Industry: The cultivation and 
manufacture of tobacco is crucial to the 
country’s economy and tobacco control 
will result in job losses, lost tax revenue, 
and trade deficits  
• While 33 million people farm tobacco worldwide, most do it part time / in 
addition to other crops 
• Half of all global tobacco farmers are in China (15 million) followed by India 
(3.5 million) and is a meaningful portion of the economy in another half-dozen 
countries 
• In the vast majority of countries, tobacco manufacturing is <1% of 
manufacturing employment 
• In the US, only 1.6% of jobs in the six-state “tobacco bloc” come from tobacco 
farming or manufacturing, and only 1% of income comes from tobacco in 
almost half of all US  
• This argument assumes that economic presence equates to economic 
dependence, even though most studies show that jobs lost to tobacco control 
or lost manufacturing/growing would be reallocated 
• A tobacco control program that does not include an increase in tobacco excise 
taxes will result in lost revenue  
Tobacco Industry: Tobacco control will 
cause severe hardships in other industries 
(e.g., restaurants) 
• No empirical evidence to support that bar / restaurant smoking bans result in 
lost business 
• Bans – and supporting studies – criticized by restaurants and bars, but no 
contrary evidence has been presented 
• Advertising bans result in industry-specific job losses but studies by the 
advertising industry suggest that these are gross but not net job losses
Tobacco Industry: Increases in tobacco 
excise taxes cause increases in 
smuggling and so result in lost 
government revenue  
• Estimates in developed countries support that a 10% increase in taxes will 
result in a 4% decrease in consumption, and estimates from developing 
countries approximate an 8% decrease in consumption for a 10% increase in 
taxes thus net government revenues should always increase with a tax 
increase; this is further supported by the absence of any studies suggesting 
the contrary 
• Smuggling is a legitimate concern and is often supported by the tobacco 
industry, but there are established anti-smuggling measures that can largely 
combat the practice 
Tobacco Industry: Tobacco taxes are 
fundamentally unfair because they are 
regressive not progressive, and unfairly 
burden the poor 
• Tax is likely regressive, though a tax increase is likely less regressive because 
evidence suggests that poorer smokers are more price sensitive 
• Concerns about regressivity can be overcome of a portion of the tax increase 
is dedicated to cessation 
Tobacco Control Advocates:  
Governments hypocritically promote 
tobacco control and subsidize tobacco 
growing, with the latter undermining health 
and tobacco control efforts  
• This is likely true 
• While the economic importance of tobacco agriculture and manufacturing has 
decreased over time, more than anything the price support system in the US 
that started in the 1930s has created an entrenched political establishment 
with a vested interest to oppose tobacco control
Tobacco Control Advocates: Advances in 
tobacco control in developed countries 
has caused tobacco companies to move 
into developing countries, thus advances 
in developed countries “cause” hardship in 
developing countries 
• While compelling, the argument is not logical from a profit-maximizing 
perspective:  companies go where there are profits to be made 
• While correlated with declining tobacco consumption in developed countries, 
tobacco industry expansion in developing countries is more causally 
associated by globalization of trade and rising consumer income in these 
countries sufficient to support purchasing of their product 
• Tobacco companies are still profitable in developed countries 
Tobacco Control Advocates: Advertising 
and promotion is the principal determinant 
of smoking, especially of smoking 
initiation by adolescents and young adults 
vs. 
Tobacco Industry:  Tobacco advertising 
has no effect on tobacco consumption – 
their only function is between-brand 
competition / marketshare 
• Advertising and promotional activities clearly increase consumption, as is well 
understood by the tobacco industry 
• However, per the 1989 Surgeon General’s report, the exact magnitude of the 
impact on smoking and / or smoking initiation is not known and possibly 
unknowable, though population-wide studies show that complete advertising 
and promotional bans reduce consumption by 6% 
• Advertising is not the principal reason for smoking initiation in adolescents and 
young adults – peer and parental behavior are stronger predictors of smoking 
initiation 
Source: [Warner, 2000] 
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These tables have summarized the point/counter-point arguments commonly employed in 
tobacco control policy debates both domestically and internationally.  Subsequent research 
studies have become available in the time since these studies (Tables 3-6—3-8) were 
published, thus altering the interpretation of some of the information supporting the arguments 
of the authors.  Nonetheless, it is clear that both tobacco control advocates and tobacco control 
opponents can and have creatively interpreted and presented some data to support what, at 
times, feels like “positions” rather than reasoned arguments.  These arguments arise, 
fundamentally, from the orthogonal philosophical interpretation of liberty-limiting tobacco control 
policies: public health and tobacco control advocates feel that the limitations on liberty are 
justified by the health and economic costs, whereas opponents do not.  It is not likely that such 
philosophical divides will be bridged, and thus such debates and arguments are likely to persist.   
“Myth” “Reality” / Rebuttal
“The tobacco companies hid the truth 
about the hazards and addictiveness of 
cigarettes from the American public” 
• Concerns about smoking date back to the 1600s 
• Scientific evidence began to emerge in the 1930s and has received 
consistent attention since the 1950s 
“Tobacco is tobacco” • Evidence suggests that cigars, pipes, and smokeless tobacco are much less 
dangerous and so the same level of restriction [as cigarettes] is not justified
“People smoke because of advertising” • Evidence suggests that advertising affects which brand people smoke, not if 
they smoke 
• Per the 1989 Surgeon General’s report, there is no “definitive answer to the 
basic question of whether advertising and promotion increase the level of 
tobacco consumption” 
“Smoking imposes costs on society” • Smokers die earlier than non-smokers and so medical costs are offset, per 
study results by Viscusi, and RAND
“Secondhand smoke poses a grave 
threat to bystanders” 
• The evidence about the health effects of secondhand smoke is not as 
conclusive as the evidence about the health effects of smoking 
• There is no evidence that secondhand smoke reduces life expectancy 
“If secondhand smoke really is 
dangerous, smoking ought to be banned 
everywhere, except in private 
residences” 
• Most epidemiologic evidence suggests that exposure to secondhand smoke 
is most dangerous when it is a home-based exposure 
• That home smoking bans aren’t part of legislation suggest a concern for 
property rights 
• But why aren’t the property rights of others – such as private employers, 
restaurant and bar owners etc – given equal consideration? 
• Private property owners should be able to establish their own police and 
market forces allowed to establish equilibrium
“States have a right to demand 
compensation from tobacco companies 
for the costs of treating smoking-related 
diseases under Medicaid” 
• Focusing on recovering medical care costs ignores the net benefit from 
shorter life spans and so states’ claims are unfounded 
• Why are cigarettes singled out for such compensation and why do states not 
also pursue compensation from manufacturers of other “harmful” products 
such as alcoholic beverages, fatty foods etc 
• The makers and consumers of cigarettes should not be punished because 
“politicians decided to pay for health care with taxpayers’ money” 
“The tobacco companies have been 
secretly manipulating the nicotine in 
cigarettes to keep smokers hooked” 
• Nicotine has not been a secret 
• Nicotine-free cigarettes were introduced in the 1920s, and reduced nicotine 
and tar brands in the 1950s 
• Ways that manufacturers have provided consistent nicotine in products has 
long been discussed in trade journals
“Smoking is ‘a pediatric disease’” • While most smokers start as teenagers, the vast majority of smokers are 
adults 
• While smoking raises the risk of certain diseases it is a behavior – 
something people choose to do – and not a disease 
“Once people have started smoking, 
nicotine addiction prevents them from 
stopping” 
• There are about as many former smokers as there are current smokers, so 
this position is insupportable 
Table 3-8. Libertarian Perspective on the "Myths" and “Realities” in the Tobacco Control Debate  
Source: [Sullum, 1998] 
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3.4 Looming Challenges 
In the preceding sections, the philosophical arguments challenging tobacco control policy 
implementation were presented.  Tobacco control policy also faces a series of specific 
challenges, many of which are related to market dynamics and a creative industry that shifts 
products and tactics in order to sustain profitability.  These issues and challenges will be briefly 
discussed here.    
3.4.1 Specially Targeted Populations 
As has been previously discussed, a substantial gradient both within (domestically) and 
between countries (globally) has developed such that smoking is increasingly concentrated in 
lower socioeconomic social strata. [Franks, et al., 2007], [World Health Organization, 2004]  
Within the U.S., the Appalachian region has been reported as a sociogeographic cluster with the 
correlated variables of high smoking prevalence, low income/high poverty, and low policy 
coverage [Ferkeitch, Liber, Pennell, Nealy, Hammer, & Berman, 2010] as well as a much higher 
probability that children will be exposed to secondhand smoke [Singh, Siahpush, & Kogan, 
2010], a known risk for increased likelihood that of smoking uptake [Greenland, Liu, Kiefe, 
Yunis, Dyer, & Burke, 1995] and so continue smoking-related disparity cycles.  This evolving 
gradient has differentially affected the social context of smoking and so the normative behaviors 
within these socioeconomic strata [Paul, Ross, Bryant, Hill, Bonevski, & Keevy, 2010], further 
aggravating concerns about the entrenchment of discrepancies in health equality.  So, whether 
the gradient in smoking is causative, symptomatic, or highly correlative with other causal 
factors, the socioeconomic disparity in smoking and health is concerning from both a social 
justice perspective and a practical perspective because of the additional challenges in realizing 
cessation and preventing initiation in populations with lower levels of education and social and 
economic resources. 
Smoking rates in women, and particularly adolescent girls, is also a concern and 
challenge facing the public health community.  While tobacco companies have long had gender-
specific products and advertising campaigns, a recent report has documented new advertising 
campaigns promoting “purse packs”, pink colored cigarettes, and branded cellphone “bling”, 
among others, in highly read fashion magazines. [American Cancer Society Cancer Action 
Network, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, with funding from the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, 2009]  Globally, some reports have found that smoking in adolescent girls now 
exceeds that in women. [Warren, et al., 2008]  These challenges highlight the need for specific 
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and prescriptive policy, vigilant compliance monitoring and enforcement of existing policy, and 
the need for particular attention to young women who represent a strong market growth 
opportunity for tobacco companies.  
3.4.2 Alternative and Smokeless Tobacco Products and the Harm Reduction Debate 
As summarized in Table 3-9, there are numerous forms of tobacco products other than 
cigarettes with which tobacco or tobacco-like doses of nicotine can be consumed.  In the United 
States, population estimates from the C.D.C. indicate that 3.3% of all adults (6.5% of men and 
0.4% of women) and 7.9% of all high school students (13.4% in males and 2.3% in females) are 
smokeless tobacco users, with higher use rates in young white males, American Indians/Alaska 
natives, southern and north-central states, and lower socioeconomic status employment 
occupations or unemployed. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  Moist snuff 
has the largest U.S. market share (approximately 73%) followed by loose leaf chewing tobacco 
(approximately 24.1%). [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]  Use of smokeless 
tobacco products has been reported to increase the risk for the development of oral, 
esophageal, pancreatic and lung cancers to varying degrees, though somewhat inconsistently 
Table 3-9. Smokeless Tobacco Products 
Type Forms Description 
Chewing Tobacco† Loose leave 
Plug 
Twist 
• Consumed by placing between the foil pouch 
(loose leaf), leaf-wrapped packet (plug) or rope 
(twist) between cheek and gums 
Snuff† Moist 
Dry 
Sachets 
• Powder (dry) can be inhaled 
• Most users put a “pinch” or “dip” (moist) or 
sachet between cheek/lips/teeth and gums 
• Snus, a Swedish moist snuff, has recently been 
introduced in the US? 
Electronic Cigarettes 
(sometimes “e-cigarettes” 
or “e-cigs)‡ 
Electronic device that looks and feels like 
a cigarette but does not burn tobacco 
• Device has a small battery-run electronic device 
that produces a warm vapor mist of nicotine that 
is inhaled 
• End of device “glows” like a cigarette 
• Flavorings can be added 
• Device comes with replacement cartridges; 
nicotine dose can be varied 
Betel Quid (sometimes 
“gutka”, “ghutka”, “gutkha”)* 
Commercially in tins, foil packets, or 
sachets 
• Betel quid is a combination of betel leaf, areca 
nut, slaked lime, and sometimes with tobacco 
added 
• Gutka is the commercial form of the product 
• Both are chewed or sucked on (saliva can be 
swallowed or spit) 
• Regional and ethnic origins in Indian sub-
continent, Asia, and Pacific Islands 
• Product is said to have stimulant and relaxant 
effects
Water-pipes (sometimes 
“hooka”, “shisha”, “goza”, 
“narghile”, “hubble 
bubble”)¥ 
Tobacco packets and device are acquired 
separately 
• Tall, upright device 
• Tobacco is heated (vaporized) in a chamber 
then smoke is inhaled after passing through a 
chamber of water 
• Regional and ethnic origins in India and Arabic 
countries 
Hard-form Lozenges, tables, tabs, strips, sticks, 
other candy-like configurations
• Sucked similar to candy 
Sources: †(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009]; ‡ [Etter, 2010]; * [Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2009]; ¥ [Knishkowy & Amitai, 2005], [Dugas, Tremblay, Low, Cournoyer, & 
O'Loughlin, 2010]; ? [Gartner, Hall, Vos, Bertram, Wallace, & Lim, 2007] 
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internationally and dependent upon the study and study population [Boffetta, Hecht, Gray, 
Gupta, & Straif, 2008], and preeclampsia in pregnant women. [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009]  Potential cardiovascular effects associated with smokeless tobacco use are 
unclear primarily due to lack of study. [Arabi, 2006]  Generally, the population-wide health 
effects of smokeless tobacco products are believed to be less than those for smoking. [Boffetta, 
Hecht, Gray, Gupta, & Straif, 2008]  Use of betel quid or gutka has been associated with 
increased risk for precancerous oral lesions and oral and esophageal cancers. [Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009] However, the potential health effects of alternative, non-
tobacco products such as electronic cigarettes are largely unknown because they are both new 
products and largely unregulated, though a few countries have banned them outright. [Etter, 
2010]  Lastly, while population studies on the effects of hookah or water-pipe smoking have not 
been conducted, a content analysis of the inhaled smoke from water-pipes suggests toxicity as 
high if not higher than cigarette smoke, though it is acknowledged that the tobacco used in such 
pipes is not well standardized. [Knishkowy & Amitai, 2005] 
As the public and private implementation of smoking bans (i.e., in public and private 
worksites, public and private indoor and outdoor spaces, and home and car bans) spread, 
smokeless and alternate tobacco products are often viewed – or portrayed – as a means to 
continue tobacco use without violating regulations and so its use is expected to grow. [Arabi, 
2007]  Tobacco companies have developed and introduced new products and promotional 
campaigns to take advantage of this potentially expanding market opportunity. [Mejia & Ling, 
2010]  Additionally, new products can often be introduced without the manufacturing regulations 
or tobacco control policy restrictions intended for cigarettes, as illustrated by electronic 
cigarettes [Etter, 2010] and hookah bars, both of which have proliferated in many states and the 
latter whose operation is not well regulated and which is becoming associated with college-age 
“party” activities including co-use of other illicit drugs and binge drinking. [Knishkowy & Amitai, 
2005], [Dugas, Tremblay, Low, Cournoyer, & O'Loughlin, 2010], [Lyon, 2008]  Thus, for the 
public health community, the challenges of smokeless and alternate tobacco products are 
twofold.  The first challenge is practical: gathering and having access to sufficient, reliable data 
to make informed policy decisions and having a policy infrastructure that can adapt and respond 
to rapidly changing market conditions.  The second challenge is philosophical: with some 
evidence that some of these products have fewer health effects, should they be promoted as 
part of a cessation strategy or would the risk of such a promotion of these products be either 
ineffective or unethical – as some have queried, “a gateway to smoking or a bridge to quitting”? 
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[Arabi, 2007]  On this latter challenge, smokeless and alternate tobacco products are fully 
embroiled in the “tobacco harm reduction debate” that is ongoing in the public health 
community. 
3.4.3 The Tobacco Harm Reduction Debate 
At the core of this debate is whether smokeless and alternate tobacco products 
represent a legitimate nicotine replacement product that will facilitate ultimate complete 
cessation, or whether smokers will simply substitute one product for another.  Some studies 
report clear health benefits of switching to snuff, snus in particular [Hall & Gartner, 2009], 
[Gartner, Hall, Vos, Bertram, Wallace, & Lim, 2007], and endorse the use of smokeless and 
alternate tobacco products as a policy tool in tobacco harm reduction. [Rodu & Godshall, 2006]  
However, many raise concerns about simple product substitution, dual-product use, or the 
relative effectiveness of these products over existing strategies for cessation inducement and 
nicotine replacement therapies. [McKee & Gilmore, 2007], [Lambe, 2007], [Mumford, Levy, 
Gitchell, & Blackman, 2005]  Other studies have suggested that the population health benefits of 
promoting smokeless tobacco as part of a tobacco harm reduction strategy, after using 
simulation modeling to account for different use patterns, would be negligible. [Mejia, Ling, & 
Glantz, 2010]   
There is a notable lack of consensus within the public health and tobacco control 
community [Martin, Warner, & Lantz, 2004], and many studies enumerate the need for 
additional, reliable information about: the products themselves including toxicologic profile; 
physiologic effects; epidemiologic effects and risks; impacts on individual behavioral patterns; 
population levels of knowledge about the products; legal and ethical challenges and concerns in 
product regulation; short-term vs. long-term effects of use and on overall probability of 
cessation; and understanding the demographic, socioeconomic, and/or sociogeographic 
clusters with greater risk or greater possible benefit from the products. [Hatsukami, et al., 2002], 
[Savitz, Meyer, Tanzer, Mirvish, & Lewin, 2006]  As has been previously pointed out, a 
substantial challenge to systematically addressing these issues in the United States has been 
the lack of a tobacco regulatory agency [Zeller, M; Hatsukami, D; and the Strategic Dialogue on 
Tobacco Harm Reduction Group, 2009], though this may have been resolved with the recent 
authority given to the F.D.A. in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of 2009.   
3.4.4  Globalization 
The tobacco industry’s use of globalization, especially trade agreements, to expand and 
develop new markets has been well documented. [Zatonski, 2003], [Szilagyi, 2006], [Shaffer, 
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Brenner, & Houston, 2005]  By design and intent, international trade agreements reduce the 
barriers to the flow of goods and services as well as the ability of individual states to regulate or 
impede the trade of products, including tobacco.  Globalization has also been credited with the 
rising income in many countries, which makes tobacco products more affordable. [Collin, Lee, & 
Bissell, 2002]  In addition to trade, the development and access to the internet has substantially 
advanced the globalization of communication, information, and culture and some reports have 
documented tobacco industry use of new media venues such as Facebook© to advertise and 
promote their products. [Freeman & Chapman, 2010]  As was discussed above, a primary 
reason to develop the F.C.T.C. was to combat the globalization of the tobacco epidemic, which 
includes the globalization of markets and marketing, and such studies highlight the importance 
of a savvy, globalized response to a savvy, globalized, and motivated industry.   
3.4.5 Tobacco-Control Challenges in the United States 
Two challenges facing U.S. tobacco control efforts merit brief discussion.  The first 
challenge is unique to neither the U.S. nor this policy area: maintaining funding for tobacco 
control programs. The C.D.C. reports that the tobacco industry spent $34 million / day or $12.4 
billion in 2006 on the advertising and promotion of cigarettes [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009] and $354 million in 2006 on the advertising and promotion of smokeless 
tobacco products, an increase from $251 million in 2005. [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009]  In the face of industry perpetually aspiring to obtain new customers and new 
markets, tobacco control efforts can never be “over” or “done” if goals to protect and promote 
public health, reduce health disparities, and advance human rights and social justice are to be 
achieved.  Thus, the tobacco control program activities as well as the funding and infrastructure 
that supports them must remain intact and the efforts to maintain the necessary funding and 
infrastructure must be sustained possibly perpetually and against ubiquitous and enduring fiscal 
pressures for such funding to be used elsewhere.  Such challenges are emphasized by a recent 
report from the C.D.C. estimating that $24.4 billion were available to states in 2008 from 
tobacco taxes and payments from legal settlements, yet states only spent 3% of those funds on 
their tobacco control programs, not even reaching the 15% of revenues recommended by the 
C.D.C.. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010]  This challenge is clearly 
recognized within the tobacco control community and efforts to both bring attention to and 
develop strategies for sustainability are not uncommon. [Wisotzky, Albuquerque, Pechacek, & 
Park, 2004], [Stoner & Foley, 2006], [Carver, Reinert, & Range, 2007]  
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Finally, in a white paper released in 2001 Philip Morris announced that they would support 
F.D.A. regulation of tobacco products provided that: a) cigarettes were regulated as a unique 
product and not a medical device; b) regulation did not lead to prohibition; c) regulations aimed 
at harm reduction do not reduce product-derived pleasure or enjoyment; d) communication 
about reduced risk products should not encourage smoking or discourage quitting; e) that 
regulations should address warning labels such that adults are fully informed about the risks 
associated with the product’s use; and f) that tobacco products remain legal products (i.e., not 
banned) or made, through regulated removal or addition of specified ingredients, so unpalatable 
as to induce cessation.  [Redhead & Burrows, 2009]  This represented a reversal from all of 
Philip Morris’ previous positions opposing such regulation (even though the white paper 
emphasizes that it did not), including the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule that first asserted F.D.A. 
jurisdiction over tobacco, and a split within the tobacco industry as all other tobacco companies 
remain opposed to F.D.A. regulation of tobacco. [Redhead & Burrows, 2009]  Philip Morris’ 
unfeigned motivation to support F.D.A. regulation of tobacco is not known, but suppositions 
include capitalizing on their size to capture marketshare from competitors, improve their public 
image, enhance its legitimacy, and an effort for a weaken-from-within strategy. [Redhead & 
Burrows, 2009], [McDaniel & Malone, 2005]  Regardless of their “new” tactic of cooperation, 
tobacco control advocates are generally wary of this cooperation and are concerned about the 
implications for and attempts to weaken tobacco control policies and programs. [McDaniel & 
Malone, 2005]  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a review of the tobacco epidemic from the public health 
perspective.  However, this review did not focus on the evidence establishing the biologic causal 
link between exposure to tobacco and adverse health outcomes nor the very large, and ever 
growing, body of public health literature establishing and advancing the understanding of 
tobacco control policy “best practices” – i.e., that body of literature representing the cumulative 
evidence for the effectiveness for various tobacco control programs and policies and the specific 
circumstances surrounding the implementation of those programs and policies.  Rather, this 
review, after a overview of the evidence for tobacco control policy “best practices”, focused on 
public health-lead efforts to enact these policies.  That is, this chapter emphasized the public 
health community’s extension of the positivist dimension of tobacco control policy (evidence for 
program and policy effectiveness) into the normative sphere:  the reasoning that the deleterious 
health outcomes, social costs, and untoward conduct of the tobacco industry is sufficient to 
warrant and justify the position that these effective policies should therefore be universally 
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adopted.  Thus, this chapter examined the transition from tobacco control policies to tobacco 
control policy regimes and both the domestic and international efforts to adopt such policy 
regimes, including the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  
This review also discussed universal challenges to implementing tobacco control policy 
regimes, especially the challenge of balancing different types of individual rights as well as that 
of the public’s interest and health with these different types of individual rights.  Other, common 
arguments both for and against tobacco control policies were also discussed, including 
arguments regarding measuring the true “cost” of tobacco use and lifespan issues, economic 
dependencies, and libertarian vs. paternalistic perspectives on the balance between individual 
choice and public health.  Finally, pending challenges for the tobacco control policy community 
were discussed, including the growing intra- and inter-country concentration of tobacco use in 
already marginalized populations (impoverished, lower socio-economic strata, visible minorities) 
and the yet-unresolved debate over tobacco harm reduction products and the efficacy as well as 
the ethical dilemmas posed by the promotion of these products as a means to abate the 
tobacco epidemic.   
The public health community has contributed much to the tobacco control literature.  This 
perspective, in particular, has been largely responsible for the development of effective tobacco 
control programs and policies and it has been well documented that there have been barriers 
and challenges to the adoption and implementation of comprehensive tobacco control policies.  
However, beyond the legerdemain of the tobacco industry in manipulating a faulty political 
process for unseemly gains [the dominant viewpoint in the public health perspective], the public 
health literature has contributed comparatively little to explanations for how and why the policy 
process has worked in the pursuit of tobacco control policy adoption.  This is the focus of the 
next chapter.    
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4 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC FROM THE POLITICAL AND 
POLICY SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
Whereas a substantial portion of the tobacco control scholarship from within the public 
health community, as befits its origins and focus (understanding and improving the public’s 
health), has centered on the elucidating and documenting causal mechanisms between 
smoking and health (both morbidity and mortality) as well as establishing an evidence base for 
effective programmatic (ultimately policy) interventions, the more common focus of tobacco 
policy scholarship from the political and policy science perspective has been understanding and 
explaining the factors influencing tobacco control policy adoption.  That is, existing political and 
policy theories and frameworks have been applied to tobacco control policy to understand, from 
a more expansive (and positivist) perspective, the factors that have influenced the evolution of 
the tobacco epidemic and have facilitated or impeded the adoption of tobacco control policy.  
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review these theories and frameworks, how they have 
been applied to the tobacco epidemic, and the important findings from these studies.  This 
review will include: theories of the policy process, especially the agenda-setting theories 
Multiple Streams Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, that have been applied to inform tobacco control policy adoption; the role of science 
and expert communities in the tobacco control policy process; the influence of the courts and 
legal proceedings on the tobacco control policy process; the importance of policy type (typology) 
on tobacco control policy adoption; how institutions and institutionalism explains tobacco control 
policy adoption; the impact of social change, including elements of issue framing, on tobacco 
control policy adoption; how policy learning, diffusion, transfer, and convergence explains 
tobacco control policy adoption; and the political and policy science perspective on the 
importance of networks in facilitating policy adoption.    
4.2 Multiple Streams Framework 
4.2.1 An Overview of the Multiple Streams Framework 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework [Kingdon, 1984] is a model of the policy process, 
the agenda setting and decision making stages in particular, that was developed as an 
extension of the “garbage can” models of choice. [Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972]; [Zahariadis, 
2007]  Kingdon’s Framework consists of three streams – the Problem Stream, Policy Stream, 
and Politics Stream – which he viewed as flowing separately and with substantial independence 
through the policy process.  In the Problem Stream are the conditions and problems facing 
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society and, in turn, policy makers.  Problems are brought to the attention of the public and 
policy makers through various mechanisms including the research and reporting on various 
indicators, feedback from existing policies or programs, the media, and focusing events.  Within 
the Problem Stream, it is the attention on the problem, which is as or more important than the 
nature of the problem itself, that influences the policy process.  Kingdon envisioned the Policy 
Stream as a milieu or “soup” of different ideas and policy solutions that compete for the attention 
and favor of (and ultimate acceptance and adoption by) policy subsystems.  Policy ideas in this 
stream are usually generated by specialists in that topic area and often, rather than being 
generated as the “best” solution to address a problem, are a solution that benefits, protects, or 
promotes the interest of the group that the specialist represents.  The Politics Stream consists of 
three sub-streams: the national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and administrative or 
legislative turnover.  The national mood refers to public opinion of and public pressure for a 
particular government action.  Pressure-group campaigns include the activities of interest 
groups that act either in the public arena or within a particular policy subsystem, including 
political action committees and industry lobby groups.  Administrative or legislative turnover 
refers to changes in the members of Congress or the White House that may impact the 
ideological predisposition of the legislative, executive (including bureaucracies), or judicial 
branches of the government.  Policy choices are made when policy entrepreneurs, powerful 
individuals or groups (or those acting on their behalf), are able to manipulate preferences, 
perceptions, and situations and “link” the three streams.  Kingdon described a “policy window” 
or “window of opportunity” as the linking of the three streams by a policy entrepreneur resulting 
in a policy decision.  The Multiple Streams Framework is particularly adept at understanding 
policy processes that are ambiguous due to any combination of fluid participation, unclear or 
problematic preferences, unclear technology, and ambivalence. [Zahariadis, Comparing three 
lenses of policy choice, 1998]  
4.2.2 Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to Tobacco Control Policy 
In a search of both public health and the political science literatures, two studies were 
identified that applied the Multiple Streams Framework in order to explain the adoption of 
tobacco control policy.  The Multiple Streams Framework was used to conduct a policy analysis 
of the factors influencing – and challenging – the adoption of smoke free ordinance in Lexington, 
KY. [Greathouse, Hahn, Okoli, Warnick, & Riker, 2005]  In analyzing more than two years of 
activities in each of the streams, the authors identified several critical factors (including building 
a strong coalition of supporters, and a comprehensive strategy that included a wealth of 
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information and a strong legal team) that enabled the eventual enactment of the ordinance in a 
pro-tobacco jurisdiction.   
In another study, the authors provided an overview of the Multiple Streams Framework 
and how it can be broadly applied to understand the adoption of tobacco control policies 
(generally) in California. [Blackman, 2005]  Thus study was designed to provide nurses with a 
better understanding of the policy process, with tobacco control as a case example.   
In summary, the systematic application of the Multiple Streams Framework has not been 
widely employed in tobacco control policy studies.  When it has, its apparent utility has been the 
flexibility and so relative ease of organizing considerable information from many, disparate 
sources and types, often over a substantial duration of time, into a coherent narrative.  Key 
concepts from the Multiple Streams Framework, specifically policy entrepreneurs and policy 
windows, have been frequently used in tobacco control studies as well as other policy areas.  
Thus, it is likely that these elements have been the key contributions of this Framework to the 
theoretical understanding of causal contributors of policy change.  However, the explanatory 
value of the Framework and policy entrepreneurs and windows aside, it is unclear that the 
Multiple Streams Framework is able to predict, in contrast to retrospectively explain, policy 
change and so its ability to identify causal forces in the policy adoption process is unclear.   
4.3 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
4.3.1 An Overview of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (P.E.T.) [Baumgartner & Jones, 1993], [Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2007] was developed, at least in part, as an oppositional view to the prevailing, pedantic 
view of the policy process as a series of ordered, logical stages: policy making was frequently 
not ordered and logical but rather dynamic, with periods of frenetic activity after long periods of 
seeming inactivity.  In this way, P.E.T. was among the first theories to emphasize the 
longitudinal nature of policy making (or at least policy analysis), rather than static, cross-
sectional approaches.  In the longitudinal view of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, policy 
areas cycle through prolonged periods of relatively minor activity followed by a period – 
“punctuation” – of significant activity, which then cycles back to a prolonged period of much 
lower inactivity.  The underlying factors influencing this cycling between equilibrium / pseudo-
equilibrium and punctuation, then, also cycle through their own characteristic phases.  In 
pseudo-equilibrium, those favored by the status quo fiercely defend the status quo, and the 
benefits being derived from it.  Negative feedback mechanisms and policy monopolies 
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established by policy sub-systems ensure an incremental approach to policy change, if any.  
Further, favored elites exert their dual-faces of power to ensure that only favorable issues reach 
the agenda and unfavorable issues are kept from the agenda. [Bachrach & Baratz, 1962]  In 
displacing pseudo-equilibrium, there is an expansion and mobilization of interest 
[Schattschneider, 1960] and progression through the issue-attention cycle, [Downs, 1972] and 
the issue begins to escape the control of the policy monopoly or subsystems, which in turn 
begin to collapse.  If the favored elite cannot re-establish pseudo-equilibrium, negative feedback 
mechanisms give way to self-propelling positive feedback mechanisms, ensuring further 
collapse of the status quo.  In such a scenario (failure to re-establish pseudo-equilibrium), there 
is rapid change as mobilization continues and policy monopolies and subsystems collapse.  
Involvement in and control over and issue becomes very fluid as there is competition not only to 
influence policy decisions but also to establish power and favor in new programs or sub-
systems that are likely to result from policy change; this is similar to or corresponds with a policy 
window, with ample opportunities for policy entrepreneurs, from the Multiple Streams 
Framework. [Kingdon, 1984]  Finally, activity decreases and the dynamics of pseudo-equilibrium 
are re-established with or without actual policy change.   
In moving through the phases of P.E.T., there is a differentiation between attention and 
activity, and issues that achieve “agenda status.”  An issue can have attention or generic activity 
paid it in any realm during any policy phase.  However, an issue having achieved “agenda 
status” is one that is on the public agenda (an issue acknowledged by the broader population as 
requiring action), the formal agenda (being acted upon within the formal structures of 
government), or the decision agenda (an issue about to be acted upon).  While achieving status 
on the public agenda is not always required (but frequently needed) for all policy changes, 
achieving formal and decision agenda status.  An issue’s “policy image,” first described in by 
P.E.T. as how that issue or policy is understood and discussed, is a key determinant in how or if 
an issue “moves through” the various agendas and / or cycles through the phases of the P.E.T..  
Thus, the P.E.T. envisages that a fundamental component of cycling from pseudo-equilibrium to 
punctuation is the competition to control or define the policy image.  In attempt to control the 
policy image and re-define pseudo-equilibrium, then, actors are mobilized so as to offer 
competing, stronger policy images.  Understanding policy change requires that one appreciates 
the factors affecting the dynamics attempting to change or maintain the policy image and thus 
the status quo.  These factors can include characteristics of the issue itself, the context 
including both micro- and macro-political factors, and the actors and the venues.  That is, the 
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P.E.T. suggests that understanding the causes leading to policy change requires and 
understanding for the magnitude of underlying factors as well as the relative mix of these 
factors, and how they are changing over time.   
4.3.2 Application of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to Tobacco Control Policy  
In considering the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, a fundamental question is whether 
tobacco control policy making has followed the characteristic pattern of pseudo-equilibrium 
followed by punctuations.  Using data from the Agendas Project, analysis by Baumgartner and 
Jones documented this pattern of policy making within the federal government.  [Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993]  These results were echoed in a later study that analyzed Congressional 
committee hearings for evidence of subsystem dynamics, including positive and negative 
feedback. [Worsham, 2006]  In analyzing information from 1945-2005 on the number and types 
of committees holding tobacco-related hearings, the types of witnesses testifying at these 
hearings, and legislative sponsorship, the author concluded that the pre-1964 Surgeon 
General’s Report agricultural-dominated policy subsystem largely persisted through the 1980s, 
with evidence for substantial negative feedback and a relatively stable policy image.  However, 
beginning in the 1990s, the policy image began to change and competition over the policy 
image (the previously overlooked health aspect) combined with legislative policy entrepreneurs 
initiated positive feedback, disrupting the previously stable policy subsystems.  As of 2005, the 
close of the study, author concluded that [pseudo-] equilibrium had not yet been re-established 
and so the final outcome was not yet apparent. [Worsham, 2006]  
In contrast, other studies have suggested that tobacco control policy making at the state-
level does not necessarily follow the expected P.E.T. patterns. [Givel M., 2006], [Givel M., 2008]  
Rather than demonstrating “cycling” -- periods of pseudo-equilibrium with [relatively] stable 
policy images and subsystems followed by positive feedback and disruption of the policy 
subsystem – the author of these studies argued that state-level policy making exhibited several 
different patterns (e.g., linear, oscillating, exponential) but not the punctuated pattern predicted 
by the P.E.T.. [Givel M., 2008], [Givel M., 2006]  
Thus, there has not been consensus as to whether tobacco control policymaking has or 
has not followed the pattern predicted by the P.E.T..  As with the Multiple Streams Framework, 
key concepts from the P.E.T., specifically positive and negative feedback, subsystems, and 
policy images, have been used widely within tobacco control policy as well as other policy 
areas, often without the systematic application of the full P.E.T. framework.  The P.E.T. has 
also, as with the Multiple Streams Framework, provided a “lens” through which to organize and 
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interpret considerable information into a reasoned explanation for the course of tobacco control 
policymaking.  From this perspective, then, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory faces a similar 
challenge as the Multiple Streams Framework in that it its ability to predict, rather than 
retrospectively explain, causal forces in policy adoption is unclear.  
4.4 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
4.4.1 An Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
As with the P.E.T., the Advocacy Coalition Framework (A.C.F.) expounds a far more 
complex version of policy making compared to a “stages” paradigm. [Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1999], [Sabatier & Weible, 2007]  A fundamental premise of the A.C.F. is that policy making is 
sufficiently complex so as to necessitate that the processes and activities associated with policy 
making occur in a policy subsystem with expertise sufficient for efficient, effective, and informed 
policy decision making; in the A.C.F., it is this subsystem that is the primary unit of study and 
analysis.  That is, the A.C.F. places substantial emphasis on the role of experts and scientific 
and technical information in the policy making process.  Further, the A.C.F. forwards that groups 
– coalitions – coalesce around common deep core beliefs, fundamental, steadfast, and 
normative beliefs about how the world “should” operate.  These coalitions, which the A.C.F. 
forwards are more expansive than traditional “iron triangles” and can include legislators, 
bureaucrats from all levels of government, scientists and other content or technical experts such 
as consultants, members of the media, and interest groups, pool and marshal resources, 
including human and other forms of capital, in an effort to translate their deep core and policy 
values into policy, thereby dominating the policy subsystem.  As multiple coalitions typically 
exist within a given subsystem, the competition within the bounds of the existing rules and 
system for resources, strategic advantage, and ultimate dominance of the subsystem (i.e., 
ability to translate policy values into policy) transpires over years or decades, and thus the 
timeframe for the A.C.F. is substantial.  [Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999], [Sabatier & Weible, 
2007], [Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009]  A diagram depicting the key elements of the 
A.C.F. is shown in Figure 4-1.   
4.4.2 Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Tobacco Control Policy 
Two Japanese-based studies employed the A.C.F. to identify the emergence of a second 
coalition – health advocates – to compete with the existing coalition – pro-tobacco – and alter 
the dynamics of policy making in the subsystem in order to enact tobacco control policies. [Sato, 
1999], [Sato, Araki, & Yokoyama, 2000]   
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Of the three agenda setting frameworks and theories discussed here, the A.C.F. is the 
most detailed regarding the elements and factors influencing the dynamics of policy subsystems 
(and, thus, policy change).  However and despite the apparent relevance of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework to tobacco control policy, few studies have systematically applied the 
A.C.F. to investigations aimed at explaining or understanding the adoption of tobacco control 
policies.  Future comparative studies might use the A.C.F. to explore how differences in 
coalition resources or strategic decisions affect their ability to influence tobacco control policy 
adoption, though a likely barrier to such studies will be the comparable data needed (and the 
current paucity thereof) to perform such empirical analyses.   
4.5 Policy Typologies 
4.5.1 An Overview of Policy Typologies 
Categorizing issues according to various characteristics or dimensions has been an 
important tool for political scientists in their quest to understand – and ultimately predict – how 
policy decisions are made.  In this area of scholarship, Lowi’s typology is often regarded as 
seminal. [Lowi, 1964]  In his typology, Lowi forwarded a system that divides policy and agenda 
setting into three distinct arenas, each with its own politics and power structures:  1) the 
distributive arena of highly individualized decisions benefitting predominately individuals; 2) the 
regulatory arena that targets largely entire sectors and creates clear winners and losers by 
benefiting one sector at the expense of the other; and 3) the redistributive arena in which an 
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entire social class is targeted with policy(ies) in an attempt to achieve equal possession.  As 
envisioned by Lowi, the policy type ordains the politics, not vice versa. [Lowi, 1964]   
Morality policy has been forwarded as an extension of Lowi’s prominent three-category 
policy typology and has been variously defined as social regulation [Tatalovich, R; Daynes, B 
W; (Eds.), 1998] or the redistribution of values. [Meier K. J., 1999]  And while the specific 
boundaries of a distinct typology have been elusive [Smith K. B., 2002], [Mooney, 2000], a 
series of characteristics of morality policy have been discussed (Table 4-1).  In evaluating the 
characteristics outlined here, and has been discussed by others, tobacco control policy does 
partially overlap with dimension of morality policy [Studlar, 2008] and thus tobacco control policy 
can be examined within the context of the typology of morality policy.   
4.5.2 De-normalization, Morality Policy, and Tobacco Control Policy  
Part of the opposition to tobacco control policy is based solely on its policy typology.  
Tobacco control policies are partially regulatory in nature and use command and control 
regulations, economic incentives, and information to influence and modulate individual behavior. 
[Licari & Meier, 1997]  The motivation for tobacco growers, manufacturers, and sellers to resist 
the tobacco control policies which are intended to reduce the demand for their otherwise legal 
product is obvious: naked economic self-interest.  The subsequent collective actions directed 
toward the political establishment and policy making systems are thus predictable.  The broader 
resistance to tobacco control policy within populations, however, is less intuitive and is plausibly 
attributable to another of tobacco control policy’s typology: morality policy and the related 
strategy of de-normalization.   
To the extent that tobacco control policies are framed – or interpreted – as being about 
right vs. wrong behavior, giving preferential treatment to one social group at the expense of 
another group, or infringing upon core values, as predicted for policies with a morality 
Author Characteristics of Morality Policy
Meier (1999) • Redistribution of values 
• Redistribution of state-accepted values onto those state-defined as perverse results in the socia
status elevation of some and social status reduction for others 
• Values of morality policies relate to demand for what has become to be labeled as “sin”
Mooney (2000) • Fundamental conflict between significant groups over core values, or “first principles”, about 
what is right and wrong 
• Characteristics of morality policy issues are 1) technical simplicity, 2) high public salience 
because they threaten basic values, and 3) are more likely than other policy types to have high 
levels of participation and engagement because of their technical simplicity and salience
Smith (2002) • Taxonomic classification based on patterns of political behavior identifies 1) higher levels of 
participation, 2) weak role for experts, 3) low levels of compromise, and 4) higher probability of 
judicial resolution of conflict
Table 4-1. Characteristics of Morality Policy 
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dimension, levels of public participation in policy debates and conflict in these debates rises.  
Thus, the components of tobacco control policy most likely to be considered as being morality 
policy are not the policy elements justified with the harm principle or even soft paternalism, but 
rather those policy elements perceived as being hard paternalism.  Further, the emphasis on the 
morality dimension in tobacco control policy has changed with the framing of the issue over time 
and, arguably, between different advocacy groups. [Studlar, 2008]  An emphasis on and the use 
of de-normalization substantially amplifies the morality policy dimension.  Generically, de-
normalization is a process whereby normative standards for a particular action or behavior are 
changed.  The evolving emphasis on socially normative behavior in public health can be traced 
to the epidemiologic transition and the shift from the leading causes of death being attributable 
to infectious disease to the leading causes of death being attributable to chronic disease with 
substantial causal contribution from social and behavioral determinants. [Cappuccio, 2004]  
Social marketing has thus developed as a central feature of health promotion and healthy public 
policy, and has as a core function the creation – changing – of social norms for acceptability and 
desirability of particular individual behaviors and influence those behaviors in order to combat 
chronic disease. [Gordon, McDermott, Stead, & Angus, 2006], [Grier & Bryant, 2005]  De-
normalization is thus a specific type of social marketing and tactic that emphasizes the 
unacceptability and undesirability of certain behaviors.  Within the context of tobacco control 
policy, the tobacco industry as well as smoking and, to some extent smokers, have been the 
target of de-normalization tactics such as exclusion from F.C.T.C. negotiations (tobacco 
industry), reducing the number of places where the activity is acceptable (smoking and 
smokers), and an increasingly negative depiction in the media and publications (tobacco 
industry, smoking, and smokers). [Studlar, 2002]  However, de-normalization has been 
controversial – adopted explicitly by some tobacco control programs (e.g., [Ontario Tobacco 
Strategy Advisory Group, 2010]), but substantially de-emphasized by others because of the 
associated risk [Studlar, 2002] even though there is some evidence linking de-normalization 
with increased cessation in adult smokers. [Hammond, Fong, Zanna, Thrasher, & Borland, 
2006]  To the extent that tobacco control policy emphasizes the unacceptability of smoking, 
smokers, or the tobacco industry, then, it invokes the morality dimension of the policy and the 
ensuing conflict over values and social preference.  The allusions about the policy and its 
proponents (public health advocates) are thus not only about paternalism but also about 
economic and spatial social exclusion. [Feldman, 2009]  The latter concern is particularly 
relevant given the addictive nature of smoking and the increasing concentration of smokers in 
lower socioeconomic social strata.  [Bell, Salmon, Bowers, Bell, & McCullough, 2010] 
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Thus, the morality dimension of tobacco control policy is a source of important secular 
opposition to these policies, economic and public health justifications aside, and the creation of 
sympathy for the “persecuted” minority (tobacco users and the tobacco industry).  Further, while 
[American] federalism is structured such that local policy solutions can be developed to resolve 
conflict and reflect local preferences in morality-policy issues, the increasing nationalization of 
policy and interjection of the federal courts, as has been the case in tobacco control policy, has 
interrupted this locally-based balance thereby increasing tension. [Mooney, 2000]  This tension 
created by loss of local control can also be seen on an international level, where the F.C.T.C. 
can be interpreted as, if not in content but in aspiration, a global prohibition regime that formally 
promotes substitution of local policy solutions for global policy convergence consistent with the 
values and economic interests of the dominant members of the international community. 
[Nadelmann, 1990]  Thus, the F.C.T.C. is part global public health governance and part global 
paternalism and would be expected to engender similar resistance internationally as do such 
policies domestically.   
4.6 Institutions and Institutionalism 
4.6.1 An Overview of the Role of Institutions and Institutionalism in Public Policy 
Institutionalism (and neo-institutionalism) is to political science is what Donabedian’s 
structure-process-outcome axiom [Donabedian, 1966] is to public health and health care.  An 
innovator in the field of health care quality improvement, Donabedian was an early scholar and 
leader and advocate for the adaptation of the rigorous quality assessment and improvement 
processes developed in industrial settings to health care delivery.  His simple, but adroit and 
profound postulate has become the foundation for the field: one cannot understand or improve 
upon outcomes without understanding the processes and structures from which they arise.  
Translated to the policy process, policies (outcomes) are the products of policy processes which 
occur within the rules and institutions (structures) that are an integral, all-encompassing part of 
the fabric of communities and societies.   
While there is not a single, succinct definition for “institutions” or “institutionalism”, [Offe, 
2006] the construct can be broadly understood as the fundamental structures and fabric of 
society existing along a spectrum of proximity to the policy making process itself.  While 
institutions may initially be created to solve fundamental organizational needs of societies 
including the provision of public goods, [Moe, 2006] once created institutions to not remain 
neutral, benign entities but rather morph into actors within the society and the policy making 
process itself, becoming agents of power distribution [Immergut, 2006], [Offe, 2006], [Moe, 
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2006] within the society thereby defining the boundaries for government capability and shaping 
and creating the very expectations of the society itself. [Offe, 2006]  In acknowledging the 
myriad form, functions, and effects of institutions, the construct can by depicted as “layers” as 
shown in Figure 4-2.  These tiers encompass the broadest social and governmental structures 
and institutions including cultural values and beliefs (tier 1), institutionalized policy regimes (tier 
2), and the structures and institutions closest to the policy making process (tier 3) such as 
judicial review, aspects of legislative organization and voting rules, and entrenchment of social 
cleavages.   
Early 20th century scholarship conceptualized institutions as formal, legal entities whose 
activities were largely confined to their constitutionally assigned responsibilities [March & Olsen, 
1984] though this perspective, whether pluralist, elitist, or statist, left many policy choices 
unexplained. [Immergut, 2006]  New, or neo-, institutionalism has emerged in an attempt to 
rectify these explanatory deficiencies, though neo-institutionalism largely rejects the rational 
actor paradigms at the foundation of institutionalism, contending that institutions are more 
complex than such models can explain. [Selznick, 1996]  Rather neo-institutionalism replaces 
the rational-actor or ‘logic of consequences and rational calculation’ paradigm of individual 
behavior with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, [Olsen, 2001] a situationally-dependent paradigm 
based on ‘rules’ incorporated through socialization. [March & Olsen, 1984]  Thus, neo-
institutionalism recognizes that institutions are simultaneously cause and effect, which greatly 
complicates analytic assumptions of exogeneity, temporal and historic ordering, and institutional 
Tier 1
Presidential or Parliamentary System
Tier 2
-Regime Type
-Government Type
Tier 3
-Broad Framework Institutions
-Secondary Institutional Characteristics
-Political Conditions and Policymakers’ goals
-Socioeconomic and Demographic Conditions
-Past Policy Choices
Figure 4-2. Three-Tiered Institutional Typology 
Source: Adapted from (Weaver & Rockman, 1995)
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ability to affect social normative standards (leading to additional analytic complications 
especially for longitudinal studies). [March & Olsen, 1984] 
4.6.2 Institutions, Institutionalism, and Tobacco Control Policy  
As regards tobacco control policy, two aspects of institutionalism have received particular 
research attention: venues and federalism.   
Venues, while institutions, are also inextricably linked to Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.  
As described in P.E.T., 
“Policy venues are the institutional locations where authoritative decisions 
are made concerning a given issue.  Policymaking authority is not 
automatically assigned to particular venues…Just as images may change 
over time, so may issues fall within several venues.”  
From: [Baumgartner & Jones, 1993] 
This is the “venue shopping” described in P.E.T.  That is, just as there can be efforts to change 
a policy image, so too can there be efforts to change the venue in which policy decisions are 
made.  Venue shopping, thus, is closely associated with mobilization, positive feedback 
mechanisms, and changing policy images.  These associations were empirically demonstrated 
in a study of tobacco control policy adoption in Scotland, where the author reported that a 
change in the policy image (rooted in a shift in attention from the Scottish Executive to the 
Scottish Parliament) caused the change in venue – the decision for devolution from the U.K. to 
Scotland – was a key factor in facilitating the adoption of legislation banning smoking in public 
places in Scotland. [Cairney, 2007] 
Changing policy venues – venue shopping – can be a valuable strategic choice not only 
because it necessarily implies mobilization and issue expansion, but also because different 
venues often have different procedural rules and norms, also part of the broader construct of 
institutionalism, that govern the decision making process within those venues.  The importance 
of such institutional rules was documented in an analysis of tobacco control policy making in 
New Sound Wales, New Zealand where the authors reported that reforms giving additional 
powers to legislative councils and committees as well the influence to backbenchers were by 
factors in successful policy adoption. [Hooker & Chapman, 2006]  Additionally, a change of 
institutions – venue shopping – is not necessarily limited to different venues within the same 
country or jurisdiction.  Thus the globalization of tobacco control policy, through efforts such as 
those of the European Union, have been discussed by some as being, at least in part, venue 
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shopping. [Princen, 2004]  (Using similar criteria, the F.C.T.C. could also be considered, at least 
in part, a venue-shopping effort, though the F.C.T.C. is not discussed in this study.])  
Federalism is a form of governmental and institutional organization wherein multiple levels 
or layers jurisdictions have constitutionally protected policy making authority.  Federalism, such 
as in the United States (central/national vs. states) and Canada (central/national vs. provinces), 
is distinguished from a unitary system, such as in Britain, in which only one legislative body has 
the authority to create policy.  However, all federalist systems are not homogeneous as it does 
not imply uniform institutional arrangements, either structurally or functionally.  Many mid-range 
theories and constructs have been developed, such as regulatory federalism, discretionary 
federalism, parliamentary federalism, presidential federalism, and executive federalism among 
others, to articulate the various forms of power-sharing arrangements and relationships between 
the different jurisdictional policy making levels (central/national, state/province, and sub-
state/province such as counties). [Kelemen, 2000], [Studlar, 2010]  So, while federalism (or 
unitarism) is a constitutional choice for a specific form of government, the specific form of 
federalism (e.g., permissive or regulatory federalism) evolves over years (generations) of dual 
or multifaceted (not always shared, and not infrequently competitive) policy making and the 
implicit balance of power that emerges from this collective policy making history and experience.  
Further, these balances of power – form of federalism – can vary between policy areas and can 
also change over time as, for example, institutional arrangements or interest group involvement 
changes.   
The multiple levels of policymaking authority in federalist systems also necessarily imply 
multiple levels of institutions and so opportunities for venue shopping with the related issue 
expansion, mobilization of interest, etc.  Several studies have focused on the impact of these 
institutional layers and venue shopping in federalist systems on tobacco control policy adoption.  
In a study of tobacco control policy adoption within individual states, the authors reported on 
several institutional characteristics, including the professionalism of the state legislature and 
government ideology, which impacted the between-state or local-to-state diffusion of tobacco 
control policies. [Shipan & Volden, 2006]  In a case-study evaluation of the Master Settlement 
Agreement, another author noted that it was federalism-permitted venue shopping that 
facilitated the states’ attorneys general to not only creatively engage the judicial system but also 
to “shop” within the judicial system to find a venue –court – most favorable to their cause 
(Michael Moore, the state attorney general for Mississippi and the first to file a suit against the 
tobacco companies, and Richard Scruggs, a tort lawyer acting on behalf of the state, 
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intentionally selected a judge-ruled chancery court so as to avoid a jury trial (juries had never, at 
that point, ruled against tobacco companies)). [Derthick, 2001]  Interestingly, this author also 
commented that, while the initial venue-change to the courts was clearly consistent with 
federalism, the ultimate result of the negotiated Master Settlement Agreement, which used a 
contractual arrangement to impose de facto tobacco control policy, was likely inconsistent with 
the federalist principles of the Founding Fathers as it circumvented the traditional, democratic 
policy making process in its imposition of de facto policy. [Derthick, 2001] 
Finally, federalism, with its constitutionally derived layers of policy making jurisdiction, is 
often compared to multi-level governance, an evolving theory attempting to explain the 
dynamics of policy making in an increasingly globalised world where countries willingly cede 
some level of their policy making sovereignty to transnational agreements and organizations, 
because of their functional similarities – multiple layers of governance, jurisdictions, and venues.  
Development of multi-level governance as a theory and an applied construct has proceeded 
particularly in response to the evolution of policy making in European Union, with its expanding 
competencies and, therefore, acquis communautaire, and scholarship on advancing its 
theoretical underpinnings continues. [Bulmer, 1994], [Bolleyer & Borzel, 2010]  Within tobacco 
control policy, studies comparing federalist systems or federalist systems to systems of multi-
level governance, such as the European Union or the F.C.T.C., have been conducted.  In 
comparing federalist systems with very different structural and power-sharing characteristics yet 
very similar tobacco control policy regimes and tobacco-related population health outcomes 
(Canada and the United States), the author reasoned that the flexibility of federalism can permit 
similar policy outcomes despite very different institutional processes because of how 
institutional arrangements can vary and adapt both between jurisdictions but also temporally 
within a given jurisdiction. [Studlar, 2010]  In analyzing the evolution of tobacco control policy 
within the European Union, one study concluded that the expansion of the European Union’s 
competencies to tobacco control, thereby instituting an arrangement of multi-level governance, 
had the effect of opening new policy venues to tobacco control policy advocates, with a 
functional effect typically ascribed to federalism, which in turn facilitated the development and 
eventual adoption of tobacco control policy by the European Union. [Mamudu & Studlar, 2009]  
However, because multi-level governance is a still-evolving construct, its explanations for 
tobacco control policy adoption have, at times, found to be yet complete particularly when 
contrasted to the explanatory (and more fully developed) capacity of federalism. [Asare, 
Cairney, & Studlar, 2009] 
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4.7 Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence 
4.7.1 An Overview of Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, and Convergence in Public Policy  
Viewed most broadly, the policy learning, diffusion, transfer (and borrowing) are related 
concepts wherein a policy enacted in one jurisdiction becomes enacted in another.  As related 
concepts, differences in definitions are subtle:  
• Policy transfer is the emulation of the policies, programs, institutions, or other policy 
apparatus from one jurisdiction or time point in another jurisdiction or time period; 
[Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996] 
• Policy diffusion is the spread of policy innovations (new policy solutions) from one 
jurisdiction to another; [Shipan & Volden, 2008] 
• Policy learning is the process whereby a jurisdiction facing a similar policy problem 
observes the policy solution in another jurisdiction, determines if that solution is 
successful, and is more likely to adopt a similar policy solution if it is deemed a 
successful and appropriate policy solution. [Shipan & Volden, 2008] 
Similarly, policy convergence is the tendency over time, often through policy learning, diffusion, 
or transfer, for jurisdictions to adopt increasingly similar policies, programs, and institutional 
arrangements. [Bennett, 1991]  Rose  differentiated between “learning” or “transfer” to achieve a 
politically-motivated policy short-cut and a genuine, analytically based “lesson drawing”, which 
he defined as a distinctive type of program that draws upon foreign experience so as to permit 
knowledge extraction in order to inform a solution to a domestically based problem. [Rose, 
2007]  Core to successful lesson drawing, then, is understanding under what circumstances the 
foreign program succeeds and to what extent can that program be successfully applied 
domestically.  The incentive for lesson drawing increases with problem solving urgency, where 
problems can appear due to changes in national or international circumstances, or because of a 
successful challenge of the status quo, including current assumptions, and ability to forward that 
the possibility for better solutions exist.  That is, the foreign example(s) is/are successfully 
forward as a benchmark or best practice (or at least ‘better’ practice) in comparison to the 
existing, domestic solution.  Such lessons, or benchmarks, can be drawn from historical 
examples, though this is inherently limited, or from different but contemporary geographic 
jurisdictions, near of far, similar or dissimilar.  Further, there are an increasing number of forums 
– national, international, global, continental, or regional – for government officials, policymakers, 
and scientists that are designed to facilitate both awareness of the opportunity to learn about 
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foreign lessons.  Within tobacco control, the F.C.T.C. and the World Conferences on Tobacco or 
Health, among others, are quintessential such examples.   
That the F.C.T.C. and W.C.To.H. conferences are deliberate forums to promote policy 
learning, transfer, and ultimately convergence is consistent with ideas developed from the 
political science perspective where some have asserted that policy transfer is not a random 
process. [Bennett, 1997]  Rather, lessons are shared and reverberate (“ripple”) through policy 
communities both formally and informally and jurisdictions can be motivated into policy transfer 
for rational reasons of lesson drawing, quasi-rational reasons of solution searching, less-rational 
legitimation, or harmonization.  As research studies have reported on the circumstances of 
policy transfer, learning, and diffusion, models differentiating between different types and 
characteristics of such diffusion have been developed.  Berry and Berry have conducted 
important scholarship in this area, articulating a framework of distinct diffusion and innovation 
forms, as described below. [Berry & Berry, 2007], [Berry, 1994]  
1) Diffusion Models 
a) National Interaction Model – models of diffusion that are based national 
communication networks among and between state policymakers, bureaucrats, 
and public-sector employees regarding public sector programs and their 
successes or failings.  The probability a state will adopt a certain program is 
proportional to the number of interactions State X has had interactions with the 
already-adopted-in State Y.   
b) Regional Diffusion Model – Adoption of policies across states is dependent upon 
geographic proximity – aka ‘neighbor’ or ‘near neighbor’ models. 
c) Leader-Laggard Models – A state (or country) takes on the role of ‘leader’, and is 
thus pre-disposed to becoming a policy innovator, whereas other states take on 
the role of ‘laggard’, thus being pre-disposed to be an adoptor.   
d) Isomorphism Models – Models that emphasize “likeness of states” (vs. 
geographic proximity) in their probability that a state will adopt a policy.  That is, 
states look to other like states for their policy cues. 
e) Vertical Influence Models – Models that suggest that diffusion from national to 
state levels are more important than horizontal diffusion across jurisdictions of 
similar ‘rank’ (e.g., municipality to municipality etc).   
2) Internal Determinants Models – These models suggest that internal factors, such as 
the political, economic, or social environment within a state are the key factors 
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determining whether a policy will be adopted.  Definition of the dependent variable is 
key in these models, as it has significant implications for framing the research 
question (and subsequent analyses). 
3) Unified Innovation Models that Include Elements of Diffusion and Internal 
Determinants – This is a model forwarded by Berry and Berry that functionally 
includes all variables, including internal determinants, resources, motivation, and 
elements from diffusion models including neighbors etc, into one analytic model.  
Analytically the model relies heavily upon event history analysis.  As with many areas 
of political science, data availability is often a limiting factor.  
4.7.2 Policy Learning, Diffusion, Transfer, Convergence, and Tobacco Control Policy  
Not unexpectedly, policy learning, transfer, and diffusion have been used to explain the 
spread of tobacco control policies between jurisdictions.  Earlier studies reported diffusion of 
tobacco control policies through jurisdictions in Canada and the United States and the role of 
advocacy groups in facilitation the policy diffusion. [Studlar, 1999] Later studies contributed 
additional empirical support to the importance of epistemic and transnational advocacy groups 
in facilitation policy learning and transfer. [Studlar, 2006], [Studlar, 2005]  However, despite 
efforts such as the F.C.T.C. and other international tobacco control advocacy efforts, tobacco 
control policies have by no means been universally adopted.  While some studies continue to 
emphasize the importance of advocacy networks for successful policy transfer and adoption, 
[Wipfli, Fujimoto, & Valente, 2010] results from other studies suggest that other issues, such as 
the policy image and ideas and institutional arrangements are also key factors in policy transfer. 
[Cairney, 2009], [Studlar, 2007] That is, the transition from knowledge transfer to successful 
policy transfer (adoption) remains a political one.   
4.8 Social Change and Social Movements 
4.8.1 An Overview of Social Change in Public Policy 
A view of public policy is that it is the tool by which societies chose to engage their 
government to deploy scarce public resources in order to reach a public solution to a problem it 
faces.  And so, if public policies are the means which a society distributes its resources and 
public policy making the process by which a society affords and controls access to the decision 
making (resource allocation) process producing those policies, public policies and the public 
policy making process are the means by which a society apportions its values.  To the extent 
that one accepts this view of public policy, it follows that a change in public policy, absent a 
fundamental change in the policy making process itself, reflects a change in either: a) the 
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society’s understanding or view of the problem; b) the society’s view of whether the problem 
should be addressed publicly or privately; or c) the society’s view of how [public] resources 
should be allocated to address the problem.  That is, policy change can be interpreted as a 
change within the society – a social change, including as regards the society’s values and 
preferences for resource allocation.   
While some scholars rebuff socially-based explanations as being too naïve, (e.g., 
[Steinmo, 1994]) social and cultural values have nonetheless emerged as either complements 
to or alternates for other explanations such as institutionalism. [Steinmo, 1994], [Kurdle & 
Marmor, 1981]  In using social and cultural explanations, cross-sectional comparative studies 
attribute differences in policy regimes to differences in some combination of the three factors 
identified above (understanding or view of the problem, preference for a public or private 
solution, values informing resource allocation to address the problem).  Likewise, in longitudinal 
studies, changes in policy or policy regimes are attributed to changes in some combination of 
these factors.  Castles’ and Obinger’s “Families of Nations” or Epsing-Andersen’s “Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism” are illustrations of explanations for differences in patterns of public and 
social welfare policy regimes attributable to differences in cultural and fundamental social 
values. [Castles & Obinger, 2008], [Epsing-Andersen, 1990]  Also within the realm of social 
explanations are causal stories [Stone, 1989] and social constructions, [Schneider & Ingram, 
1993] which are fundamental to how a society understands or views a problem and, 
conceivably, its preference for a public or private solution to the problem.  It is acknowledged, 
that neither social constructions nor causal stories are likely discrete from the policy images of 
the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.  Conceptual overlaps aside, it is straightforward to 
understand how either changes (longitudinal) or differences (comparative or cross-sectional) in 
the perceptions of power (“weak” or “strong”) or construction (“positive” or “negative”) altering 
categorization as “advantaged”, “contenders”, “dependents”, or “deviants” in the social 
construction paradigm, [Schneider & Ingram, 1993] or how similar changes in actions 
(“purposeful” or “unguided”) or consequences (“intended” or “unintended”) leading to an 
adjustment in the perceived classification as “mechanical cause”, “accidental cause”, 
“intentional cause”, or “inadvertent cause” in the causal story paradigm [Stone, 1989] could 
affect a fundamental shift in a society’s understanding of the problem or its preference for a 
public solutions.   
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4.8.2 Tobacco Control Policy Adoption as a Social Movement 
In tobacco control policy, social explanations have been forwarded to account for adoption 
of tobacco control policies and changes in tobacco control policy regimes.  The changing and 
selective framing of tobacco control policies has been examined and the success of public 
health advocates in framing public smoking bans as protecting “innocent” victims has been 
forwarded as a key factor in the spread of smoke-free policies. [Larsen, 2010]  Additionally, 
Nathanson in particular has contributed substantial scholarship to elucidating and reporting on 
various elements of social change that have contributed to the substantial changes in tobacco 
control policy regimes in developed countries.  In particular, Nathanson notes that particularly in 
the fragmented American context, the work of grass-roots advocacy groups to re-frame 
smoking, the tobacco industry, and the need for and role of tobacco control policy has been 
essential in affecting the sea-changes in tobacco control policy regimes. [Nathanson, 2007]  
Further, Nathanson also concludes that the substantial declines in smoking prevalence are 
primarily attributable to the transformation of smoking from social acceptable to socially 
unacceptable due to the efforts of health-related social movements.  [Nathanson, 1999], 
[Nathanson, 2005]  However, while these empirical studies have identified the importance of 
social movements and social change, rigorous quantitative studies have to be conducted so as 
to better understand the relative importance of preferences for public vs. private solutions 
compared to cultural values.  
4.9 Science and Expert Communities  
4.9.1 An Overview of Science and Expert Communities in Public Policy 
Scientific information and expert communities are incorporated into multiple policy 
frameworks, most notably the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the subsystems and policy 
images of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.  Scientific information can also be considered in 
isolation as an instrument with a “central role in the framing and legitimation of policy.” [Ingram, 
Schneider, & McDonald, 2002]  So, while the importance of scientific knowledge and expertise 
in the policy process has been recognized, the mechanisms of how this information exerts its 
effects are complex.  Two different classification systems have been developed to explain the 
factors influencing the impact of scientific expertise in the policy process. 
In Nathanson’s classification system [Nathanson, 2007], the ability of scientific information 
and experts to influence the policy process is constrained by several contingencies including:  
• Characteristics of the political regime – both the scientific ideas and the experts 
forwarding those ideas will, in a pluralist system with both cultural and 
 [95] 
 
institutional incentives for competition, will face more challenge and skepticism 
than is encountered in a corporatist or hierarchical systems.     
• Social and political location (status) and the framing expertise of “knowledge 
brokers” – incorporation of scientific knowledge or experts into the policy process 
(e.g., though proposed bills, hearings etc.) depends, in no small measure, on the 
normative beliefs of the policymakers, which is also related to how that scientific 
information has been presented and “framed” by knowledge brokers.  These 
brokers, such as the media and other journalists, play a crucial role in translating 
this scientific information into policy images, causal stories, and socially 
constructed notions of who does and doesn’t need or deserve protection through 
constructions of culturally credible risk and victimization.    
• Beneficial intersections of timing and opportunity – while this contingency is 
typically beyond the control of policy makers, knowledge brokers, experts, or 
other actors in the policy process, it is nonetheless important: some ideas and 
arguments, no matter how sound or creative, do not resonate and so they must 
either change or wait until they are received more favorably.  
In Weible’s framework, [Weible, 2008] intended to supplement the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, expert information can be used for learning, political purposes (e.g., the distortion 
or misrepresentation of facts), or instrumentally as part of a rational policy process to develop 
evidence-based policy. Further, how information is used is contingent upon the type of coalition 
configuration as either unitary subsystems, collaborative subsystems, or adversarial subsystem.  
Thus a series of propositions is forwarded on the use of expert information in subsystems:  
1. The political use of expert-based information will be highest in 
adversarial subsystems. 
2. The instrumental use of expert-based information will vary from the 
highest in collaborative, to an intermediate level in unitary, and to the 
lowest in adversarial policy subsystems. 
3. Learning will occur within conditions or among experts with similar 
analytical approaches in all subsystems and will most likely occur 
across coalitions or across experts with dissimilar analytical 
approaches in collaborative systems. 
 
From: [Weible, 2008] 
Thus scientific information and experts is clearly important in the policy process, though 
how the information is used and its impact is dependent upon the context of the policy process 
itself.   
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4.9.2 Science and Expert Communities in Tobacco Control Policy 
The importance and role of scientific information and experts in tobacco control policy is 
not in dispute.  The causal role of this information in changing the fundamental understanding of 
the problem, including the construction of risk and victimization, the policy images, the 
perceptions of the tobacco industry, and the social changes that this information fueled has 
been well documented both within the United States and globally. [Nathanson, 1999], 
[Nathanson, 2007], [Asbridge, 2004], [Beaglehole, 1991], [Warner, 2005], [Bayer & Colgrove, 
2002], [Mamudu, 2007]  However, what has been less well understood, particularly within the 
public health community, is why, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, policy has not 
followed logically and rationally from this overwhelming scientific evidence.  While some within 
the public health and epidemiologic communities have attempted to better understand – and 
modify – the approach to the intersection of science and public policy, [Savitz, Poole, & Miller, 
1999], [Brownson, Royer, Ewing, & McBride, 2006], [Brownson, Chriqui, & Stamatakis, 2009] a 
substantial proportion of the tobacco control advocacy community has and continues to respond 
with disbelief and frustration, viewing a “failure” to adopt the “right” or “needed” policy as a 
“failure” of the political system. [Larsen, 2008]  The response from the political science 
perspective is that,  
“The path from knowledge to policy is not straightforward; scientific 
consensus does not lead automatically to policy consensus.” 
From: [Nathanson, 2007] 
That is, policy adoption is not a scientific exercise or process, but a political one. 
4.10 The Judiciary 
4.10.1 An Overview of the Role of the Judiciary in Public Policy 
The description of the judiciary in the elementary school, introductory version of the three-
branches-of-government form of American democracy is that the judicial branch interprets the 
constitution.  That is, it does not function to create policy, simply to ensure that policy created in 
the legislative branch does not violate constitutionally protected rights.  However, legal, political 
and policy science scholars alike have long understood the naiveté of that view of the American 
judiciary.  Within policy frameworks, the judiciary can alternately a venue (Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory), a strategic opportunity and / or resource or an external event (Advocacy 
Coalition Framework), or an actor within society whose actions affect the society’s 
understanding or view of the problem (including through framing, social constructions, or causal 
stories), opportunities or constraints on public or private solutions to the problem or how 
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resources are allocated to address the problem.  Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, the courts 
were increasingly used as an avenue to affect social reform, and a substantial body of 
scholarship has developed attempting to understand and better explain how legal mobilization 
and the judiciary affect public policy  
Legal mobilization is an umbrella-term encompassing instances when litigation – or the 
threat of litigation – is proactively pursued to assert rights.  As has been previously described, 
[McCann, 2008] 
• Legal mobilization begins with “non-official” legal actors, private citizens, and 
thus is often considered a “bottom-up” approach because it begins with those 
outside the legal community, often, in cases of legal mobilization seeking social 
reform, by those considered less powerful or socially marginalized. 
• In the broadest understanding of legal mobilization, actual litigation is but part of 
a dynamic, complex continuum of interactions between disputing parties, ranging 
from filing claims or charges, negotiations, legal proceedings, and post-
proceeding negotiations.  Thus, legal mobilization, while a strategic decision, is 
also a process, and the judiciary can have myriad policy-like effects at any and 
all stages of this process.  
• The decision to employ legal mobilization is complex as are the possible 
outcome and thus the policy repercussions are uncertain depending upon when, 
how, and the form of resolution to the initiating dispute. 
• There are substantial socially-derived disparities in the ability or predisposition 
(“legal consciousness”) to employ legal mobilization as a strategy to assert rights 
related to the substantial capital and personnel resources needed to improve the 
chances of success. 
Additionally and as numerous scholars have identified, the inability of the courts to enforce their 
decisions, termed by many as the “myth of rights”, combined with the observed “counter-
mobilization backlash” has led to the questioning of legal mobilization as a strategy to affect 
social change. [McCann, 2008]  However, whether legal mobilization is viewed as effective or 
successful may depend upon the evaluation time frame selected. [Epp, 2008]  The highly 
fragmented, federalist system in the United States creates substantial incentives for legal 
mobilization.  However, while the inability of the courts to enforce or implement their decisions 
(expansion or extension of rights to a new group) is very real as is the often well orchestrated 
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mobilization backlash by opponents, the “myth of rights” may be a short-term phenomenon, 
disappearing if a longer-term evaluation timeframe is taken. [Epp, 2008]  That is, the social 
policy impact of the courts may be realized through processes such as those articulated by the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework or the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as well as what some 
scholars have termed the “administrative professions”:  the translation of judicial decisions to 
real and palpable changes in [social] policy is virtually entirely dependent upon intermediaries – 
coalitions, subsystem actors, bureaucrats, policy or cause advocates, or other motivated 
experts who are both aware of and insist upon the realization of legal decisions in policies, 
programs, and regulations and are prepared to re-engage the legal system (or threaten to do 
so) if their requirements are not met. [Epp, 2008]  
4.10.2 The Judiciary and Tobacco Control Policy 
Legal mobilization has been an oft employed strategy in the “war on tobacco” and the 
paths from the offices of tobacco control advocates and the tobacco industry to the courts are 
well trod.  An overview of key legal cases in the decades-long efforts to enact tobacco control 
policies, as well as the relationships of these suits to policy, is included in Appendix 1.  In 
addition to the public health “three-waves” etiology, (e.g., [Douglas, Davis, & Beasley, 2006]) 
there was an increase in scholarship addressing the relationship between tobacco lawsuits and 
tobacco control policy particularly surrounding the Master Settlement Agreement.  Some of this 
scholarship empirically explored some of the issues discussed above specifically related to 
tobacco control policy including how the legal mobilization and events in the courts affected a 
change in the policy image sufficient to motivate the tobacco companies to compromise. 
[Mather, 1998]  Additionally, while some of this scholarship was generally positive toward the 
possibility that the Master Settlement Agreement could be an exception to the generally-held 
belief that effective (or timely) policy does not come from the courts, [Jacobson & Warner, 1999] 
other views were decidedly less favorable, considering the terms of the Master Settlement 
Agreement to be undemocratic, a court-imposed tax, and state “nanny-ism”. [Melnick, 1999]  
Now, more than a decade after the enactment of the M.S.A., retrospective analyses are 
emerging.  Clearly, the “undoing” of the tobacco industry, as predicted by some, has not 
materialized. [Kelder Jr. & Daynard, 1997]  Further, evaluation of policy impacts of the legal 
mobilization resulting in the M.S.A. is complicated because, as it has now been reasonably well 
documented, the states did not implement the M.S.A. homogeneously nor all not quite 
implemented as expected. [Jones & Silvestri, 2010]  Most notably, states have substantially 
diverted M.S.A. funds to uses other than tobacco control programs leaving state programs 
underfunded, and, with the passage of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
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Control Act, it took more than 10 years to achieve the national-level regulatory regime contained 
in the aborted Global Settlement Agreement. [Jones & Silvestri, 2010]  In the end, a [not so] 
quiet consensus that seems to emerge is that the disclosure stipulations, mandating the 
creation of multiple tobacco industry internal documents (now available online) and the 
scholarship and subsequent legal actions that this otherwise unattainable information has 
afforded, may ultimately have the largest and longest-lasting impact on tobacco control policy. 
[Miura, Daynard, & Samet, 2006], [Givel & Glantz, 2004] 
The preponderance of scholarship on the role of litigation in tobacco control policy has 
been focused on the Master Settlement Agreement.  Few empirical and even fewer quantitative 
studies have systematically investigated the effect of the larger body tobacco litigation on 
tobacco control policy either at the national or lower-court level.  This area of inquiry is well 
suited for examination, especially as some policy and “legal mobilization” entrepreneurs are 
suggesting that the “lessons” from tobacco litigation be applied to other areas of public health, 
particularly obesity. [Alderman & Daynard, 2006]  
4.11 The Political and Policy Science Perspective on Networks 
Within political and policy science, three areas of scholarship have emerged with 
overlapping language, definitions and constructs: epistemic communities; transnational 
advocacy networks (sometimes called global advocacy networks); and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework.  Early empirical work differentiated epistemic communities from interest groups and 
social movements, disciplines and professions, and legislators and bureaucrats (and 
bureaucracies) based on knowledge, beliefs, and interests. [Haas, 1992]  According to this 
work,  
“…it is the combination of having a shared set of causal and principled 
(analytic and normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a 
common policy enterprise (common interests) that distinguish epistemic 
communities from various other groups.  They differ from interest groups in 
that the epistemic community members have shared causal beliefs and 
cause-and-effect understandings…epistemic communities have exerted 
their influence on decision makers in a wide variety of issue-areas.  
Generally called upon for advice under conditions of uncertainty, they have 
often proved to be significant actors in shaping patterns of international 
policy coordination.” 
From: [Haas, 1992]  
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In expanding the notion of epistemic communities to include individuals beyond subject 
specialists, advocacy networks, sometimes also discussed as coalitions, have been described 
as:  
“Advocacy networks are significant transnationally, regionally and 
domestically.  They may be key contributors to a convergence of social and 
cultural norms able to support processes of regional and international 
integration …. [They] are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, 
reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and 
exchange…Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge 
around those issues where: (1) channels between domestic groups and 
their governments are hampered or severed where such channels are 
ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the ‘boomerang’ 
pattern of influence characteristic of these networks; (2) activists or 
‘political entrepreneurs’ believe that networking will further their missions 
and campaigns, and actively promote them; (3) international conferences 
and other forms of international contacts create arenas for forming and 
strengthening networks.” 
From: [Keck & Sikkink, 1999] 
In contrast to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which emphasizes stable and 
enduring coalition formation around fundamental values and typically within a single subsystem, 
the development of epistemic communities and advocacy networks has been more functional, 
both arising from and focusing on what these more loosely-organized networks have 
accomplished. [Farquharson, 2003]  Within tobacco control, the development of these networks, 
either within or between jurisdictions as well as globally, has been the explicit goal of, for 
example, the World Conferences on Tobacco or Health as well as the C.D.C.’s National 
Tobacco Control Program.  These networks, because of their diverse membership from both 
technical and lay communities, likely have more theoretical grounding in global advocacy 
networks or the Advocacy Coalition Framework compared to epistemic communities due to the 
emphasis of the latter on common understandings based on similar technical expertise. 
[Farquharson, 2003]  Studies have reported on the success of these networks in taking 
advantage of the multiple venues in multi-level governance arrangements to advance myriad 
public health policies including tobacco control policies. [Princen, 2007]  Further, numerous 
other studies have reported on various characteristics of the network organization, including 
strategic membership, community involvement, and use of the media, that have facilitated 
network success in advancing tobacco control policies. [Chapman & Wakefield, 2001], 
[Farquharson, 2003], [Farquharson, 2005], [Lewis, 2006]   
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Thus these networks, whether originating from epistemic communities, loose associations 
locally or globally based, or more the formal and organized structures consistent with the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, have and continue to be important facilitators of the policy 
learning and diffusion as well as policy convergence, and the social changes associated with 
tobacco control policy adoption.  A form of institution themselves, they have become 
institutionalized through, for example, the C.D.C.’s N.T.C.P., and have also been able to 
understand and utilize existing institutional arrangements to affect change.  In Donabedian 
parlance, these networks have become the functional structures through which the processes to 
change both tobacco control policy adoption and the reduction of smoking prevalence are 
produced. 
4.12 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a review of tobacco control policy from the political and policy 
science perspective.  This chapter has examined both the conceptual underpinnings (generally) 
as well as the application to tobacco control policy (more specifically) for agenda setting 
theories and frameworks, the role of science and expert communities, the impact of the courts 
and legal proceedings, the effect of the morality-policy dimension of tobacco control policy, 
institutions and institutionalism, the role of social change and issue framing, policy learning and 
diffusion, and the effects of networks on tobacco control policy learning, diffusion, transfer and 
convergence.  As a generalization, each of these sub-fields or topic areas contributes, using a 
common policy science phrase, a “lens” through which various aspects of the policy adoption 
component of the tobacco epidemic can be organized and explained.  No single “lens” is “best” 
or provides the “right” explanation – each emphasizes slightly different causal factors and 
elements of the policy process.  A comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing 
tobacco control policy adoption requires a broad and integrated understanding of the 
contributions from each of these “lenses”.   
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5 AN INTEGRATED POLICY HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE TOBACCO 
EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE LENS OF IDEAS, 
INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS 
5.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
In the previous two chapters, the existing tobacco epidemic and tobacco control policy 
literature, representing the cumulative understanding and knowledge contribution, from two very 
different perspectives – that of the public health community and the political and policy science 
community – was reviewed.  From the positivist perspective, the cumulative contribution of the 
public health community has been substantial, particularly as regards evidence establishing the 
biologic and epidemiologic causality of tobacco use and deleterious health outcomes as well as 
the development of “evidence-based” programs and policies to prevent tobacco use and / or 
promote the cessation of its use.  However, a considerable portion of the literature from the 
public health perspective has a decidedly normative viewpoint.  In particular, it is this normative 
viewpoint that supports the outlook that, having established the harmful health effects caused by 
tobacco use and exposure, the untoward and shady conduct of the tobacco industry, and the 
effectiveness of programs and policies to abate tobacco use, these policies and programs 
should therefore be universally and ubiquitously adopted so as to eventually abolish all tobacco 
use and exposure and ultimately eliminate the tobacco industry in its entirety.  That is, this 
dimension of the public health perspective on the tobacco epidemic is rather dogmatic and 
prescriptive regarding how individuals ought to behave – or at least how individuals ought to be 
allowed to behave.  This normative stance also typically interprets the absence of the policies 
and programs that “should” be in place as a “failure” of the political system, usually attributable 
to the undue influence of the tobacco industry.   
Thus, this normative dimension of the public health perspective on the tobacco epidemic 
is rather narrow.  Most particularly, it is a very narrow construction of policy process and the 
factors that influence it including, for example, a population’s tolerance for or acceptance of 
governmental paternalism, trade-offs between social goods and individual rights, the relative 
values of different individual rights.  Further, the strong de-normalization element within the 
public health community is, as has been discussed by others, anti-political and anti-democratic 
(owing to the presumption that the tobacco industry is not legitimate and so should not be given 
an legitimate voice in the policy process), which is an incongruous stance given the still-legal 
status of the activity (tobacco use) and the industry, and the pluralist nature of most 
industrialized societies.  Additionally, this narrow interpretation of events and the tobacco 
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epidemic could also be considered unscientific.  Specifically, the reluctance to pursue 
explanations for the pace of policy adoption beyond that of impediments imposed by the “evil 
tobacco industry” could be viewed as some as the collection of data to support a position rather 
than the more scientifically grounded collection of data to test an hypothesis.  Regardless, this 
normative dimension of the public health perspective flounders – perhaps because it is so 
normative – to provide a comprehensive or inclusive explanation for the evolution of the tobacco 
epidemic, particularly tobacco control policy adoption.   
Explanations for the adoption (or lack thereof) of tobacco control policies are, however, 
the strength of the political and policy science perspective.  The political and policy science 
literature has applied and contributed multiple theories and frameworks, particularly of the policy 
adoption process, to the tobacco epidemic in an effort to provide explanations for the how, if, 
when, and where tobacco control policies are adopted.  Further, while the political and policy 
science perspective tends to be more positivist and without the normativist dimension of the 
public health literature, it is also not as well developed nor with the depth of the public health 
literature.  For example, while some of these policy process frameworks and explanations seem 
particularly applicable, the scholarship to systematically and comprehensively apply them to the 
tobacco epidemic has simply not occurred.  Additionally, in focusing on policy adoption as the 
primary outcome, the political and policy science literature typically overlooks or ignores that 
which the policies affect: tobacco use.  Thus, each perspective largely ignores contributions of 
the other and, in their own way, each perspective also discounts the populace and its use of 
tobacco on policy adoption of and, thus, the evolution of the tobacco epidemic.   
Therefore, the intent of this empirical chapter is to incorporate the two perspectives and 
literatures on the tobacco epidemic into an integrated narrative on the evolution of the tobacco 
epidemic.  The framework that will be used to organize this integrated policy history is that of 
ideas, interests, and institutions.   
5.2 Ideas, Interests, and Institutions 
In presenting a framework with which to understand and explain the evolution of public 
policy, Heclo (Heclo H. , Ideas, Interests, and Institutions, 1994) identified three fundamental 
and inextricably intertwined constructs: ideas, interests, and institutions.  
“At this point one begins to sense the liberating effect of seeing interests, 
institutions, and ideas not as the proprietary battleground among different 
social science “approaches” but as the shared patrimony of human 
materials for getting a better view of the world.  The interrelationships are 
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complicated, to be sure, but not every complication is a contradiction. We 
can recognize that interests, ideas, and institutions all “matter” in a very 
fundamental sense without forcing ourselves to choose which type of factor 
is analytically precedent ….” 
Further, Heclo described each of these three pillars of policy evolution as: 
“…self-interest probably explains more of the variance in political affairs 
than any other single factor, but this does not mean it explains very 
much…[but] individual choices are embedded in institutional settings that 
privilege some options and delete others ….” 
And 
“…institutions are supposed to be the things that stay around, fostering 
continuity and a long-term view of affairs….Institutions are the bearers of 
such traditions and practices…Institutions may go beyond helping 
individuals signal and coordinate preferences more effectively, beyond 
privileging or deleting options, and beyond even the historical construction 
of understandings that bequeath meaning to our options an practices.  “ 
Heclo discussed the “reciprocity” between these constructs such that it is difficult to identify 
discrete boundaries between them:  
“…it is how to follow the strands of ideas, interests, and institutions as they 
intertwine and enfold in dynamic processes…” 
And,   
“Political institutions can also provide the means for changing ideas about 
our interests and preferences.”  
Thus, Heclo advanced that understanding policy evolution required an understanding of 
these three interdependent, dynamic constructs.  It is this lens that will be used to examine the 
evolution of tobacco control policy in the United States.   
5.3 Ideas 
In the 1950s, cigarettes in America were both ubiquitous and superlative symbols of 
freedom and Americanism.  With few restrictions, smoking was common in workplaces, 
Congressional committee rooms, by physicians at their patient’s bedside, in restaurants, 
theatres, and airplanes – it was everywhere, and many, if not most, people did it.  As symbols of 
youth, freedom, and American cool, cigarettes were the perfect accessory for James Dean’s 
jeans, white t-shirt and tosseled hair, and Joe Camel™ and the Marlboro Man™ were iconic 
American brands.  To evolve from products with such social prominence and acceptance to 
ones highly restricted and with a negative social image, ideas about cigarettes by both the 
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public and policy makers alike needed to cross two specific thresholds: a) that tobacco is a 
“problem product” whose use has negative consequences and imposes harm and unfair costs 
on society, and b) because of the nature of the product, society needs to be protected from 
these negative consequences, harms, and costs by government action.  That is, there was a 
needed change in the ideas about the problem, the preference for a public or private solution for 
the problem, fundamental values regarding public protection among other things, or some 
combination of these ideas.  The evolution of these ideas, then, is directly related to the re-
framing of tobacco in general and cigarettes specifically from iconic symbols of individualism 
and American freedom to that of a social menace. 
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In 1954 when approximately 45% of Americans smoked, only 39% of Americans 
believed that smoking caused lung cancer, but by 1992, when 23% of Americans smoked, the 
proportion of Americans who reported that smoking caused lung cancer was 92%, or a 140% 
increase in this 38-year time period. (Morales, L; Gallup, Inc., 2008)  Likely the single biggest 
agent for change during this period was the continual emergence of scientific evidence 
identifying an ever-increasing number of diseases, risk factors, and costs associated with 
tobacco use.  Prominent among this scientific evidence has been the U.S. Surgeon General’s 
office which has, between 1994-2007, released 34 reports on various aspects of tobacco use, 
cigarette smoking, exposure to secondhand smoke, and the health and economic 
consequences thereof (Table 5-1).  Through these reports, not only has the information from 
individual scientific studies been summarized, synthesized, and presented in a publicly-
Table 5-1. Smoking and Tobacco-Related Reports of the U.S. Surgeon General, 1964-2007 
Year Title
1964 Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service
1967 The Health Consequences of Smoking, A Public Health Service Review
1968 The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1968 Supplement to the 1967 Public Health Service Review
1969 The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1969 Supplement to the 1967 Public Health Service Review
1971 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General: 1971
1972 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1972
1973 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1973
1974 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1974
1975 The Health Consequences of Smoking 1975
1976 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Reference Edition
1979 Smoking and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General
1979 The Health Consequences of Smoking, 1977-1978
1980 The Health Consequences of Smoking for Women: A Report of the Surgeon General
1981 The Health Consequences of Smoking - The Changing Cigarette: A Report of the Surgeon General
1982 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cancer: A Report of the Surgeon General
1983 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cardiovascular Disease: A Report of the Surgeon General
1984 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease: A Report of the Surgeon General 
1985 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the Workplace: A Report of the Surgeon General
1986 Smoking and Health, A National Status Report: A Report to Congress
1986 The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
1986 The Health Consequences of Using Smokeless Tobacco
1988 The Health Consequences of Smoking - Nicotine Addiction: A Report of the Surgeon General
1989 Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking - 25 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General
1990 The Health Benefits of Smoking Cessation: A Report of the Surgeon General
1992 Smoking and Health in the Americas: A Report of the Surgeon General
1994 Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General
1994 Surgeon General's Report for Kids about Smoking
1998 Tobacco Use Among U.S. Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups: A Report of the Surgeon General
2000 Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General
2001 Women and Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General 
2004 The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General
2006 The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General
2007 Children and Secondhand Smoke Exposure-Excerpts from The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the 
Surgeon General
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digestible and actionable format, but the Surgeon General has given the information (i.e., results 
from individual scientific studies) credibility and prominence not otherwise achievable.  
 While population surveys on the knowledge and attitudes about the harmful effects of 
tobacco use and cigarette smoking have not been collected with the same frequency or 
standardized methodological rigor as, for example, smoking prevalence, the 1989 Surgeon 
General’s Report did summarize such results from several different sources. (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1989)  An overview of selected 
results from the “Adult Use of Tobacco Survey (A.U.T.S.)” is shown in Figure 5-1.  The 
proportion of Americans who believe that smoking is harmful to your health, and that it causes 
lung cancer and heart disease have all increased substantially since 1964, the year of the 
seminal Surgeon General’s report affirming that tobacco is causative of deleterious health 
outcomes. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964)   
The results from the A.U.T.S. survey, the Gallup, Inc.® polls, and the decline of smoking 
prevalence in the absence of substantive tobacco control policies until the 1980s (discussed in 
the Policy Stream below) strongly suggests that the American public, and so one can only 
assume policy makers as well, had an increasing understanding of the negative health 
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consequences of smoking and tobacco use.  However, the transformation of cigarettes from a 
harmful product left to strictly private decision making to a product requiring substantial 
government regulation and restriction was likely strongly related to three factors: 1) the 
emergence of evidence that secondhand smoke was also causative of deleterious health 
effects, 2) the rise of the non-smokers’ rights movements, and 3) the demise of the tobacco 
industry.  The 1986 Surgeon General’s Report had as one of its principal conclusions that 
exposure to secondhand smoke (termed “involuntary smoking” in the report) caused lung 
cancer in healthy non-smokers. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Surgeon General, 1986)  Results summarized in the 1989 Surgeon General’s report support the 
evolution of the public’s view of this issue. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Surgeon General, 1989)  In 1974, 46% of respondents agreed that smoking was 
hazardous to nonsmoker’s health while 81% of respondents agreed with this statement in 1987, 
though these data have different original sources.  And has been discussed above, support for 
“totally banning” smoking in public places such as restaurants, workplaces, and hotels and 
motels has steadily increased from 1987-2005: for example, 17% reported supporting a total 
smoking ban in restaurants in 1987 compared to 54% in 2005 (Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005).  
The increasing evidence for the deleterious effects of secondhand smoke (culminating in the 
1986 Surgeon General’s report) was a key impetus for the formation and expansion of the 
nonsmokers’ rights movement, which began in the 1970s and expanded rapidly thereafter. 
(Nathanson, 2007)  These groups, such as G.A.S.P. (Groups Against Smokers’ Pollution), were 
important agents in transforming and re-framing cigarettes, smokers, and the tobacco industry 
as infringing on the public’s right to breathe clean air and jeopardizing the health of children, a 
traditionally protected social group.  In any policy area, the ability to successfully link a policy 
image to a “right” is a powerful strategy in reframing a policy problem (Feldman & Bayer, 
Unfiltered: Conflicts Over Tobacco Policy and Health, 2004) and this strategy has been 
successfully employed by these nonsmokers’ groups. 
Finally, while the favorable opinion of and prevalence of smoking had already begun to 
decline, another key factor has been the declining influence of the tobacco industry.  Despite 
ample and credible scientific evidence to the contrary, including the 1988 Surgeon General’s 
report (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1988), 
as late as 1994 tobacco industry executives testified under oath before a Congressional 
committee that nicotine was not addictive.  This testimony was later undermined by documents 
from the tobacco industry itself, released as part of a settlement in a Minnesota law suit, and the 
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credibility of the tobacco industry suffered substantially.  Thereafter, it became far more difficult 
for the tobacco industry to position themselves as the “innocent victims” of aggressive targeting 
by zealous public health activists.   
Regarding public attitudes towards tobacco control policies, these attitudes can be 
evaluated from different perspectives and at different levels of resolution.  Unfortunately and 
regardless of the perspective or resolution, very little information has been systematically 
collected over regular, prolonged intervals and thus conclusions regarding the public ideas 
about and attitudes towards tobacco control policies must be inferred.  At the macro-level, there 
have been periodic public opinion surveys regarding attitudes, defined broadly, toward 
restriction on smoking and tobacco sales.  The 1989 Surgeon General’s report summarized the 
results from several surveys. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Surgeon General, 1989)  While fully acknowledging the challenge of comparing results from 
different survey sources (including slightly different instruments and companies/groups 
administering the survey), in 1964 52% of all adults agreed that smoking should be allowed in 
fewer places than it is now compared to 70% in 1975.  In 1978 16% of adults favored a total ban 
on smoking in public places compared to 60% in 1988, and in 1964 36% of adults agreed that 
cigarette advertising should not be permitted compared to 55% of adults in 1988.  Additionally, 
as was discussed above, Gallup, Inc.® has reported that, amongst adults, 17% favored total 
bans in restaurants and workplaces in 1987 compared to 54% and 41%, respectively, in 2005. 
(Moore, D W; Gallup, Inc., 2005)  Results from individual studies also support a trend of more 
favorable attitudes towards restrictive tobacco control polices.  In California and the U.S.A., 
there has been a 28.6% (from 58.5% to 75.8%) and a 23.2% (from 46.5% to 57.3%) respective 
increase in support for a smoking ban in at least four of six venue sites (restaurants, hospitals, 
indoor work areas, bars, indoor sports venues, indoor shopping malls). (Gilpin, Lee, & Pierce, 
2004)  Finally, the National Social Climate Survey of Tobacco Control study, a recently 
established study based on social institutional theory, has reported similar trends: in 2000 61% 
of respondents felt that smoking should not be allowed at all in restaurants compared to 83.6% 
in 2008; and 59.7% of respondents in 2005 felt that people should not be allowed to smoke 
within twenty feet of a doorway compared to 65.1% in 2008. (American Academy of Pediatrics 
Julias B. Richmond Center of Excellence, 2008)  Thus, based on the information from these 
disparate sources it is not unreasonable to infer that the social ideas have become more 
favorable to increasingly restrictive comprehensive tobacco control policies.   
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In summary, since the early 1950s tobacco and smoking has evolved from a widely used 
and widely accepted product to one which the majority of the population views unfavorably and 
as needing substantial regulation and restriction.  While increasing knowledge about the 
deleterious effects of smoking and secondhand smoke has played an important role in the 
transformation of this issue, so too has the nonsmokers’ rights movement and the actions of the 
tobacco industry itself.  Thus, the two predominant yet diametric and competing images or 
“frames” regarding tobacco and smoking that currently exist are a) that cigarettes are an entirely 
unsafe and addictive product promoted by a deceptive and untrustworthy industry resulting in 
unjustifiable societal harm and cost and so should be banned outright vs. b) that provided the 
tobacco industry complies with existing legislation and regulation to protect those who chose not 
to smoke, then the government and society should leave the tobacco companies alone to sell 
their legal products to those who chose to exercise their right to smoke.  It is clear that many 
ideas in the tobacco control debate have changed over time, including ideas about the health 
effects of smoking, the tobacco industry, and even some ideas about where it is and is not 
acceptable to smoke (and the subsequent support for smoking bans).  However, it is less clear 
whether these changes in ideas are due to changes in information about tobacco use and the 
tobacco industry with associated changes in the understanding (construction) or risk and 
populations deserving protection, or if these changes in ideas are due to more fundamental 
changes in preferences for public vs. private solutions, or social values, which might, for 
example, indicate in a change in the preference or tolerance for paternalism in favor of 
unabridged individual rights.  Neither is it clear if these ideas are distributed equally throughout 
a population at a given point in time (they most likely are not), their temporal distribution within a 
given society, or their relative distributions between societies at any given point in time.  
Empirical studies evaluating these questions, but could provide valuable insights into the role 
and importance of ideas in the adoption of tobacco control policy as well as tobacco use itself.   
5.4 Interests 
The struggle to enact tobacco control policy has, fundamentally, been a struggle 
between two competing interests:  the interest of the state to prevent its citizens from smoking 
thereby improving health and avoiding unnecessary expenses, and the interests of the tobacco 
industry to continue to sell and profit by its legal products.  The interests of the state can thus be 
interpreted as motivated by hard or soft paternalism and possibly (and more cynically) a desire 
by the bureaucracy to protect its [expanding] role in the “war on tobacco”, and thus the state and 
other public health advocates work to support the adoption of more restrictive tobacco control 
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policies.  The interests of the tobacco industry can be understood as motivated by self 
preservation and profit, and thus in opposition to the adoption of tobacco control polices.   
5.4.1 Tobacco Industry Interests 
The opposition of the tobacco industry to regulation in any form has been well 
documented and specific details of activities have emerged in large measure because of the 
public disclosure of documents from American-based tobacco companies and, while this has 
clearly been a global phenomenon and strategy (Thomson & Wilson, 2002), (Hiilamo, 2003), 
(Barraclough & Morrow, 2008), (Smith & Malone, 2006), (Smith, 2006), (Mamudu, Hammond, & 
Glantz, 2008), (World Health Organization, 2008), many of the details have emerged because of 
the public disclosure of documents from American-based tobacco companies.  The American 
release of these documents, which has resulted in the publication of many books and academic 
manuscripts as well as their warehousing on multiple websites in both the U.S. and the U.K., 
have had multiple sources including documents leaked from a tobacco industry insider to a 
university professor, as part of the disclosure and investigation for Congressional hearings, and, 
perhaps most significantly for both volume and impact, as part of the terms of the settlement in 
State of Minnesota v. Philip Morris (the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Minnesota sued Philip Morris for conspiracy and fraud regarding the hazards of smoking, 
impeding the development of safer cigarettes, and intentionally targeting children as new 
consumers (Bero, 2003), (Public Health Law Center, 2010)), and the extension of the 
requirement for public disclosure of industry documents in the subsequent Master Settlement 
Agreement.   
A substantial portion of the legacy of the disclosure of these documents has been to 
reveal tobacco industry strategies to defeat or impede tobacco control policies which can be 
categorized as: making misleading and fraudulent claims to the public and policymakers 
regarding both tobacco products (particularly health effects and nicotine addiction) and industry 
conduct; intentionally failing to disclose or hiding information regarding tobacco products and 
industry knowledge and strategies; creating controversies about scientific studies and public 
health reports, their claims, and / or their authors; extensive involvement of lawyers and a 
legalistic framework in scientific studies (or the critique thereof), marketing, and public relations; 
creation and funding of third-party groups to act as a non-partisan “front” for political lobbying, 
conducting scientific studies, conducting public relations campaigns, and funding public groups 
such as “smokers’ rights” groups; global coordination amongst tobacco companies regarding 
strategies and tactics to counteract the public relations and legal liability of scientific evidence 
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linking smoking to deleterious health effects; various tactics and strategies designed to pressure 
and influence other corporations and organizations into supporting tobacco industry positions; 
and, of particular interest to epidemiologists and public health advocates, obstruction of 
legislation requiring documentation of smoking on death certificates. (Bero, 2003), (Sweda Jr & 
Daynard, 1996)   
These now-disclosed documents have also, for example, brought “Operation Berkshire” 
to light, the code name for a cooperative and conspiratorial strategy amongst international 
tobacco companies dating back to 1977, in attempt to counteract anti-smoking campaigns and 
legislation by continuing to create controversy over the veracity of study results linking smoking 
to morbidity and mortality and refusal to accept any such evidence as definitive “proof”. 
(Francey & Chapman, 2000)  “Operation Berkshire” was accompanied by “Operation Mayfly”, 
also a cooperative international effort designed to diminish the effect of the World Health 
Organization’s report “Smoking or Health – The Choice is Yours”, and involved a series of field 
tests and projects in Australia and New Zealand in and around 1981 to influence public opinion 
to be more favorable to smoking and the tobacco industry. (Francey & Chapman, 2000)  More 
recently, analysis of industry documents and other sources identified “Project Sunrise”, a Philip 
Morris (U.S.A.) strategy which was started in 1995 to counter industry (and smoking) 
marginalization and bolster the social acceptability of smoking by “voluntarily and willingly” 
working with moderate tobacco control advocates while working to undermine and ostracize 
more strident tobacco control advocates, thus creating controversy and disagreement within the 
tobacco control movement in a classic divide-and-conquer approach. (McDaniel, Smith, & 
Malone, 2006)  Additionally, a recent report detailed how the tobacco industry was able, by 
providing funding to a study investigator, to obtain data from the Framingham Study in the early 
1970s, now one of the most renowned and important longitudinal epidemiologic studies in 
American history, thus enabling a tobacco industry consultant to re-analyze the data in an effort 
to discredit existing Framingham-based studies on the associations between smoking and 
coronary heart disease (tobacco industry funding was terminated after the dataset was 
obtained). (Cataldo, Bero, & Malone, 2010) 
These documents have also allowed researchers to document tactics used as part of the 
tobacco industry’s vociferous opposition to the release of the risk assessment of environmental 
tobacco smoke by the E.P.A., eventually released in 1993. (Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004)  
These tactics included: lobbying for an executive order to change the standards for risk 
assessments by federal agencies to create a delay in the release of the E.P.A. report; lobbying 
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for an executive order to transfer jurisdiction from the E.P.A. to O.S.H.A., thereby making the 
E.P.A. report without weight or authority; creating controversy (and subsequent political 
pressure) about and discrediting the E.P.A.’s methodology and assessment procedures; 
working closely and directly with a single Congressman (Thomas Bliley, R-VA) to affect the 
policy and procedural processes from the “inside”; and finally, filing suit against the E.P.A., 
again in the attempt to delay or stop the release of the report, and discredit its contents before 
its release.  While some tactics were not successful, others were – the release of the report was 
delayed and controversy surrounded its findings largely persisted until the tobacco industry suit 
against the E.P.A. was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, but that did not happen until 
2002 (aspects of this case are discussed in more detail in the Judicial Stream below). (Muggli, 
Hurt, & Repace, 2004)  
Tobacco industry efforts to influence the policy process, either indirectly through 
contributions to political campaigns or directly through opposing ballot initiatives and taxes, have 
also been documented.  At the central-level, a recent report documented that almost $7 million 
from 17 tobacco industry political action committees was received by Congressional legislators 
(almost $13,000 per member) during the period 1993-2000. (Luke & Krauss, 2004)  Further, 
while Republicans compared to Democrats received more money (respective mean 
contributions of $22,005 vs. $6,057) and were more likely to vote pro-tobacco on the 49 
tobacco-related bills between 1997-2000 (73% for Republicans vs. 23% for Democrats), it was 
Democrats whose voting was more influenced by contributions compared to Republicans 
(Democrats were 9.8% more likely to vote pro-tobacco for every $10,000 received compared to 
3.5% more likely for every $10,000 in contributions to Republicans).  Tobacco industry 
contributions to legislators have also been shown to influence voting patterns in state 
legislatures. (Monardi & Glantz, 1998)  Also at the state-level, in 1997 the Tobacco Institute, a 
tobacco industry lobbying group, spent almost $3 million on state lobbyists. (Givel & Glantz, 
2001)  However, these “common wisdom” findings – that money=influence – has been 
challenged by a study reporting that longer-term voting patterns of U.S. Congress members 
were more related to political ideology, as measured by the Americans for Democratic Action 
voting score, than tobacco industry contributions or connections to the tobacco agricultural 
“bloc”. (Wright, 2004)  (This finding of the importance of political ideology is echoed in the 
findings from two Canadian studies that reported that ideology, as measured by a general 
orientation towards favoring government intervention in health promotion, was a significant 
predictor in Canadian legislators’ support for tobacco control policies, though these studies were 
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not assessing tobacco industry financial contributions or lobbying. (de Guia, et al., 2003), 
(Cohen, de Guia, Ashley, Ferrence, Northrup, & Studlar, 2002))  Other key tactics employed by 
the tobacco industry at the state-level have included: lobbying and campaign contributions, 
particularly to those identified as “legislative leaders” regardless of their opinion toward smoking 
and / or the tobacco industry; gifts and honoraria; strategic alliances with like-minded or 
sympathetic interest groups or groups that could then work to indirectly advance the interests of 
tobacco (for example legislative groups); covert funding of front groups that were ostensibly 
unaffiliated with the tobacco industry while, in fact, being operated by the industry (for example, 
funding of groups who asserted to represent a restaurant or motel industry group though they 
were owned and funded by the tobacco industry); making every attempt to delay votes on 
legislation until time for the legislative session expired thus requiring the bill to be re-introduced; 
working to defeat or undermine legislation after enactment; and advocating for inclusion of pre-
emption clauses in state legislation thus preventing localities from implementing stronger 
restrictions. (Givel & Glantz, 2001)   
In single issue areas, such as taxes, or single events, such as ballot initiatives, the 
tobacco industry has also been very adept at both understanding the specifics and nuances of 
and manipulating the process in their favor.  For example, the industry has extensively funded 
citizen groups in order to facilitate issue re-framing favorably for the industry, such as funding 
groups to argue that tobacco taxes are socially unfair and regressive thereby re-framing the 
issue to create opposition toward increases in tobacco excise taxes. (Campbell & Balbach, 
2009)  Additionally, the tobacco industry has been successful in defeating individual ballot 
measures when and where public health advocates have not been prepared for industry tactics 
including exploiting subtleties in procedural rules, developing tobacco-industry sponsored 
alternative ballot measures, and promulgating misinformation and voter confusion campaigns. 
(Tung, Hendin, & Glantz, 2009)   
The motivation for the tobacco industry to act with such vigor and with such resources is 
patently obvious: to protect their revenues and profits by preventing litigation, regulation, or 
marginalization. (Bero, 2003)  Despite a decade of legal fights and a sharp increase in 
regulations, restrictions, and taxes, the tobacco industry continues to be very profitable.  Altria, 
the parent company of Philip Morris, has recently reported a 27% increase in revenue, a 3.6% 
increase in total sales, and a 27% increase in their stock value over the past year. (Becker, N; 
Dow Jones Newswire, 2010)  Further, while cigarettes sales volume has decreased by 0.7%, 
the sales volume of smokeless products has increased by 22%. (Becker, N; Dow Jones 
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Newswire, 2010)  Each smoker represents a tremendous lifetime revenue stream for tobacco 
companies.  For example, some authors have estimated that each smoking-addicted high 
school senior represents $20,000 in lifetime revenues and that the 27% decline in the 
prevalence of smoking amongst high school seniors between 1997-2002 (from 36.5% to 26.7%) 
represented $4 billion in forgone future revenues for tobacco companies. (Healton, Farrelly, 
Weitzenkamp, Lindsey, & Haviland, 2006)  In another series of estimates and calculations, 
images of smoking in movies are projected to entice 390,000 adolescents to start smokin which 
results in estimated lifetime revenues of $4.1 billion and estimated lifetime profits of $894 million 
for tobacco companies. (Alamar & Glantz, 2006)  Finally, as an example of the cost to the 
tobacco industry of comprehensive tobacco control programs, from 1989-2004 the California 
Tobacco Control Program was estimated to have prevented the sale of 3.6 billion packs of 
cigarettes representing $9.2 billion in pre-tax revenues for the tobacco industry. (Lightwood, 
Dinno, & Glantz, 2008)  Thus, when such tobacco control programs are understood from this 
financial perspective, it is not difficult to see that, for the tobacco industry, a “few million” spent 
in an attempt to defeat tobacco control initiatives remains a cost effective, prudent investment.  
5.4.2 Public Health and State Advocacy Interests 
Countering the tobacco industry are anti-tobacco advocates.  Groups opposing the 
tobacco industry have evolved substantially over time in number, focus, resources, and 
organization, the result of significant legal mobilization and social mobilization of interests 
efforts.  What began as a few groups that formed in response to the mounting scientific 
evidence of the deleterious health effects and substantial (and avoidable) societal costs caused 
by tobacco products, has evolved (expansion) into a series of organizations and bureaucracies 
that support a (now) fairly extensive and overlapping network of coalitions.  While it is beyond 
the scope of the present analysis to provide a detailed account of evolution of each these 
groups and networks, a broad overview and timeline is shown in Table 5-2.  The C.D.C., the 
nation’s leading public health agency, was established very early as a hub for the synthesis and 
dissemination of credible scientific information and support and technical information for groups 
and organizations promoting the adoption of anti-tobacco polices, including “how-to” and “best 
practices” for the organization, operation, and sustainability of coalitions.  The C.D.C.’s 
promotion of a “coalition” or “network of coalitions” model is not unique to tobacco control, but 
rather is the most common model used by the C.D.C. and other public health agencies (e.g., the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) in chronic disease prevention and health promotion 
activities.  The C.D.C. regards a coalition as a group of individuals and organizations with a 
diverse array of skills, expertise, resources, and spheres of influence that come together to 
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advance a specific cause (in this case, adoption of anti-tobacco policies) and who collectively 
can leverage these assets to affect change in ways the members could not individually.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, community-based coalitions are central to the C.D.C.’s strategy for 
implementing the National Tobacco Control Program. (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2007)  
In additional to the strategic, scientific, and financial that the C.D.C. provides to state-
level tobacco control programs and, in turn, these community-based coalition networks, the 
C.D.C. also provides support and advice on the structure, function, and sustainability of the 
community-based organizations and coalitions themselves. (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2007)  Many of these C.D.C. “best practice” strategies and approaches have been 
accumulated and assembled from the experiences – successful and otherwise – of the early 
anti-tobacco groups such as the Group Against Smoking Pollution (G.A.S.P.), the Action on 
Smoking and Health (A.S.H.), American Non-Smokers’ Rights (A.N.R.), the collective 
experiences of the California anti-tobacco movement including the California Tobacco Control 
Program (widely considered to be pioneers in the anti-smoking campaign and the tobacco 
control policy movement), as well as from the formal, funded scientific trials assessing 
community-based approaches to implementing anti-tobacco policy trials such as the COMMIT, 
ASSIST, IMPACT, and SmokeLess States programs.  In addition to these public coalitions, 
there are myriad other groups and coalitions, variously funded by private foundations and 
Table 5-2. Overview of the Development of Anti-Tobacco Groups and Coalitions 
Era Year Event
Grassroots / State Coalition 
Movement 
(1960s-1980s) 
1963 • Colorado state coalition forms 
1965 • CDC establishes the National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health 
• National Clearinghouse later becomes the Office on Smoking and Health 
1967 • Action on Smoking and Health is formed 
1970s • GASP (Group Against Smoking Pollution) networks form nationwide 
National Movement 
(1980s-2000s) 
1981 • Coalition on Smoking or Health forms (includes American Lung Association, 
American Cancer Society, and the American Heart Association) 
1986 • American’s for Non-Smoker’s Rights (ANR) is established 
1985-1993 • National Cancer Institute funds the COMMIT (Community Intervention Trial for 
Smoking Cessation) 
Era of Coalition Funding 
(1990s – Present) 
1991-1998 • National Cancer Institute and American Cancer Society fund ASSIST  
(American Stop Smoking Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention) trial 
• ASSIST is supplemented by the IMPACT (Initiative to Mobilize for the 
Prevention and Control of Tobacco Use) trial by the CDC 
• ASSIST and IMPACT trials later become incorporated into CDC’s National 
Tobacco Control Program 
 1994-2000 • Robert Wood Johnson Foundation  in conjunction with the American Medical 
Association fund the Smokeless States initiative  
 1995 • Robert Wood Johnson Foundation launches the Center for Tobacco Free Kids 
• This Center plays an important role in the negotiations leading up to the 
Master Settlement Agreement 
 1998 • American Legacy Foundation is created by and funded from the Master 
Settlement Agreement 
 1999 • National Tobacco Control Program is launched at the CDC 
 1999 • The CDC, Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco control Program 
publishes the first “Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs” 
 2007 • The CDC, Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco control Program 
publishes and updated “Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs” 
Source (in part): (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007) 
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organizations whose mission is directly and solely tobacco-related (primary) or is also but 
indirectly tobacco-related (secondary), that also interact with all other types of organizations, 
coalitions, and networks.  Based on the number of agencies who have listed themselves on the 
Action for Smoking and Health website, it is not unreasonable to estimate that the number of 
groups and individuals self-identifying as an anti-tobacco coalition (or part thereof) approaches 
1,000 nationally (most states average 7-12 listed groups, but other states list many more groups 
– e.g., California has 69 groups and individuals listed). (Action for Smoking and Health, 2010)   
Thus, the current, cumulative picture of anti-tobacco coalitions is that of a large, 
complex, and overlapping network of public agencies, private organizations and foundations, as 
well as individuals and groups at the national, state, and local levels.  A schematic overview of 
these coalition networks and how they interact is presented in Figure 5-2.  The 
interconnectedness, interdependence, and fluidity of these groups cannot be overemphasized.  
A recent social-network analysis of five C.D.C.-funded state coalitions examined how the 
network structure, communication style, and funding stability affects network productivity. 
(Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004)  In addition to identifying that both communication style and 
funding stability were important in facilitating network productivity, the analysis illuminated the 
complexity of the social interactions – individuals and groups can act alone, in conjunction with 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Office for Smoking and Health
National Tobacco Control Program
State/Territorial/Tribal Public Health 
Agency
Chronic Disease Prevention Program
Tobacco Control Program
Six National 
Networks for 
Tobacco Control 
and Prevention
G
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l &
 n
on
-
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l c
om
m
un
ity
-b
as
ed
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
Community-Based Coalition 
Networks
National Supporting 
Agencies  
(Public)
Primary: F.D.A., 
Interagency 
Committee on 
Smoking and Health
Secondary: E.P.A., 
O.S.H.A., N.I.H., etc.
National Supporting 
Agencies 
(Private)
Primary: A.S.H., 
G.A.S.P., A.N.R., 
American Legacy 
Foundation, 
Campaign for 
Tobacco Free Kids, 
etc.
Secondary: American 
Cancer Society, 
American Heart 
Association, 
American Lung 
Association, Robert 
Wood Johnson 
Foundation, etc.
S
ta
te
 &
 L
oc
al
 C
oa
lit
io
ns
 
(P
riv
at
e)
Branches of national, primary agencies (e.g., 
state-wide G.A.S.P., A.N.R., Campaign for 
Tobacco Free Kids, etc.
Branches of national, secondary agencies 
(e.g., American Heart Association, American 
Lung Association, American Cancer Society, 
etc.
Individuals, organizations, and groups 
advocating for tobacco control policies (e.g., 
public health officials, municipalities, workers’ 
groups, etc.)
Figure 5-2. Schematic Representation of Current Anti-Tobacco Coalition Networks 
 [118] 
 
other members of a given coalition, as part of a collective coalition action, or as part of another 
(overlapping) coalition. (Krauss, Meuller, & Luke, 2004)  This interconnected network, then, 
serves not only as the functional component that implements the goals and initiatives of the 
C.D.C.’s National Tobacco Control Program, but also as the apparatus to counteract and 
oppose tobacco industry interest groups.  That is, this apparatus and its constituent elements,  
fostered and developed as part of the National Tobacco Control Program, has evolved to be the 
political groups that challenge to the issue framing and interests of the tobacco industry in the 
public and policy arenas.   
In summary, interest and advocacy groups have had substantial influence on the 
evolution of tobacco control issue expansion, mobilization, and counter-mobilization backlash, 
have most certainly affected the public’s perception of tobacco and smoking as a problem 
(Problem Stream), opposing interest groups competing for control over issue framing, policy 
image, and policy subsystem at multiple venues within the American federalist structure have 
dominated the Politics Stream.  
5.5 Institutions  
If the starting point for the evaluation of the evolution of tobacco control policy is the 
1940s-1950s, the dominant subsystem coalition (A.C.F.) or controller of the subsystem and 
policy image (P.E.T.) was the tobacco industry (which includes tobacco farmers).  Thus, the 
tobacco industry, the then benefactors of the status quo, where highly motivated to maintain the 
policy image and venue / institutional arrangements, promote negative feedback, and prevent 
mobilization.  In contrast, public health activists were highly motivated to impel matters in a 
diametrically opposite direction.  As discussed above, public health advocacy networks and 
coalitions employed strategies such as framing and social construction, substantially aided by 
both scientific information and information gleaned from tobacco industry documents, to change 
the policy image and society’s ideas about smoking and the tobacco industry in an effort to 
mobilize interest in order to disrupt the subsystem and pseudo-equilibrium and thereby affect 
policy change.  An additional strategy employed by these public health advocacy networks was 
changing venues, thereby disrupting the institutional arrangements supporting the status quo 
and benefiting the tobacco industry.  This strategy, implemented in numerous ways, has been 
greatly aided by the pluralist and federalist American system. 
First, as reported by others, the primary central-level policy making venue in the tobacco 
industry controlled subsystem / pseudo-equilibrium was agriculturally-based committees and 
forums in Congress. (Baumgartner & Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 1993), 
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(Worsham, 2006)  With re-framing and other efforts meant to expand the issue, public health 
advocacy networks and coalitions were able to gradually erode this policy monopoly and 
mobilize different Congressionally-based venues, such as health and welfare related 
committees.  The ultimate result of this positive feedback was certainly the destruction of the old 
policy monopoly, which was institutionalized, in part, by the elimination of agricultural subsidies 
as part of the Master Settlement Agreement (and so agriculturally-based committees are no 
longer important policy making venues).  Whether a new pseudo-equilibrium and policy 
monopoly has yet been re-established is still unclear; perhaps there will be an extended period 
of Weible’s adversarial subsystem before a dominant coalition emerges. (Weible, Expert-based 
information and policy subsystems: a review and synthesis, 2008) 
A second example of a venue-change strategy employed by the public health advocacy 
networks and coalitions has been the establishment, through the National Tobacco Control 
Program, of a network of community-based advocacy coalitions.  In so doing, the C.D.C. 
compelled a change from central (national) level policy making venues to state and local policy 
making venues.  Additionally, funding provided through the C.D.C. to state-level departments of 
public health has functionally institutionalized this venue change and, in so doing, has attempted 
to instill an oppositional voice to the tobacco industry in virtually every jurisdiction in the country.   
A third and important venue-change strategy has been legal mobilization.  Seminal cases 
in this legal mobilization are summarized in Appendix 1 (summarized in Table 5-3).  As 
predicted by scholars of the role of the judiciary in policy, the trajectory of this mobilization has 
been complex, has met with much counter-mobilization backlash, and the implications for 
tobacco control policy are, in many instances, still uncertain. (Epp, 2008), (McCann, 2008)  With 
the numerous different types of cases and legal bases for suits, the trajectory of this legal 
mobilization has not been as consistent or unidirectional – the resolution in some cases has 
represented advancement for tobacco control policy, while the resolution in other cases has 
represented clear restriction for tobacco control policy.  Regardless of the ultimate resolution of 
a case, tobacco industry documents and scientific evidence have played increasingly important 
roles in cases over time, and the effective use of both internal industry documents and scientific 
evidence has also been an increasingly important factor in achieving a final judgment against 
the tobacco industry.  Further, it is also clear that the tobacco companies have engage in 
substantial counter-mobilization backlash and have maintained their strategy of defending (or 
prosecuting) each case to the fullest extent possible using all means at their disposal, which are 
not unimposing.  Given the revenue streams at stake for the tobacco companies, litigation is an 
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important tactic to delay implementation of a regulation or stop an industry practice thereby 
maintaining a revenue streams, even if temporarily while a case proceeds through the legal 
system. 
Finally, an element of institutions that is most fundamental and also the least studied as it 
impacts tobacco control policy is cultural values.  Cultural values are intimately intertwined with 
all aspects of policy making, yet little is understood about how a society’s values regarding 
public vs. private solutions to problems, or the protection of individual human rights vs. property 
rights has impacted either tobacco control policy adoption or tobacco-related population health.  
Further, it is fairly patent that the ultimate goal of tobacco control advocates is the complete 
elimination of all tobacco products.  The ability to attain this goal may well depend upon its 
Category Example Cases Impact on Policy 
Suits with Individual Plaintiffs 
Claiming Personal Harm 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group 
 
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al. 
• Unclear direct effects 
• Possible secondary impacts:  
• Establishing precedent and case law particularly related to 
liability and industry wrongdoing 
• Making public previously unknown information through the 
discovery process 
• Product and industry framing in the Problem Stream 
• Policy images in the Policy Stream 
Class Action Suits Claiming 
Personal Harm 
 • Unclear direct or secondary effects (these suits almost 
universally unsuccessful) 
Suits Claiming Harm from 
Exposure to Secondhand or 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke 
Helling v. McKinney, No. 91-1958 
 
Thaxton v Norfolk Southern Railroad Co., 239 Ga 
 
Gainsborough St. Realty Trust v. Haile, No. 98-
02279 
 
Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al 
• Direct impacts: 
• Established the legal precedent for the harmful effects of 
secondhand smoke 
• In establishing liability for not protecting non-smokers from 
exposure to secondhand smoke, de facto requirements 
(policy) for smoke-free environments created 
Suits Seeking Reimbursement 
for Tobacco-Attributable 
Expenses 
Moore v. American Tobacco, et al. 
Case No. 94-1429. followed by others, then the 
Master Settlement Agreement 
 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip 
Morris U.S.A Inc 
 
Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas v. American 
Tobacco Co.)  
 
Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip 
Morris Inc 
• Complex impacts 
• The M.S.A. represented de facto policy by contractual 
agreement with enforcement through civil contractual law 
dispute mechanisms  
• Important secondary impacts:  
• Establishment of the tobacco industry document library 
• Creation of the American Legacy Foundation 
• Controversial aspect: 
• Failure of states to use M.S.A. settlement payments to 
adequately fund state tobacco control programs  
Suits Disputing Scope of Action Philip Morris v Day One 
 
F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp 
 
Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization 
Corporation et al. v. the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency No. 98-2407 
 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney 
General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596 
 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et al. v. FDA et al. 
No. 1:09-CV-117-M 
 
Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a 
NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. 
Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL))      
 
Altria Group, In., et al. v. Good et al 
 
United States of America v. Philip Morris U.S.A, 
Inc., et al. 
• Very complex, often with yet unclear impacts (cases still 
ongoing or only recently concluded) 
• Some actions (F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp, Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney General of 
Massachusetts et al.) succeeded in greatly restricting 
government scope of action that, as in the ruling in the latter 
case on First Amendment commercial free speech standards, 
functionally created enduring restrictions on the scope of 
government policy 
• Some actions failed to restrict scope of government action 
(Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et 
al. v. the United States Environmental Protection Agency)    
Table 5-3. Summary of Seminal Legal Cases Discussed in Appendix 1 
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consistency with pervading cultural values balancing individual freedoms with collective public 
health.   
5.6 Ideas, Interests, and Institutions and Policy Change 
In additional to Heclo’s ideas, interests, and institutions, several elements of Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1984) supplement the understanding of the changes in 
tobacco control policy regimes, particularly policy entrepreneurs and policy windows which are 
discussed here.   
5.6.1 Focusing Events & Policy Entrepreneurs 
Within the context of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework, focusing events are 
significant events, often “crises”, that serve to focus much attention on a problem or issue and 
which Kingdon viewed as critical in opening the “policy window”.  Similarly, policy entrepreneurs 
are creative policy problem solvers who are able to recognize (or facilitate the creation of) a 
focusing event and the opening of the policy window and are able to “join” the streams in an 
open policy window to create policy and / or policy change.   
The effort to enact comprehensive tobacco control policies has been a collection of 
myriad efforts, many of which have been cumulative and interdependent and pursued over the 
past 50-75 years.  In such a long-standing, complex progression and because so many have 
participated, it would be tempting to list the many people and organizations who have 
contributed to or any event that may have impacted the evolution of tobacco control policies.  
However, the identification of a policy entrepreneur or focusing event is intended not to diminish 
the contributions of those not so designated, but rather to identify those people and events 
whose contributions were decisive.  Therefore, five categories of policy entrepreneurs 
(politicians, advocacy organizations, non-governmental organizations, bureaucracies, and 
individuals) and three types of focusing events can be identified, each of which are discussed 
below.   
Collectively, the Surgeon General’s reports can be considered focusing events, 
particularly the 1964, 1986, and 1988 Surgeon General’s reports (establishing that smoking 
causes morbidity and mortality, exposure to secondhand smoke causes morbidity and mortality, 
and that nicotine is addictive, respectively).  While not a single event, their almost annual 
release and the commitment of the government to research and produce these reports on 
multiple different aspects of tobacco, smoking, and health, has had an unquestionable impact 
on the evolution of ideas about the problem.  Further, as previously discussed, not only did 
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these reports have the explicit endorsement of the government, but the attention they received 
gave prominence and attention to the findings of individual studies not otherwise obtainable, 
thus altering the perception of the problem and the problem image.   
Also a series of events to be considered collectively, the release of tobacco industry 
documents from the various sources has had unquestionable effects on the evolution of ideas, 
interests, and institutions.  The content of these documents, including the timeline of what the 
tobacco companies knew when, and the strategies and tactics routinely employed by the 
industry has had far reaching consequences that are still unfolding.  In addition to influencing 
the image of the industry, the information gleaned from the study of these documents has had a 
profound impact on the outcome of myriad legal actions.  Almost uniformly, these documents 
have greatly facilitated the ability of the government or other actors in holding the tobacco 
companies accountable as these documents have provided a unique form of “evidence” and 
“proof” of the willful actions of the tobacco companies.   
Finally, the M.S.A. has also been studied by others as a focusing event. (Wood, 2006).  
However, given that the M.S.A. is de facto policy, it is unclear that policy itself can also be a 
focusing event.  It is more likely that the events leading up to the M.S.A. would agree with 
Kingdon’s conception of a focusing event.  Specifically, the M.S.A., signed in 1998, can be 
viewed as being the culmination of a series of events over 5-7 years all of which served to focus 
attention on tobacco, smoking, and, perhaps more importantly, the tobacco industry.  The series 
of events, all discussed above, in the 1990s included: the Synar Amendment in 1992; the 
release of the E.P.A. Risk Assessment in 1992 and the subsequent very public fight and filing of 
suit by the tobacco industry; the release of thousands of Brown & Williamson internal 
documents and their subsequent publishing in a series of articles in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association in 1995 and then in book form (“The Cigarette Papers”) in 1996; the 
announcement of the intention of the F.D.A. to regulate tobacco in 1995 and the Final Rule in 
1996 followed by substantial legal action; and, also very importantly, a series of Congressional 
hearings conducted by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) that variously summoned tobacco industry 
executives (who famously testified that smoking is not harmful for your health), and former 
tobacco-industry scientists and insiders.  These events, coupled with a series of T.V. 
documentaries (the afore discussed “Smoke Screen” on A.B.C.’s “Day One” program) and 
Pulitzer Prize-winning magazine articles (Freedman, 1995), (Freedman, Philip Morris memo 
likens nicotine to cocaine, 1995) served to intensify scrutiny on both smoking but also the 
conduct of the tobacco industry.  In the middle of these events, individual state Attorneys 
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General began to file lawsuits on behalf of the states (Mississippi, the first state to do so, filed in 
1994).  The initial national settlement was announced in 1997, the McCain Bill failed in early 
1998, and the M.S.A. signed in late 1998.  Alternatively, then, the M.S.A. could be regarded as 
a needed alternate after the failure, in spite of all the attention and evidence, of the legislative 
process.  Hence, the M.S.A. could be considered as an event that focused attention on the still 
powerful political influence of the tobacco industry.  This time period – almost a decade-long 
period of sustained, multi-faceted activity and attention on this policy area – has also received 
substantial scholarly attention, being the subject of multiple books from both a public health and 
policy perspective.  The ‘tobacco wars’ as the time period is commonly described, is widely 
regarded as being an extraordinary nexus of events and juncture in public policy making.  This 
time period and these extraordinary, intertwined events are also the subject of multiple literary 
investigations that document and interrogate both the events and the actors in far more depth 
than can be discussed in this analysis.   
 In addition to focusing events, five categories of policy entrepreneurs are considered as 
being critical factors facilitating the advancement of tobacco control policies.  Among politicians, 
Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA), the late- Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. John McCain 
(R-AZ) have performed critical roles in the advancement of tobacco control policies.  As the 
Chairman for the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce), Rep. Waxman was among the first to conduct hearings on tobacco issues in a 
Committee or setting outside of the agricultural policy subsystem (subsystems are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter), including the 1986 Committee hearing on the health effects of 
environmental tobacco smoke.  In particular, the hearings conducted in 1994 (Rep. Waxman 
was then the ranking Majority member) with testimony from tobacco company executives and 
former scientists were particularly seminal.  Rep. Waxman was also closely associated with the 
Synar Amendment and was a sponsor of the proposed Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2007, an earlier version of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act enacted in 2009.  Sen. John McCain worked to develop and then introduced the 
Universal Tobacco Settlement Act of 1997 (S.1414.PCS, also known as the “McCain Bill”), the 
legislation needed to enact the original 1997 proposed national settlement agreement to create 
a legislative framework for an aggressive, national, comprehensive tobacco control policy 
regime.  The McCain Bill, however, did have enough votes to in the Senate and thus ultimately 
failed leading to the need to adopt the 1998 Master Settlement agreement, a much weaker, 
state-by-state, contractually-based approach to tobacco control.  While postulated reasons for 
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the failure of the McCain Bill have included the Senator’s leadership style and legislative skills, 
the Bill and the Senator also had substantial opposition from within the Republican party as well 
as opposition from the tobacco industry. (Hook, 2000)  Regardless of the outcome of the 
McCain Bill, many within the tobacco control advocacy community have acknowledged 
McCain’s efforts to advance tobacco control policies. (Kranish, 2008)  Finally, the late Sen. 
Edward Kennedy was also a long-standing proponent of tobacco control polices.  Throughout 
his long political career, the Senator sponsored several tobacco bills, though many ultimately 
failed.  In 2007, Kennedy introduced to the Senate the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act of 2007, the predecessor-bill sponsored by Rep. Waxman that ultimately became 
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.  
 Advocacy organizations have also been critical in working to draw attention to the issue 
and advance tobacco control policies.  These groups are non-profit, independent organizations 
that have formed for the singular purpose of advancing tobacco control policies.  Most 
prominently, these groups include the Action for Smoking and Health, Americans for 
Nonsmokers’ Rights, and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, all of which formed very early in 
the anti-tobacco movement (1967, 1976, and 1995 respectively) and have been active, 
prominent and outspoken advocates of tobacco control polices and equally outspoken 
opponents of “big tobacco”.  More recently, the American Legacy Foundation was formed 
pursuant to the M.S.A. and can also be considered member among this group of advocacy 
organizations.  In addition to direct policy advocacy, these groups have functioned to continually 
maintain issue prominence by releasing reports and press releases, documenting events, and 
functioning as a source of information countervailing the messages, marketing, and tactics of 
“big tobacco”.  These groups have also frequently been involved in litigation, either as the 
initiators (plaintiffs), a named defendant, or author to an amicus brief in an ongoing legal 
proceeding.  These advocacy organizations are differentiated from state-level, C.D.C.-funded 
tobacco coalitions by their duration and longer history of action, the independence of their 
funding and thus their ability to function more independently, innovatively, and vigorously to 
advance their organization’s cause.    
A similar group of advocacy organizations that have functioned as policy entrepreneurs 
are a group of non-governmental organizations including the American Cancer Society, the 
American Lung Association, the American Heart Association, and the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation.  While these groups have functioned similarly to the advocacy organizations 
(above) as related to policy advocacy, publishing and disseminating reports and information, 
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and filing amicus briefs, a fundamental difference is that these non-governmental organizations 
have a primary mission other than tobacco control and so tobacco control advocacy is a 
secondary, supportive component of their mission.  This difference has had important 
implications for these groups, particularly as related to prioritization of resources and activities 
as well as engaging in activities that may jeopardize the larger mission of these groups.  A 
secondary but important difference between these non-governmental organizations and the 
advocacy organizations (above) has been the functioning of these groups as grant-funding 
agencies.  All four of these organizations have long-standing general grant programs and have, 
periodically, created tobacco-specific grant funding programs (e.g., the SmokeLess States 
program funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation).  Thus, these non-governmental 
organizations have also systematically supported the advancement of the body of scientific 
knowledge underpinning tobacco control policies.  Both of these types of groups have had 
important, if slightly different, entrepreneurial roles in the advancement of tobacco control 
policies in large measure because of their ability, as previous studies of the entrepreneurial 
potential of non-governmental organizations have identified, to enlist and direct resources, 
including public opinion and trust, in ways that government cannot. (Magnusson, 2009)   
The advocacy and non-governmental organizations are also distinguished from the 
government agencies and bureaucracies that have also had an important role in the 
advancement of tobacco control policies, including the National Cancer Institute (N.C.I.), C.D.C., 
F.D.A., and E.P.A.  While some might question the designation as entrepreneurial for fulfilling 
the mission of the bureaucracy itself, the impact of the sustained efforts of these agencies 
cannot be in question.  The C.D.C., F.D.A., and N.C.I. all reside within the Department of Health 
and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) with the 
N.C.I. administratively within the N.I.H.  Both the N.C.I. and the C.D.C. became enmeshed in 
tobacco control efforts almost from the inception of this public health effort.  The C.D.C. was 
integrally involved in all, including the early, Surgeon General’s reports and, as lung cancer was 
the first adverse health outcome to be causally associated with smoking, the N.C.I. was also 
very early to adopt anti-smoking and cessation as part of their mission and agenda.  Both the 
N.C.I. and C.D.C. have also been the leading grant-making agencies, thus being important 
facilitators in not only understanding the physiologic consequences of smoking but the 
development of efficient, effective, and evidence-based tobacco control policies, all of which 
have served not only to advance the knowledge of the field but have been critical in defending 
against the legal challenges of tobacco control legislation and regulation.  The F.D.A. is notable 
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because of its exclusion in the early tobacco control efforts.  The announcement in 1995 by 
then-President Clinton and Dr. David Kessler (then-F.D.A. Commissioner, discussed below) to 
assume F.D.A. jurisdiction over tobacco, while ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court 
served to “force” a conversation within the tobacco control community, including supportive 
legislators, about how best to develop and implement a comprehensive, national, tobacco 
control policy regime in the United States.  The ultimate result was the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act enacted in 2009, which legislated jurisdiction of tobacco 
regulation to the F.D.A.  Finally, while the E.P.A. has had a comparatively small role in the 
evolution of tobacco control policy, it has been important.  The E.P.A.’s insistence on 
proceeding with their environmental tobacco smoke risk assessment while facing substantial 
political, industry, and industry-supported public opposition followed by almost a decade of legal 
challenges served to bring substantial attention to the deleterious effects of environmental 
tobacco smoke.  The 1992 risk assessment was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court and, in 
while also being a vindication for the E.P.A., served to create a de facto requirement for smoke-
free environments.   
Finally, there have been a series of individuals whose contributions have been 
entrepreneurial – innovative, creative, novel, risky, and with results that have substantially 
impacted the trajectory of tobacco control policy.  These individuals and their contributions are 
identified below: 
• Dr. David Kessler, a pediatrician, was the F.D.A. Commissioner from 1990-1997.  With 
then-President Clinton, Dr. Kessler assumed F.D.A. jurisdiction over tobacco regulation 
and issued a Final Rule that was heavily focused on the prevention of use initiation by 
youth and adolescents.  This strategic decision for policy focus continues to affect and 
influence problem and policy images and policy formulation.  Although the 1996 Final 
Rule was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court, there is a direct connection 
between Dr. Kessler’s actions in the early-mid 1990s and the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act enacted in 2009.   
• Michael (Mike) Moore was the Attorney General for Mississippi from 1988-2004.  He was 
the initiator of the state-led lawsuits against the tobacco companies seeking restitution 
for Medicaid expenditures for tobacco-related medical treatment.  Mississippi was the 
first state to file their lawsuits, with other states following shortly thereafter.  Moore 
became the de facto leader of the Attorneys General and the chief negotiator in the 
subsequent settlement agreement discussions.   
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• Merrell Williams was working as a paralegal in 1988 for a firm in Kentucky which had a 
sub-contract with Brown & Williamson to screen and code internal documents that might 
be damaging in a product liability suit.  During the course of his work, Williams was 
assigned thousands of documents including documents about the company’s knowledge 
about the health effects and addictiveness of smoking and marketing efforts aimed at 
children.  Williams began smuggling documents out at night by strapping them to his 
waist under a girdle, copying them, and returning them in the morning.  He kept a copy 
of the documents and also sent a copy to a friend in case anything happened to him.  
The path to the eventual release of the documents was complex, but they eventually 
ended up in the hands of Dr. Stanton Glantz (discussed below) – the infamous “Mr. 
Butts” mailing – as well as in the hands of Congress.  Williams was sued by Brown & 
Williamson, but eventually settled with them a sealed agreement.   
• Matthew Myers has been the President of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids since 
2000 after being the organization’s legal counsel for several years.  Myers has a long 
history with tobacco control advocacy, including representing the Action for Smoking OR 
Health and being a negotiator in the 1998 M.S.A. discussions.  Since the strategic 
decision by Kessler and the F.D.A. to focus policy on youth and adolescents, the 
Campaign and Myers have had increased prominence and were active in the formulation 
and advocacy for the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009. 
• Dr. Jeffrey Wigand was the Vice-President of Research and Development at Brown & 
Williamson in the early 1990s.  Wigand became the famous “whistleblower” in the 1995 
(and again in 1996) 60 Minutes (C.B.S.) documentary program on tobacco companies 
during which he asserted that tobacco companies were knowingly manipulating tobacco 
leaf blends in order to alter nicotine delivery.  Wigand later made similar testimony to 
Congress.  Wigand was the first tobacco industry “insider” to turn and testify against the 
tobacco companies; his story was told, in part, in the 1999 movie of the same name 
(“The Insider”, Touchstone Pictures).      
• Dr. Stanton A. Glantz is a professor of medicine at University of California San Francisco 
and is a well-known, long-time tobacco control activist.  Currently, PubMed lists 277 
publications for “Glantz SA” and, while his early publications reflect is initial training and 
research focus (cardiac function), as early as 1984 Dr. Glantz had begun to focus and 
publish on the health effects of secondhand smoke. (Glantz, What to do because 
evidence links involuntary (passive) smoking with lung cancer, 1984)  Dr. Glantz 
received national attention when he became the receiver of the mailing from “Mr. Butts” 
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of thousands of Brown & Williamson documents, which he promptly published in a series 
of articles as well as a book (discussed above).  Dr. Glantz has also been integrally 
involved in California’s tobacco control efforts, a state known for its comprehensive 
policies and smoking prevalence rates among the lowest in the nation.    
The above list of policy entrepreneurs is likely smaller than could be developed.  Again, 
in any policy effort that has lasted decades countless individuals and groups will have 
contributed.  Particularly omitted from the above list are individuals and groups that have been 
entrepreneurial in state-level policy activities, especially those in California and Minnesota which 
are widely regarded as “leader” states in the adoption of tobacco control polices.  This omission 
is, in part, due to the focus of this analysis on national level efforts to adopt a comprehensive 
tobacco control policy regime.   
5.6.2 Policy Windows 
In Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework, policy window are those unique opportunities 
for policy change which open infrequently and only for short periods of time.  That is, policy 
windows are when new policy is adopted but because this can only be determined 
retrospectively (i.e., policy changed so a policy window must have been “open”), the Multiple 
Streams Framework cannot be considered true theory.  However, as the present analysis is a 
retrospective application of the Framework its utility in understanding the trajectory of national 
tobacco control policy adoption in the United States is not jeopardized.  Further, in a 
retrospective analysis, both the windows that “opened” and the windows that remained “closed” 
can be identified.  Discussed below are the traditional policy windows that resulted in policy 
adoption through legislation, pseudo-policy widows that resulted in policy adoption through non-
legislative means, and failed policy windows –attempts to adopt legislation that failed.   
5.6.2.1 Traditional Successful Policy Windows 
These policy windows are those that resulted in policy through traditional, legislative 
means.  These legislated Acts, as previously discussed, include: 
• Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984 which required warning labels on 
cigarette packages and the Surgeon General to report annually to Congress on the 
advertising practices of the tobacco industry and the health consequences of 
smoking; 
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• Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 which required 
more and stronger warning labels on cigarette packages and that tobacco 
companies submit a list of product ingredients to the government; 
• Synar Amendment to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration 
(A.D.A.M.H.A.) Reorganization Act of 1992 which required that all states adopt and 
enforce restrictions on the prohibition of sales of tobacco products to minors; and 
• Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 which legislated 
jurisdiction of tobacco regulation to the F.D.A. and required substantial new and 
more restrictive regulations on the sales and marketing of tobacco products. 
As also discussed above, other pieces of legislation, regulation, and Executive Order 
have also occurred, but the above five Acts are the most significant and those that have 
addressed comprehensive tobacco control.   
5.6.2.2 Non-Traditional, Non-Legislative Policy Windows 
 These policy windows are those events that resulted in de facto tobacco control policy 
through non-traditional, non-legislative means.  As discussed above, these events are almost 
exclusively related to litigation.  These non-traditional, non-legislative policy windows include: 
• Protection from environmental tobacco smoke.  The series of individual and class-
action lawsuits combined with the 1992 E.P.A. risk assessment that classified 
environmental tobacco smoke as a class A carcinogen (also upheld in litigation) 
created the expectation for smoke-free environments and liability for those not 
providing such environment; 
• The Master Settlement Agreement of 1998.  Though a contractual agreement 
between the tobacco companies and the individual states, these agreements created 
restrictions on advertising and promotion that had a comparable effect to similar 
restrictions that might have been enacted through legislation.   
• Release of tobacco industry documents and tobacco industry practices.  As has 
been discussed above, these documents and practices have been released through 
various means, almost all related to activities resulting from legal mobilization.  
Former tobacco industry executives and scientists have testified at Congressional 
hearings and as expert witnesses in legal proceedings, all of which are now part of 
the public record.  Tobacco industry documents have been leaked directly (“Mr. 
Butts”) as a result of legal proceeding and, most significantly, as part of the 
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Minnesota settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998 and again as part of the 
Master Settlement Agreement of 1998.  While the testimony or documents do not 
directly or indirectly constitute policy or even pseudo-policy, the knowledge gleaned 
from these sources has been critical in developing and justifying new tobacco control 
policies, especially in light of developments of case law and the expansion of First 
Amendment commercial free speech rights.  In reading the full text of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and the 2010 FDA Final rule, 
the importance of this information becomes manifest – it is critical in justification of 
the regulations and the demonstration that they have not unnecessarily or unduly 
infringed upon the rights of the tobacco companies. 
5.6.2.3 Failed Policy Windows 
 Failed policy windows are attempts to achieve, through legislation or regulation, 
comprehensive tobacco control policy that failed.  The two most patent examples of such failed 
policy windows are the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule, which was overturned by the Supreme Court in 
2000, and Universal Tobacco Settlement Act of 1997 (McCain Bill), which failed to clear the 
Senate and resulted in the failure of the 1997 proposed national settlement and the adoption 
instead of the Master Settlement Agreement.  There were, however, many other failed 
legislative attempts at achieving a national comprehensive tobacco control regime.  As a 
testament to both the challenges and complexity of achieving a national tobacco control policy 
regime, the THOMAS database at the Library of Congress was used to search the records from 
the 101st – 111th Congress (January 1989 – present, the only dates available online) using the 
terms “tobacco prevention”, “smoking prevention”, and “tobacco control”. (The Library of 
Congress, 2010)  The results, after removal of duplicate records, are the 120 records 
representing each bill introduced into either the Senate or House of Representative summarized 
in the table below (Table 5-4).  While it is acknowledged that each of the entries in this table are 
not truly independent, what is apparent in examining this table is that while some Congressional 
sessions have been more active than others, all Congressional sessions since 1989 have 
attempted to enact tobacco control policies.  That is, the opponents of tobacco control policies 
have been comparatively successful in resisting regulation. 
Table 5-4. List of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation (1989-2010) 
Congress # Title Action Reference 
101st 
(Jan. 1989-Jan. 1991) 
Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1989 Introduced in Senate [S.1527.IS ] 
101st Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1989 Introduced in Senate [S.1528.IS ] 
101st Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act Introduced in House [H.R.5041.IH ] 
101st Tobacco Deregulation Act of 1990 Introduced in House [H.R.4965.IH ] 
101st Tobacco Product Education and Health Protection Act of 1990 Introduced in Senate [S.1883.IS ] 
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Congress # Title Action Reference 
101st Tobacco Product Education and Health Protection Act of 1990 Introduced in House [H.R.3943.IH] 
102nd 
(Jan. 1991-Jan. 1993) 
Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1991 Introduced in Senate [S.561.IS ] 
102nd Adolescent Tobacco Prevention Act of 1991 Introduced in Senate [S.560.IS ] 
102nd Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act Introduced in House [H.R.4361.IH ] 
102nd Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act Introduced in Senate [S.2191.IS ] 
103rd 
(Jan. 1993-Jan. 1995) 
Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act Introduced in Senate [S.629.IS ] 
103rd Healthy Students-Healthy Schools Act Introduced in House [H.R.1439.IH ] 
103rd Smokeless Tobacco Distribution Control Act of 1993 Introduced in House [H.R.3025.IH ] 
103rd Women's Health Equity Act of 1993 Introduced in House [H.R.3075.IH ] 
104th 
(Jan. 1995-Jan. 1997) 
Tobacco Products Control Act of 1995 Introduced in Senate [S.1262.IS ] 
104th Women's Health Equity Act of 1996 Introduced in House [H.R.3178.IH ] 
104th Women's Health Equity Act of 1996 Introduced in Senate [S.1799.IS ] 
104th Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1995 Introduced in House [H.R.2414.IH ] 
105th 
(Jan. 1997-Jan. 1999) 
Bipartisan NO Tobacco for Kids Act of 1998 Introduced in House [H.R.3868.IH ] 
105th Bipartisan NO Tobacco for Kids Act of 1998 Introduced in House [H.R.3868.IH ] 
105th Common Sense Smoking Prevention Act of 1998 Introduced in House [H.R.4600.IH ] 
105th Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998 
Engrossed Amendment 
as Agreed to by Senate 
[H.R.2264.EAS ] 
105th Drug Demand Reduction Act Introduced in Senate [S.2647.IS ] 
105th Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act Introduced in Senate [S.1492.IS ] 
105th Healthy and Smoke Free Children Act Introduced in House [H.R.3028.IH ] 
105th Healthy Kids Act Introduced in Senate [S.1638.IS ] 
105th Healthy Kids Act Introduced in House [H.R.3474.IH ] 
105th KIDS Act Placed on Calendar in 
Senate 
[S.1889.PCS ] 
105th Minority Community Tobacco Reduction Act Introduced in House [H.R.4189.IH ] 
105th National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act Senate Amendment 
Ordered to be Printed 
[S.1415.AS ] 
105th PAST Act Introduced in Senate [S.1648.IS ] 
105th Pregnant Mothers and Infants Health Protection Act of 1997 Introduced in Senate [S.938.IS ] 
105th PROTECT Act Introduced in Senate [S.1530.IS ] 
105th PROTECT Act Placed on Calendar in 
Senate 
[S.1530.PCS ] 
105th Public Health and Education Resource (PHAER) Act Introduced in Senate [S.1343.IS ] 
105th Public Health and Education Resource (PHAER) Act Introduced in House [H.R.2764.IH ] 
105th Teen Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 1998 Introduced in House [H.R.3889.IH ] 
105th To establish a responsible United States international tobacco policy, 
to prevent tobacco companies from targeting tobacco products to 
children, to ensure no government promotion of... 
Introduced in House [H.R.3738.IH ] 
105th Tobacco Market Transition Act Introduced in Senate [S.1582.IS ] 
105th Tobacco Market Transition Act Introduced in House [H.R.3437.IH ] 
105th Tobacco Products Control Act of 1997 Introduced in Senate [S.201.IS ] 
105th Universal Tobacco Settlement Act Reported in Senate [S.1415.RS ] 
105th Universal Tobacco Settlement Act Introduced in Senate [S.1415.IS ] 
105th Universal Tobacco Settlement Act Placed on Calendar in 
Senate 
[S.1414.PCS ] 
105th Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1997 Introduced in House [H.R.516.IH ] 
105th Youth Tobacco Possession Prevention Act Introduced in House [H.R.3655.IH ] 
106th 
(Jan. 1999-Jan. 2001) 
Child Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 2000 Introduced in House [H.R.4041.IH ] 
106th Children's Smoking Prevention, Health, and Learning Trust Fund Act 
of 1999 
Introduced in Senate [S.584.IS ] 
106th FDA Tobacco Jurisdiction Act of 2000 Introduced in House [H.R.4042.IH ] 
106th KIDS Act Introduced in Senate [S.2379.IS ] 
106th Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Reauthorization Act Introduced in Senate [S.1823.IS ] 
106th Tobacco Use Prevention and Public Health Act of 1999 Introduced in House [H.R.1289.IH ] 
106th Youth Smoking Prevention and Public Health Protection Act Introduced in Senate [S.2568.IS ] 
106th Youth Tobacco Possession Prevention Act Introduced in House [H.R.144.IH ] 
107th 
(Jan. 2001-Jan. 2003) 
Child Tobacco Use Prevention Act of 2001 Introduced in House [H.R.1044.IH ] 
107th FDA Tobacco Jurisdiction Act of 2001 Introduced in House [H.R.1043.IH ] 
107th KIDS Act Introduced in Senate [S.247.IS ] 
107th Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001 Introduced in Senate [S.940.IS ] 
107th Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001 Introduced in House [H.R.1990.IH ] 
107th Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Reauthorization Act Introduced in Senate [S.437.IS ] 
107th Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2002 Introduced in House [H.R.5035.IH ] 
107th Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for our Farmers Act of 
2002 
Introduced in House [H.R.3940.IH ] 
107th Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for Our Farmers Act of 
2002 
Introduced in Senate [S.2764.IS ] 
 [132] 
 
Congress # Title Action Reference 
107th Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2002 Introduced in House [H.R.4753.IH ] 
107th Youth Smoking Prevention and Public Health Protection Act Introduced in Senate [S.2626.IS ] 
108th 
(Jan. 2003-Jan. 2005) 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Engrossed as Agreed to 
or Passed by Senate 
[S.2974.ES ] 
108th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Considered and Passed 
by Senate 
[S.2974.CPS ] 
108th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in Senate [S.2461.IS ] 
108th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in House [H.R.4433.IH ] 
108th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in Senate [S.2461.IS ] 
108th HeLP America Act Introduced in Senate [S.2558.IS ] 
108th Leave No Child Behind Act of 2003 Introduced in Senate [S.448.IS ] 
108th Leave No Child Behind Act of 2003 Introduced in House [H.R.936.IH ] 
108th Quit Smoking Incentive and Opportunity Act of 2003 Introduced in House [H.R.2876.IH ] 
108th Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2004 Introduced in Senate [S.2642.IS ] 
108th Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2004 Introduced in House [H.R.4820.IH ] 
108th Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2003 Introduced in House [H.R.245.IH ] 
108th Tobacco Livelihood and Economic Assistance for our Farmers Act Introduced in House [H.R.140.IH ] 
108th Tobacco Market Transition Act Introduced in House [H.R.986.IH ] 
108th Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2003 Introduced in Senate [S.1490.IS ] 
108th Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2003 Placed on Calendar in 
Senate 
[S.1490.PCS ] 
108th Tobacco Reduction, Accountability, and Community Enhancement 
Act of 2003 
Introduced in House [H.R.3160.IH ] 
108th Youth Smoking Prevention and State Revenue Enforcement Act Introduced in House [H.R.1839.IH ] 
109th 
(Jan. 2005-Jan. 2007) 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in Senate [S.666.IS ] 
109th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in House [H.R.1376.IH ] 
109th HeLP America Act Introduced in House [H.R.5951.IH ] 
109th HeLP America Act Introduced in Senate [S.1074.IS ] 
109th Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2006 Introduced in Senate [S.3915.IS ] 
109th Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2005 Introduced in House [H.R.1377.IH ] 
110th 
(Jan. 2007-Jan. 2009) 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Reported in House [H.R.1108.RH ] 
110th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Engrossed as Agreed to 
or Passed by House 
[H.R.1108.EH ] 
110th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Referred to Senate 
Committee after being 
Received from House 
[H.R.1108.RFS ] 
110th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in Senate [S.625.IS ] 
110th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in House [H.R.1108.IH ] 
110th HEALTH Act Introduced in Senate [S.1834.IS ] 
110th Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2008 Introduced in Senate [S.3187.IS ] 
110th Secondhand Smoke Education and Outreach Act of 2007 Introduced in Senate [S.2005.IS ] 
110th Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2007 Introduced in Senate [S.1013.IS ] 
110th Smuggled Tobacco Prevention Act of 2008 Introduced in House [H.R.5689.IH ] 
110th Stop Adolescent Smoking Without Excessive Bureaucracy Act of 
2008 
Introduced in House [H.R.5513.IH ] 
111th 
(Jan. 2009-Jan. 2011) 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 
Engrossed as Agreed to 
or Passed by House 
[H.R.2997.EH ] 
111th Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 
Placed on Calendar in 
Senate 
[H.R.2997.PCS ] 
111th Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 
Public Print [H.R.2997.PP ] 
111th Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 
Engrossed Amendment 
as Agreed to by Senate 
[H.R.2997.EAS ] 
111th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in Senate [S.982.IS ] 
111th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Introduced in House [H.R.1256.IH ] 
111th Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Reported in House [H.R.1256.RH ] 
111th Federal Tobacco Act of 2009 Introduced in Senate [S.579.IS ] 
111th Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2009 Introduced in Senate [S.332.IS ] 
111th Lung Cancer Mortality Reduction Act of 2009 Introduced in House [H.R.2112.IH ] 
111th Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 
1256) entitled `An Act to protect the public health by providing the 
Food and Drug Administration with certain authority... 
Engrossed Amendment 
as Agreed to by Senate 
 [H.R.1256.EAS ] 
111th Smoke Free Mothers and Babies Act of 2009 Introduced in Senate [S.670.IS ] 
111th Smoke-Free Federal Workplace Act Introduced in House [H.R.4131.IH ] 
111th STOP Act Introduced in Senate [S.3288.IS ] 
111th STOP Act Introduced in House [H.R.5178.IH ] 
111th Stop Adolescent Smoking Without Excessive Bureaucracy Act of 
2009 
Introduced in House [H.R.1432.IH ] 
111th To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug 
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to 
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain... 
Enrolled as Agreed to or 
Passed by Both House 
and Senate 
[H.R.1256.ENR ] 
111th To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug Placed on Calendar in [H.R.1256.PCS ] 
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Congress # Title Action Reference 
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to 
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain... 
Senate 
111th To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug 
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products, to 
amend title 5, United States Code, to make certain... 
Engrossed as Agreed to 
or Passed by House 
[H.R.1256.EH ] 
111th Youth Prevention and Tobacco Harm Reduction Act Introduced in House [H.R.1261.IH ] 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary & Contribution 
Using Heclo’s ideas, interest, and institutions framework, and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams 
Framework this chapter has integrated the political and policy science viewpoint with the public 
health perspective on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic to provide a more comprehensive 
policy history analysis of critical factors in this evolution, including the adoption of tobacco 
control policies.  A persistent observation has been the tension between oppositional forces – 
those motivating progression towards comprehensive tobacco control policy and those forces 
opposing such policy adoption.  The forces motivating more comprehensive policy have 
included the advancing knowledge of the health consequences of smoking and exposure to 
secondhand smoke whereas the opposing forces have included social norms and expectations 
for the appropriate role of government and tolerable balance between individual and property 
rights.  Changes in the ideas and images toward smoking and the tobacco industry has 
motivated the adoption of more restrictive policy while opposing interest groups have vied for 
the attention and favor of legislators.  Additionally, policy adoption has alternately been 
facilitated and opposed by activities resulting from legal mobilization.  The ability of tobacco 
control advocates to achieve their ultimate goal – elimination of all tobacco products – will likely 
depend upon a fundamental change in pervading cultural values balancing individual freedoms 
with collective public health. 
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6 ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES, PROGRAMS, 
AND POPULATION TOBACCO-RELATED HEALTH IN THE U.S. STATES 
6.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
Based upon the literature reviews and analyses in the previously presented chapters, it is 
clear that the trajectory of the tobacco epidemic in industrialized countries is intertwined with 
substantial social change.  This social change is particularly notable in Heclo’s sphere of ideas, 
as discussed in the previous chapter.  As social change is entwined with secular decrease in 
tobacco use and increase in tobacco control policy adoption, it is reasonable to inquire as to the 
temporal relationship between policy adoption and population-level tobacco use.  The public 
health perspective assumes that policy drives changes in tobacco use, largely discounting the 
role of social change, in particular ideas and cultural values (institutions), as factors facilitating 
or impeding the adoption of tobacco control policy.  The political and policy science perspective, 
despite the theoretical if not empirical understanding that smoking prevalence is an important 
political outcome and factor in the policy adoption process (e.g., (Marmor & Lieberman, 2004)), 
in essence ignores the effect – or effectiveness – on the population on whose behalf the policies 
are adopted.  Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of the temporal 
relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population-level tobacco use.   
6.2 Background 
Tobacco use is widely regarded as the single most preventable cause of death world-
wide. (World Health Organization, 2008)  Its deleterious health effects are well known: smoking 
has been shown to cause almost a dozen cancers and chronic diseases such as cardio- and 
cerebrovascular disease, aneurysms, and periodontitis among others.  (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2009)  Additionally, exposure to second hand smoke has been causally 
linked to sudden infant death syndrome, respiratory illness, lung cancer, cardiovascular disease, 
and low birth weight. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009)  More recently, it has 
also been demonstrated that exposure to the toxins in so-called “third hand smoke”, the residue 
deposited on fabrics and surfaces by cigarette smoke and that remain after the cigarette is 
extinguished, causes adverse health outcomes. (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006)  The World Health Organization (WHO) has 
estimated that, by 2030, tobacco use will cause 8 million deaths annually and result in 1 billion 
cumulative deaths during the 21st century. (World Health Organization, 2008)   
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The public health case, then, for enacting strict tobacco control policies or even an 
outright ban on tobacco is straightforward: the causal links between smoking and disease and 
death were definitively established in the 1960s with the publishing of the US Surgeon General’s 
Report “Smoking and Health” (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964), and 
the vigor of that scientific evidence has only strengthened in time, including the expansion to 
non-tobacco users involuntarily exposed to second- and third-hand tobacco smoke. (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006), (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009)  Further, the estimated 6-8% of all health care 
expenditures spent treating smoking-related diseases is entirely preventable. (Warner, The 
economics of tobacco: myths and realities, 2000)   
The toxic contents of cigarettes are also well established.  Of the 200-250 poisonous 
gases and chemicals in cigarettes, many are severely restricted or banned in all other 
applications.  For example, eleven of the chemicals are classified as type 1 carcinogens (the 
most lethal classification), one is radioactive, and others, such as lead, are known to cause 
mental retardation and developmental delays in children. (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2006)   
Finally, nicotine is a potent psychostimulant similar to amphetamines or cocaine, with a 
significant addictive potential. (Balfour, 2002)  Research has demonstrated that the addiction is 
established very early – possibly as soon as the first cigarette – in use, (DiFranza, 2008) and 
review of tobacco industry documents has shown that cigarette contents have been intentionally 
manipulated in order to circumvent nicotine content regulations while increasing the 
addictiveness of nicotine through ‘freebasing’, a chemical process virtually identical to and with 
the analogous effects of freebasing cocaine as ‘crack cocaine’. (Stevenson & Proctor, 2008)   
In their 2000 decision in the case of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. et al, the 
U.S. Supreme Court agreed with almost all of the arguments regarding the toxicity and danger 
of cigarettes and then, ironically, denied the F.D.A. the authority to regulate cigarettes.  Citing 
the F.D.A.’s own primary directive to assure the safety and effectiveness of products for their 
intended use, the Supreme Court rationalized that under these criteria the F.D.A. would be 
required to ban all tobacco products, which was clearly contrary to the intentions of Congress in 
light of the ‘alternate regulatory scheme’ and thus regulation of cigarettes was ruled as outside 
the jurisdiction of the F.D.A..  Thus, within the U.S. (and elsewhere), tobacco remains classified 
as a consumer product, not a drug or hazardous compound, and its regulation within the 
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purview of the Congress or other legislative body.  Enacting tobacco control policies, therefore, 
has and continues to require the action of the policy making apparatus of a given jurisdiction.  
The challenge in the U.S., then, as in other industrialized countries, has been to enact tobacco 
control policies so as to avert the substantial personal and societal costs associated with 
tobacco use.  Despite the profound change in the information known about tobacco use and the 
tobacco industry as well as the associated policy images, tobacco control policy adoption, 
especially at the central level, has lagged.  According to two models developed to characterize 
the tobacco epidemic, the Phases of Tobacco Control (Studlar, Tobacco Control. Comparative 
Politics in the United States and Canada, 2002), (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public 
health, political economy, or morality policy?, 2008) and the Tobacco Epidemic Model (Lopez, 
Collishaw, & Piha, 1994), adoption of tobacco control policies does not begin until decades after 
the onset of the epidemic and well after the entrenchment of tobacco use in the society.  
However, as has been observed in all industrialized countries, smoking prevalence begins to 
decline before policy adoption, leading to the question of the temporal association and 
relationship between smoking prevalence, tobacco control policies, and tobacco control 
programs and regimes.   
There is a substantial body of scientific literature that has developed the evidence base for 
effective tobacco control policies. (e.g., as summarized in (Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, The 
effects of tobacco control policies on smoking rates: a tobacco control scorecard, 2004))  
Further, three large research programs contributed substantially to the knowledge base for the 
development of effective tobacco control programs:  
• COMMIT (Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation) 
? Funded by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of 
Health 
? Focused on heavy smokers 
? Ended in 1992 
? Participating communities: Vallejo, CA , Hayward, CA, Cedar 
Rapids/Marion, IA, Davenport, IA, Fitchburg/Leominster, MA, Lowell, MA, 
Paterson, NJ, Trenton, NJ, Santa Fe, NM, Las Cruces, NM, Yonkers, NY, 
New Rochelle, NY, Utica, NY, Binghamton/Johnson City, NY, Raleigh, 
NC, Greensboro, NC, Medford/Ashland, OR, Albany/Corvallis, OR, 
Bellingham, WA, Longview/Kelso, WA, Brantford, Ontario, Canada, 
Peterborough, Ontario, Canada 
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• ASSIST (American Stop Smoking Intervention Study) 
? Funded by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of 
Health  
? Planning phase (October 1991 – October 1993) and implementation 
phase (November 1993 – September 1999) 
? 17 participating states (Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Washington, Wisconsin) 
• Smokeless States 
? Funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation  
? 48 state-wide coalitions (plus 2 additional non-state coalitions) from 1993-
2004 
These programs were all funded by government-sponsored research funding institutes or 
private research foundations and the C.D.C’s National Tobacco Control Program was 
developed using findings and recommendations from these research programs.  That is, in the 
U.S., the central government, even though it lagged in central-level policy adoption, was 
instrumental in developing the multi-level network of community-based advocacy coalition 
structure in place in the U.S. today.   
In the United States, tobacco control programs are implemented by the individual states.  
This organizational arrangement facilitates inter-state analyses comparing features of either 
tobacco control programs and / or policies implemented at the state-level and measures of state 
population health (e.g., smoking prevalence).  California followed by Massachusetts, Arizona, 
Oregon, and Florida were the first states to implement state-level tobacco control programs and 
thus early evaluations of “state tobacco control programs” were case-study based approaches 
to examining the structures and processes implemented in these early-adopter states and the 
subsequent progress in the reduction of smoking prevalence. (Siegel, 2002), (Wakefield & 
Chaloupka, Effectiveness of comprehensive tobacco control programmes in reducing teenage 
smoking in the USA, 2000), (Pierce, 2007)  Population-based analyses have also been 
undertaken. (Luke, Stamatakis, & Brownson, State youth-access tobacco control policies and 
youth smoking behavior in the United States, 2000), (Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 
2008), (Tauras, et al., 2005)  Generally, state spending on tobacco control programs has been 
reported to be statistically significantly and negatively associated with smoking prevalence.  
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Interestingly, the associations were much stronger when individual-level rather than population-
level smoking prevalence was outcome and dependent variable, thus allowing for direct 
adjustment for socioeconomic status and demographic variables. (Tauras, et al., 2005), 
(Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008)  Additionally, statistical methods that allowed for 
weighting of previous spending on tobacco control increased the association between current 
spending and declines in smoking prevalence, though the authors could not determine the 
reason for this observation or the important (causative) aspects of a state’s tobacco control 
program. (Farrelly, Pechacek, Thomas, & Nelson, 2008) 
A primary challenge with these studies that may account for the perhaps more tepid than 
expected results is the implicit assumption in the directionality of causality from tobacco control 
program to smoking prevalence.  In other words, while it is typically assumed that 
comprehensive tobacco control programs cause a decrease in smoking prevalence, in fact it 
may be that a lower smoking prevalence, which can conceivably serve as a proxy for the social 
acceptability of smoking and / or socially-based institutionalized values, may precede tobacco 
control policy adoption and represent reduced barriers to such policy adoption.  That is, some 
social changes may occur before policy changes, thereby creating a feedback mechanism.  Any 
such feedback mechanism would not be detectable in a precede-proceed evaluation model or 
before-and-after study design.  Further, these feedback mechanisms, or “social conditioning” 
and creation of social predispositions to tobacco control policy, may be heightened in the case 
of states that were early innovators and participants in the scientific studies that served as the 
basis for the best-practice comprehensive tobacco control programs.  Therefore, the primary 
purpose of this study is to assess the timing of changes in smoking prevalence (social change) 
compared to policy change.  It is hypothesized that lower prevalence in advance of policy 
change supports the notion that social change precedes policy change. 
6.3 Materials and Methods 
All fifty states as well as the District of Columbia were included in this study.  Population-
level smoking prevalence was used as the health outcome variable as well as a proxy variable 
for social changes leading to a reduction in barriers to adoption of tobacco control policy.  Six 
tobacco control policies were selected for their range in direct impact on individual behavior and 
thus perceived “intrusiveness” as well as uniform data availability.  The six selected policies 
were: 
1. Smoke-free indoor air policies at government worksites 
2. Smoke-free indoor air policies at private worksites 
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3. Smoke-free indoor air policies at restaurants 
4. State cigarette excise tax 
5. Youth access to cigarette vending machine policies 
6. Policies requiring licensure for tobacco retail locations 
Data on state-level policy and smoking prevalence were obtained from the C.D.C’s 
STATE data system (publicly available at www.cdc.gov).  Annual smoking prevalence data were 
obtained from 1990 to 2009 and, to account for slight variations in year-to-year data availability, 
state prevalence was averaged for each state for the 5-year intervals of 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 
2000-2004, and 2005-2009 (a 4-year interval but the last year for which data were available was 
2009).  For the six tobacco control policies, annual policy status (whether a specific policy had 
been adopted) was obtained from 1995 to 2004.  To correspond with the 5-year intervals 
established for smoking prevalence, a variable was created characterizing the absolute status 
for each policy (whether a policy had been adopted and the type of policy adopted) for the years 
1995 (the start of the study period) and 2004 (the end of the study period).  For each policy for 
each state, an additional variable was created that categorized, for the time periods 1995-1999 
and 2000-2004, whether a state had: a) no baseline policies and did not add any policies during 
the time period; b) no baseline policies but did add policies during the time period; c) did have 
baseline policies but did not add any policies during the time period; or d) did have baseline 
policies and added policies during the time period.   
In addition to these tobacco control policy and population smoking prevalence data, data 
for three additional, variables were obtained: a) the percent of the state’s population living below 
the poverty level from the 1989 and 1999 Census Abstract; b) the state’s educational 
attainment, specifically the proportion of the population having achieve a high school education 
or higher, from the 1990 and 2000 Census Abstract; and c) the magnitude of the state’s tobacco 
agricultural industry, as estimated by the number of tobacco acres harvested, from C.D.C.’s 
STATE data system.    
All data were obtained from the aforementioned public data sources.  Data were 
downloaded and manipulated in Microsoft Office Excel® and then exported to S.P.S.S.® (I.B.M. 
S.P.S.S. Statistics Version 19, I.B.M. Corporation, Somers, N.Y.) for statistical analysis.  To 
assess whether changes in population smoking prevalence preceded or followed tobacco policy 
adoption, differences in the average state-level adult smoking prevalence was calculated for 
each type of policy adoption categories described above for the time periods before, during, and 
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after the 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 policy adoption evaluation timeframe.  This was assessed 
in univariate analysis using A.N.O.V.A..  The assessment was repeated with multivariable 
analysis using general linear models (G.L.M.) A.N.C.O.V.A. with the above described variables 
for educational attainment, poverty, and tobacco agriculture as covariates and the categorical 
tobacco policy adoption categorical variable as a random factor.  For simplicity, in the 
A.N.O.V.A. and G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A. analysis, statistically significant differences between the 
mean smoking prevalence at different levels of the tobacco policy adoption categorical variable 
(unadjusted mean in A.N.O.V.A. analysis and covariable-adjusted estimated marginal mean in 
G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A.) was assessed using the 95% confidence intervals rather than post-hoc 
tests.   
6.4 Results 
The descriptive characteristics of the fifty-one jurisdictions included in this analysis are 
shown in Tables 6-1 and 6-2.  State tobacco excise taxes were the only policies in place in all 
jurisdictions and were also the policies most likely to be changed (37% of jurisdictions increased 
taxes in 1995-1999 and 66% of jurisdictions increased taxes in 2000-2004).  In contrast, smoke-
free indoor air policies for private work sites and restaurants were the least common in both time 
periods as well as the least likely to be adopted.  Policies requiring licensure for tobacco retail 
sales also had a low adoption rate.  For the 1995-1999 time period, the average state tobacco 
excise tax was $0.34±0.19 (standard deviation) increasing to $0.55±0.36 in 2000-20004.   
The averaged adult smoking prevalence declined from the 1990-1994 to the 2005-2009 
time period: 23.27%±2.77 in 1990-1994, 23.26%±2.73 in 1995-1999, 22.73%±3.01 in 2000-
2004, and 19.79%±3.12 in 2005-2009.   
Results from univariate A.N.O.V.A. analysis are shown in Table 6-3.  All policies except for 
the youth access to vending machines and retail licensure policies demonstrated a statistically 
significant (p<0.05) or a trend toward a statistically significant (0.05<p<0.1) association between 
smoking prevalence and policy adoption category.  In general, smoking prevalence was lower in 
all time periods, including before the policy adoption timeframe, in jurisdictions with policies at 
baseline and in jurisdictions that adopted policies compared to those jurisdictions either without 
baseline policies or that did not adopt policies during the timeframe.  For example, in the 2000-
2004 policy adoption timeframe, seven states had neither baseline nor did they adopt smoke-
free indoor air statues at government worksites.  At the opposite end of the policy adoption 
categorization, seven states had both baseline policies and adopted additional government 
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worksite smoke free air policies during the 2000-2004 timeframe.  From 1990-1994 to 2005-
2009, the former “policy inactive” states were observed to have an averaged adult smoking 
prevalence of: 25.93% (95%CI 23.60-28.27), 25.77% (23.26-28.29), 25.62% (22.99-28.25), and 
22.93% (20.01-25.85), respectively.  In contrast, the latter “policy active” states were observed 
to have an averaged adult smoking prevalence of: 22.62% (95%CI 21.01-24.24), 22.69% 
(21.32-24.05), 21.95% (20.21-23.69), and 19.00% (17.00-20.99), respectively.  It is noted that, 
while the confidence intervals between these two groups overlap, the absolute value of the 
overlap is small and it is not unreasonable to attribute this to the sample size in each group 
(n=7) and thus interpret this as a strong trend towards statistically significant differences 
between these groups at each timeframe.  That is, there was a strong trend towards “policy 
active” states having lower smoking prevalence compared to “policy inactive” states before 
policy adoption, a difference which grew in the timeframes after policy adoption.  This latter 
observation of a lower and growing difference in smoking prevalence implies bi-directional 
feedback between smoking prevalence and policy adoption.   
These univariate analyses were repeated using multivariable G.L.M. A.N.C.O.V.A. analysis 
to assess whether the associations observed in univariate analysis would persist after 
accounting for other known covariates of policy adoption, educational attainment, poverty, and 
tobacco agriculture.  No statistically significant observations were observed (results not shown).  
It is noted that, given the cell sample and the number of covariables, it is unclear whether these 
null results are attributable to the absence of reliable association or lack of sufficient statistical 
power.   
6.5 Discussion 
This study assessed the temporal association between smoking prevalence and tobacco 
control policy adoption.  This association was assessed for multiple different policy types and 
timeframes.  Results from this analysis suggest that lower smoking prevalence precedes policy 
adoption, increasing the likelihood of policy adoption.  Policy adoption, in turn, may contribute to 
a differentially larger decrease in smoking prevalence in policy adopting compared to policy 
non-adopting states.  Further, the results from this study suggest that the association between 
smoking prevalence and policy adoption depends upon the type of policy.  Policies that have a 
more direct impact on individuals, such as smoke free air policies in restaurants and worksites, 
were observed to have a stronger association with prior population smoking prevalence 
compared to policies that have more indirect impacts on the majority of the population, for 
example retail licensure and youth access polices.    
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The present analyses have several limitations and the results should be interpreted 
cautiously and regarded as preliminary.  First, the observations from univariate analysis were 
not replicated in multivariable analysis.  However, it is unclear whether this is the result of 
insufficient statistical power or errant and / or unreliable results in univariate analysis.  Given, 
however, that univariate statistical significance was observed for multiple policy types and 
timeframes, this latter explanation seems less plausible than the former.  Future studies should 
aim to increase the statistical power by increasing the number of jurisdictions and or timeframes 
evaluated.    
An additional important limitation is the relative simplicity of the statistical models 
employed in this analysis.  If, in fact, the temporal association between smoking prevalence and 
policy adoption is bidirectional and recursive, linear statistical models are likely inadequate.  
Future studies should incorporate more complex statistical models that reflect these complex 
causal associations.   
Finally, the number and type of covariates included in the present analysis is likely 
incomplete.  Future studies should attempt to include a more comprehensive set of factors 
associated with both policy adoption and smoking prevalence, including interactions with 
different jurisdictions, particularly jurisdictions with different tobacco control policy regimes.     
6.6 Chapter Summary & Contribution 
This chapter has provided quantitative evidence that lower smoking prevalence may 
precede policy adoption, possibly functioning to – or signaling – lower society-originating 
barriers to tobacco control policy adoption.  This evidence diverges from the predominant public 
health perspective that policy precedes prevalence reduction, and not vice versa.  It is, however, 
consistent with the theoretical contributions of, for example, Marmor and Lieberman who 
asserted the interactive feedback between policy and prevalence. (Marmor & Lieberman, 2004)  
The observations reported in this chapter also point to the importance of social factors in 
tobacco control policy adoption, factors that have been largely overlooked by both the public 
health and political and policy science communities.   
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Table 6-1. Descriptive Characterization of Tobacco Control Policies During Study Timeframes 
 
n % n % 
Smoke-free Indoor Air 
Policies at Government 
Worksites 
1995, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 10.0 19.6 2004, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 7.0 13.7 
In Designated Areas 31.0 60.8 In Designated Areas 24.0 47.1 
In Separate Ventilated Areas 2.0 3.9 In Separate Ventilated Areas 5.0 9.8 
Banned 8.0 15.7 Banned 15.0 29.4 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9.0 17.6 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  7.0 13.7 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1.0 2.0 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 
Baseline Policies, No Change  39.0 76.5 Baseline Policies, No Change  37.0 72.5 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2.0 3.9 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 7.0 13.7 
Smoke-free Indoor Air 
Policies at Private 
Worksites 
1995, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 30.0 58.8 2004, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 24.0 47.1 
In Designated Areas 20.0 39.2 In Designated Areas 19.0 37.3 
In Separate Ventilated Areas 1.0 2.0 In Separate Ventilated Areas 3.0 5.9 
Banned 0.0 0.0 Banned 5.0 9.8 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  30.0 58.8 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  24.0 47.1 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 5.0 9.8 
Baseline Policies, No Change  21.0 41.2 Baseline Policies, No Change  17.0 33.3 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 5.0 9.8 
Smoke-free Indoor Air 
Policies at Restaurants 
1995, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 21.0 41.2 2004, 4th 
Quarter 
No Provision 19.0 37.3 
In Designated Areas 29.0 56.9 In Designated Areas 23.0 45.1 
In Separate Ventilated Areas 0.0 0.0 In Separate Ventilated Areas 2.0 3.9 
Banned 1.0 2.0 Banned 7.0 13.7 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  21.0 41.2 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  19.0 37.3 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2.0 3.9 
Baseline Policies, No Change  29.0 56.9 Baseline Policies, No Change  23.0 45.1 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1.0 2.0 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 7.0 13.7 
State Cigarette Excise 
Tax 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  0.0 0.0 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  0.0 0.0 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 
Baseline Policies, No Change  32.0 62.7 Baseline Policies, No Change  17.0 33.3 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 19.0 37.3 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 34.0 66.7 
Youth Access to 
Cigarette Vending 
Machine Policies 
1995, 4th 
Quarter 
No Restrictions 16.0 31.4 2004, 4th 
Quarter 
No Restrictions 4.0 7.8 
Limited Restrictions and No Supervision 1.0 2.0 Limited Restrictions and No Supervision 1.0 2.0 
Not Allowed in Youth-Accessible Areas 
Unless Supervised and-or Locked 
18.0 35.3 Not Allowed in Youth-Accessible Areas 
Unless Supervised and-or Locked 
14.0 27.5 
Banned from Youth-Accessible Areas 16.0 31.4 Banned from Youth-Accessible Areas 32.0 62.7 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  8.0 15.7 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  4.0 7.8 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8.0 15.7 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 3.0 5.9 
Baseline Policies, No Change  27.0 52.9 Baseline Policies, No Change  43.0 84.3 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8.0 15.7 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1.0 2.0 
Policies Requiring 
Licensure for Tobacco 
Retail Locations 
1995, 4th 
Quarter 
No Retail Licensing Requirements 16.0 31.4 2004, 4th 
Quarter 
No Retail Licensing Requirements 9.0 17.6 
Retail Licensing for Vending Machines 
Only 
4.0 7.8 Retail Licensing for Vending Machines 
Only 
3.0 5.9 
Licensing for Over-the-Counter Retail 
Sales Only 
1.0 2.0 Licensing for Over-the-Counter Retail 
Sales Only 
2.0 3.9 
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n % n % 
Retail Licensing Required for Over-the-
Counter and Vending Machine Sales 
30.0 58.8 Retail Licensing Required for Over-the-
Counter and Vending Machine Sales 
37.0 72.5 
Policy 
Change, 1995-
99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  12.0 23.5 Policy 
Change, 2000-
04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9.0 17.6 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 4.0 7.8 No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2.0 3.9 
Baseline Policies, No Change  33.0 64.7 Baseline Policies, No Change  40.0 78.4 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2.0 3.9 Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0.0 0.0 
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Table 6-2. Descriptive Characterization of Continuous Variables During Study Timeframes 
 
n Missing Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 1990 51 0 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.40 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 1995 51 0 0.30 0.27 0.17 0.03 0.75 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 2000 51 0 0.42 0.34 0.28 0.03 1.11 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, 04 51 0 0.74 0.60 0.48 0.03 2.05 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, State Average for 1995-99 51 0 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.03 0.75 
State Cigarette Excise Tax, State Average for 2000-04 51 0 0.55 0.44 0.36 0.03 1.34 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 1990 45 6 23.99 23.60 2.78 17.10 29.50 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 1995 50 1 22.78 22.45 2.81 13.20 27.90 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 2000 51 0 22.85 23.30 3.01 12.90 30.50 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, 2005 51 0 21.02 20.60 3.13 11.50 28.70 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 1990-94 51 0 23.37 22.74 2.77 15.48 29.93 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 1995-99 51 0 23.26 23.30 2.73 14.20 30.16 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 2000-04 51 0 22.73 22.42 3.01 12.28 30.48 
Adult Smoking Prevalence, State Average for 2005-09 51 0 19.79 19.48 3.12 10.40 27.32 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 1990 49 2 14965.51 0.00 49590.28 0.00 284200.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 1995 49 2 13541.33 0.00 44725.50 0.00 261100.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 2000 49 2 9580.00 0.00 31023.38 0.00 167400.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, 2005 46 5 6478.70 0.00 22021.53 0.00 126000.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, Average for 1990-94 50 1 14830.60 0.00 48719.64 0.00 268720.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 1995-99 49 2 14684.06 0.00 48903.60 0.00 265840.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 2000-04 49 2 8769.06 0.00 28973.96 0.00 162640.00 
Agricultural Acres Harvested, State Average for 2005-2008 46 5 7348.97 0.00 26274.47 0.00 157275.00 
Educational Attainment of High School or More (Census), 1990 51 0 76.22 76.70 5.59 64.30 86.60 
Educational Attainment of High School or More (Census), 2000 51 0 81.87 82.13 4.37 72.86 88.33 
Percent Below Poverty Level (Census), 1989 51 0 13.14 12.42 4.13 6.42 25.21 
Percent Below Poverty Level (Census), 1999 51 0 12.11 11.42 3.31 6.55 20.22 
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Table 6-3. Univariate Association (A.N.O.V.A. Analysis) Between Smoking Prevalence and Tobacco Control Policy Adoption During Different Study Timeframes 
 
  Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99 
Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04 
    n Mean Std. Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. 
Smoke-free 
Indoor Air 
Policies at 
Government  
Worksites 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94  
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9 25.25 2.66 23.21 27.29 0.100 7 25.93 2.52 23.60 28.27 0.026 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 20.46    0     
Baseline Policies, No Change  39 23.08 2.71 22.20 23.96 37 23.02 2.76 22.10 23.94 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 21.98 0.79 14.86 29.10 7 22.63 1.75 21.01 24.25 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9 25.32 2.52 23.38 27.26 0.035 7 25.77 2.72 23.26 28.29 0.028 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 19.36    0     
Baseline Policies, No Change  39 22.96 2.61 22.11 23.80 37 22.89 2.70 21.99 23.79 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 21.76 0.82 14.39 29.13 7 22.69 1.47 21.32 24.05 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9 25.49 2.48 23.58 27.39 0.010 7 25.62 2.84 22.99 28.25 0.020 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 19.68         
Baseline Policies, No Change  39 22.30 2.84 21.38 23.22 37 22.33 2.96 21.34 23.32 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 20.26 1.39 7.81 32.71 7 21.95 1.88 20.21 23.69 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  9 23.04 2.75 20.93 25.15 0.003 7 22.93 3.16 20.01 25.85 0.013 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 16.46    0     
Baseline Policies, No Change  39 19.23 2.80 18.32 20.14 37 19.35 2.98 18.36 20.35 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 17.83 1.63 3.22 32.44 7 19.00 2.16 17.00 20.99 
Smoke-free 
Indoor Air 
Policies at 
Private  
Worksites 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  30 23.96 2.80 22.92 25.01 0.065 24 24.38 2.86 23.17 25.59 0.085 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 22.44 2.13 19.80 25.09 
Baseline Policies, No Change  21 22.51 2.56 21.35 23.67 17 22.26 2.69 20.87 23.64 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 23.19 1.78 20.98 25.40 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  30 23.93 2.59 22.96 24.89 0.035 24 24.30 2.69 23.16 25.43 0.060 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 22.13 1.42 20.37 23.89 
Baseline Policies, No Change  21 22.30 2.69 21.08 23.53 17 22.13 2.91 20.64 23.63 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 23.21 1.41 21.45 24.96 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  30 23.52 2.82 22.47 24.58 0.024 24 23.87 2.80 22.68 25.05 0.074 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 21.62 2.67 18.30 24.94 
Baseline Policies, No Change  21 21.60 2.98 20.24 22.96 17 21.54 3.23 19.88 23.20 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 22.45 2.05 19.90 25.00 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  30 20.70 3.06 19.56 21.84 0.012 24 20.91 2.98 19.65 22.17 0.099 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 19.20 3.49 14.86 23.54 
Baseline Policies, No Change  21 18.50 2.80 17.23 19.77 17 18.52 3.05 16.96 20.09 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 0     5 19.35 2.51 16.23 22.47 
Smoke-free 
Indoor Air 
Policies at 
Restaurants 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  21 24.19 2.47 23.07 25.32 0.093 19 24.23 2.51 23.02 25.44 0.336 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added      2 23.88 2.97 -2.80 50.56 
Baseline Policies, No Change  29 22.90 2.84 21.82 23.98 23 22.65 3.11 21.31 24.00 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 19.42 . . . 7 23.23 1.97 21.41 25.05 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  21 24.34 2.30 23.29 25.38 0.013 19 24.42 2.41 23.26 25.58 0.121 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added      2 23.60 0.40 20.04 27.16 
Baseline Policies, No Change  29 22.65 2.70 21.63 23.68 23 22.50 3.08 21.17 23.83 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 18.08 . . . 7 22.50 1.60 21.02 23.99 
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  Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99 
Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04 
    n Mean Std. Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  21 24.17 2.72 22.93 25.41 0.002 19 24.19 2.79 22.84 25.53 0.035 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added      2 24.01 2.84 -1.53 49.55 
Baseline Policies, No Change  29 21.90 2.70 20.88 22.93 23 21.82 3.09 20.48 23.15 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 16.48 . . . 7 21.40 1.88 19.66 23.14 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  21 21.54 3.06 20.15 22.93 0.001 19 21.48 3.04 20.01 22.95 0.006 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added      2 22.14 4.41 -17.50 61.78 
Baseline Policies, No Change  29 18.72 2.48 17.78 19.66 23 18.69 2.84 17.46 19.92 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 1 14.26 . . . 7 18.18 1.45 16.84 19.51 
State 
Cigarette 
Excise Tax 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94 
Baseline Policies, No Change  32 23.92 2.68 22.95 24.89 0.062 17 24.10 2.59 22.77 25.43 0.183 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 19 22.43 2.74 21.11 23.75 34 23.00 2.82 22.01 23.98 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99 
Baseline Policies, No Change  32 23.98 2.41 23.11 24.84 0.013 17 23.62 2.69 22.24 25.00 0.506 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 19 22.05 2.87 20.67 23.43 34 23.08 2.77 22.11 24.04 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
Baseline Policies, No Change  32 23.72 2.42 22.84 24.59 0.002 17 23.51 3.14 21.90 25.12 0.194 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 19 21.07 3.24 19.51 22.63 34 22.34 2.92 21.32 23.36 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
Baseline Policies, No Change  32 20.91 2.63 19.97 21.86 0.001 17 20.65 3.19 19.00 22.29 0.170 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 19 17.91 3.04 16.45 19.38 34 19.37 3.04 18.31 20.43 
Youth 
Access to 
Cigarette 
Vending 
Machine 
Policies 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  8 23.51 2.21 21.66 25.35 0.920 4 22.65 2.16 19.21 26.08 0.761 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 23.92 1.86 22.36 25.47 3 23.73 2.14 18.40 29.05 
Baseline Policies, No Change  27 23.14 3.38 21.80 24.48 43 23.35 2.89 22.46 24.24 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 23.42 1.88 21.85 24.99 1 25.98 . . . 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99  
No Baseline Policies, No Change  8 23.79 2.29 21.87 25.70 0.891 4 22.83 1.42 20.57 25.08 0.948 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 23.58 1.47 22.35 24.80 3 24.00 2.88 16.85 31.15 
Baseline Policies, No Change  27 23.00 3.33 21.68 24.32 43 23.23 2.87 22.35 24.12 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 23.27 1.97 21.63 24.92 1 23.88 . . . 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  8 23.72 2.88 21.31 26.13 0.747 4 22.76 2.92 18.12 27.40 0.658 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 22.82 1.64 21.45 24.19 3 23.77 2.77 16.88 30.66 
Baseline Policies, No Change  27 22.37 3.56 20.96 23.78 43 22.58 3.08 21.63 23.53 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 22.87 2.29 20.96 24.78 1 26.02 . . . 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  8 21.15 3.37 18.34 23.97 0.566 4 20.17 2.75 15.79 24.55 0.311 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 19.42 1.70 17.99 20.84 3 20.75 3.60 11.81 29.68 
Baseline Policies, No Change  27 19.42 3.44 18.06 20.78 43 19.57 3.10 18.61 20.52 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 8 20.09 2.93 17.64 22.54 1 25.26 . . . 
Policies 
Requiring 
Licensure 
for Tobacco  
Retail 
Locations 
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1990-94 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  12 23.15 2.66 21.46 24.84 0.794 9 22.85 2.30 21.08 24.62 0.800 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 4 22.17 1.57 19.67 24.67 2 22.90 4.92 -21.32 67.12 
Baseline Policies, No Change  33 23.60 2.99 22.54 24.66 40 23.50 2.84 22.60 24.41 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 23.13 2.22 3.18 43.08 0     
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 1995-99 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  12 23.44 2.97 21.55 25.33 0.566 9 23.24 2.31 21.46 25.01 0.935 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 4 21.53 1.55 19.06 23.99 2 22.56 6.34 -34.36 79.48 
Baseline Policies, No Change  33 23.33 2.80 22.33 24.32 40 23.30 2.72 22.43 24.17 
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  Policy Adoption Timeframe
1995-99 
Policy Adoption Timeframe
2000-04 
    n Mean Std. Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% CI 
(Lower) 
95% CI 
(Upper) 
Stat. 
Sig. 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 24.48 0.71 18.13 30.83 0     
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2000-04 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  12 22.78 3.28 20.69 24.86 0.743 9 22.53 2.29 20.78 24.29 0.832 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 4 21.72 2.44 17.83 25.61 2 21.57 7.20 -43.10 86.24 
Baseline Policies, No Change  33 22.72 3.09 21.62 23.81 40 22.83 3.03 21.86 23.80 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 24.68 0.11 23.66 25.70 0     
Adult Smoking 
Prevalence, State 
Average for 2005-09 
No Baseline Policies, No Change  12 20.35 3.69 18.01 22.69 0.486 9 19.85 2.59 17.86 21.84 0.995 
No Baseline Policies, Policies Added 4 19.28 3.01 14.49 24.07 2 19.61 7.57 -48.37 87.59 
Baseline Policies, No Change  33 19.48 2.99 18.42 20.54 40 19.79 3.11 18.80 20.78 
Baseline Policies, Policies Added 2 22.66 0.59 17.32 28.00 0     
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7 TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY AND RELATED POPULATION HEALTH 
OUTCOMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF E.U. 
ACCESSION ON POPULATION HEALTH  
7.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
The previous chapter provided quantitative evidence for the importance of lower smoking 
prevalence in facilitating tobacco control policy adoption, leading to additional reduction in 
tobacco use.  These observations point to the importance of social factors and changes in both 
policy adoption and reduced tobacco use.  However, the necessity of these social factors and 
changes in the successful abatement of tobacco use is unclear and the effect of international 
efforts such as the F.C.T.C. is predicated on their non-requirement.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to assess the impact of tobacco control policies on societies that have not undergone social 
changes to the same degree as in industrialized countries, specifically the mostly ex-Soviet bloc 
countries that acceded to the E.U. in 2004 and 2007.    
7.2 Background 
The deleterious health effects of primary and secondary exposure to tobacco smoke, 
including almost a dozen cancers and chronic diseases such as cardio- and cerebrovascular 
disease, are well known.  While tobacco use is the second leading cause of death worldwide, 
predicted to cause one billion cumulative deaths during the 21st century, is it also the most 
preventable cause of death. (World Health Organization, 2008)  As the cost of treating and 
caring for those afflicted by tobacco use or exposure continues to rise and place enormous 
burdens on societal resources, reducing tobacco use and its subsequent adverse health 
consequences through tobacco control policies (T.C.P.) is paramount.   
Though causal links between smoking and health were definitively established in the 
1960s, (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964) T.C.P. did not proliferate in 
industrialized countries until the mid-1980s after a sustained period of “policy hesitancy” 
(Studlar, Tobacco Control. Comparative Politics in the United States and Canada, 2002) whilst 
smoking prevalence and consequent health effects reached epidemic proportions.  The barriers 
to implementing effective T.C.P. in the industrialized world, often supported by the tobacco 
industry, (Bero, Implications of the tobacco industry documents for public health and policy, 
2003) have been formidable, though they are slowly being overcome and more restrictive 
policies are garnering public support and being implemented.  As comprehensive T.C.P. are 
gradually enacted and the societal benefits progressively realized in industrialized countries, 
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public health efforts are increasingly focused on the developing world: the tobacco epidemic in 
the industrialized world has unfolded over almost three quarters of a century, but is it possible 
for the policy and public health lessons learned in industrialized countries to be transferred to 
developing countries, truncating the duration of the epidemic and forgoing some of the 
enormous societal costs in countries least able to absorb such avoidable costs? (Jha, 
Chaloupka, Corrao, & Jacob, 2006)  
The Tobacco Epidemic Model (T.E.M.) is a four-stage natural history model that 
characterizes the tobacco epidemic based on trends and progression in smoking prevalence 
(male and female), smoking related mortality, and tobacco control policies. (Lopez, Collishaw, & 
Piha, 1994)  While smoking prevalence is low in early stages, it rises sharply to a peak before it 
declines, with prevalence in men peaking before prevalence in women.  Due to a prolonged 
latency period, smoking-attributable mortality rates lag that of prevalence, not peaking until well 
after prevalence has begun to decline.  Tobacco control efforts are nascent until the final stages 
of this model, when they become more organized, successful, and comprehensive.  
An implicit public health goal for T.C.P. transfer, then, is reducing the 30-50 year lag (as 
characterized by the T.E.M.) between the initial stages of the tobacco epidemic and adoption of 
comprehensive T.C.P..  A substantial body of scientific evidence exists regarding the 
effectiveness of specific T.C.P. elements (Jha, Chaloupka, Corrao, & Jacob, 2006), (Levy, 
Chaloupka, & Gitchell, The effects of tobacco control policies on smoking rates: a tobacco 
control scorecard, 2004) and policy learning and diffusion has emerged as a key mechanism for 
the trans-jurisdictional adoption of similar policy elements as well as the knowledge about 
needed infrastructure and strategies to make the T.C.P. successful. (Rose, 2007), (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1996)  International treaties and transnational tobacco control agreements have become 
important instruments in policy learning and diffusion, thus aspiring to facilitate international 
convergence of T.C.P., the most prominent example of which is the W.H.O. Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (F.C.T.C.).  However, while the treaty has in excess of 160 
signatories, it is yet unclear how successful the F.C.T.C. will be in implementing common, 
effective policies throughout the diverse membership.  Further, the F.C.T.C. process remains 
the target of intense tobacco industry efforts to weaken its success. (Mamudu, Hammond, & 
Glantz, Tobacco industry attempts to counter the World Bank report Curbing the Epidemic and 
obstruct the WHO framework convention on tobacco control, 2008)   
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A second example of facilitated international policy diffusion is the European Union (E.U.) 
T.C.P. acquis communautaire, the common laws and policies in effect throughout members of 
the E.U..  Until 1987, member states of the E.U. were individual actors in T.C.P., each having 
exclusive authority over its own domestic policy.  The E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire 
establishes minimum policy requirements which all members must adopt, though individual 
members may adopt more restrictive policies in a process of multilevel governance. (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2001)  The Single European Act of 1987 was the first expansion of E.U. jurisdiction into 
public health, with the justification that health is important to economic integration.  This 
expanded in 1993 in the Treaty of the European Communities (Maastricht).  Development of the 
E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire started in 1989 with a directive banning T.V. advertising and 
has grown to also include: 1989 and 1992 directives on product labeling; a 1990 directive on 
maximum tar levels; and three directives on minimum tax levels in 1992 (2) and 1995.  The 
most comprehensive directive, a virtual ban on direct and indirect advertising, started 
development 1989 and was eventually implemented in 1997 after much debate, controversy, 
and compromise.  This directive was immediately challenged by Germany in the European 
Court of Justice, which annulled it in 2001.  The E.U. subsequently adopted a narrower directive 
in 2002, which banned only direct cross-border advertising. (Duina & Kurzer, 2004)   
E.U. accession is an elaborate process, leading from formal application to acceptance of 
candidacy status, negotiations regarding progression toward membership requirements in 
different policy areas, formal votes on entrance by E.U. institutions, and formal votes within 
individual candidate countries. (Glenn, 2004), (Grabbe, 2003)  For the twelve countries 
acceding to the E.U. in 2004/2007, most applied for candidacy between 1994-1996, meaning a 
ten-year period in which to absorb and adopt the E.U. T.C.P. acquis communautaire.  The E.U. 
T.C.P. acquis communautaire would be expected to have considerably more influence on policy 
adoption and population health outcomes in newly joining members without a substantial history 
and infrastructure in this policy area.  Thus it is hypothesized that, by both proximity and the 
process of E.U. accession, the E.U. could be an obvious source of policy learning and diffusion 
for accession countries to abbreviate stages of the T.E.M..   
The purpose of the present study is to: 
1. Assess the extent to which T.C.P. convergence has taken place coincident with 
the 2004/2007 accession and characterize the nature of convergence, if any;  
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2. Assess the extent to there has been convergence in tobacco-related population 
health outcomes, specifically prevalence of smoking, tobacco consumption, and 
mortality from smoking-related causes; 
3. Extend the understanding of the accession process on T.C.P. adoption and 
related population health, if any, by comparing accession countries to European-
neighborhood countries on the same indicators.   
7.3 Materials and Methods 
All fifteen “existing countries” 1 (members of the E.U. before 2004) and twelve “accession 
countries” 2 (those acceding to the E.U. in 2004 or 2007) were included in this study except 
Cyprus, excluded due to the absence of data for almost all indicators at all time points.  The four 
non-E.U. “European-neighborhood” comparison countries selected based on both cultural 
similarity and data availability were Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and Albania.  Donabedian’s 
structure-process-outcome conceptual model (Donabedian, 1966) guided the selection of 
variables for this study.  Selected outcome variables were smoking prevalence (percent of 
population aged 15+ years that were regular daily smokers; total, female, and male population), 
consumption (number of cigarettes per person per year; total population), and smoking-related 
mortality (standardized death rate from selected smoking-related causes per 100,000; total, 
female, and male population).  Selected process variables included the price of cigarettes (2001 
only), and an assessment of the number, timing, and type of T.C.P. instrument adoption 
(described below).  Finally, structural variables were real GDP (rGDP; $PPP, USD), and 
spending on health care as a percent of G.D.P..   
Data were obtained from common, publicly available data sources assembled and 
maintained by the W.H.O. Regional Office for Europe (European Health for All database, (World 
Health Organization, 2009) and the Tobacco Control database (World Health Organization, 
2009).  Data were downloaded and reconstituted in a Microsoft Office Access® database for 
manipulation and processing, then exported into S.P.S.S.® (formerly S.P.S.S., Chicago, IL; now 
I.B.M. S.P.S.S. Statistics, I.B.M. Corporation, Somers, N.Y.) for statistical analysis.  To 
compensate for different collection and reporting years in different countries, values were 
averaged across five year intervals for each country.  The period 1990/94 was the baseline time 
                                                
1 Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Finland, Austria, Sweden 
2 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria 
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period as it corresponded with time of application for accession for several countries and the 
first time period for which complete data were available.  The subsequent time periods of 
1995/99, 2000/04 and 2005/07 (the last year for which data, though not from all countries, were 
available) were also considered.   
Countries were grouped aggregately as “existing” or “accession” countries.  While 
variation in all indicators exists within these groups, the primary goal of this analysis was 
assessing the convergence of accession countries to the average, established community 
standard.  One-way ANOVA analysis was used to determine the presence of statistically 
significant differences between existing and accession countries at each time period.  Within 
each country group, paired-sample t-tests were used to determine if there had been a 
statistically significant change between the baseline and the final, full-data time period 
(2000/04).  For each indicator, the rate of change within country group was determined using 
simple regression, where the selected indicator was the dependent variable and time was the 
independent variable.  The estimated β coefficients for existing and accession countries were 
compared using Student’s t-test.   
Information about T.C.P. status and activity was obtained from the W.H.O.-Europe 
Tobacco Control Policy database. (World Health Organization, WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, 2009)  Five policy areas were included: direct advertising (6 specific topics), indirect 
advertising (2), product distribution (3), smoke-free public spaces (7), and smoke-free public 
transit (4).  A simple score (T.C.P.-s) was calculated that assigned 0.5 points if the specific topic 
was addressed by a policy restriction and 1.0 points if the specific topic was addressed by a 
policy ban.  A total of 22 points – one for each policy element – were possible.  A country’s 
T.C.P-s (a score out of 22) was calculated for each of the four study time periods.  The duration 
of T.C.P. activity was calculated for each country by subtracting the year of the first policy 
element listed from 2007.  The number of unique legislative events was determined as the 
number of unique times that tobacco control legislation was enacted (which could include a 
single or multiple policy elements).  The authors acknowledge that other scores for this purpose 
have been developed, specifically the Tobacco Control Scale (T.C.S.). (Joossens & Raw, 2006)  
It is not our intent to replace or improve upon the T.C.S., but because the T.C.S. was calculated 
from non-publicly available data sources and for a short time period, we developed an alternate 
score that would allow us to quantify policy and policy change over time including in jurisdictions 
not included in the T.C.S..  Additionally, while the price of cigarettes is an acknowledged 
important element of TCP, taxes were excluded from the current study because most accession 
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countries received derogations (delays) on tax harmonization upon their entry into E.U. 
membership. (European Commission, 2004) 
7.4 Results 
The selected structural variables for existing and accession countries are compared in 
Table 7-1.  As anticipated, existing countries had higher rG.D.P. and spent more on health care 
at each time point than did accession countries.  Both existing and accession countries had 
statistically significant change (growth) in both variables between 1990/94 and 2000/04.  The 
rate of growth of rG.D.P. was statistically significant in both existing and accession countries, 
though the rate of growth of rG.D.P. in existing countries approached being statistically 
significantly larger than the growth of rG.D.P. in accession countries (p for Student’s t-test for 
difference between simple regression β = 0.064).  Finally, while the rate of growth in health care 
spending was statistically significant in existing countries, it was not in accession countries (p for 
simple regression β = 0.099).   
Results for the comparisons of prices and T.C.P.-s between existing and accession 
countries are shown in Table 7-2.  Price for the cheapest/most popular brand of cigarettes was 
statistically significantly lower in accession compared to existing countries, though there was no 
difference in the 2001 price of the most popular international brand.  For the T.C.P.-s, 
comparisons showed that existing countries had implemented more total policy elements during 
the baseline time period, but for the remaining study time periods there was no difference in 
score between existing and accession countries.  Further, while both country groups had a 
statistically significant increase in T.C.P.-s during the study period and a statistically significant 
rate of change in T.C.P.-s, the rate of change for adoption of policy elements was statistically 
significantly higher in accession countries.  Existing countries had a longer history of T.C.P. 
activity, including more unique legislative events, likely related to a longer history of policies 
establishing smoke free public areas and advertising restrictions. 
Table 7-3 summarizes results from comparisons in the selected measures of population 
health outcomes.  Our analysis suggested that there was neither difference between nor change 
within country groups in per capita cigarette consumption.  Neither were there any differences in 
the overall population smoking prevalence (except for the 2005/07 time period where existing 
countries had an approaching-significantly lower prevalence (p=0.079), though it should be 
noted that data were available for fewer countries during that time period).  And, while there was 
a statistically significant decrease in the within-group prevalence for both country groups, the 
rate of change in prevalence was not significant for either country group.  Different patterns, 
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however, were noted for gender-specific smoking prevalence.  For all time periods, the 
prevalence of female smoking in accession countries was statistically significantly lower than 
that in existing countries (except in the last time period, though the same, previous caveats 
regarding data availability apply).  The results suggest that female smoking prevalence 
remained “flat” in both country groups (statistically not significant within-group change or rate of 
change) throughout the study time periods.  A statistically significantly lower proportion of men 
(or approaching statistical significance) in existing countries smoked compared to men in 
accession countries, though there was a statistically significant within-group reduction in male 
smoking prevalence in both country groups.  However, neither the within-group rate of change 
nor the between-group rate of change comparison was statistically significant.   
The estimated standardized mortality rates for selected smoking-related causes for the 
total population, female population, and male population were lower at all study time periods in 
existing compared to accession countries.  Both the within-group change and rate of change in 
smoking-related mortality decreased statistically significantly in existing countries for all 
population strata (total, female, male).  In accession countries, there was a statistically 
significant decrease in the within-group mortality rates (all population strata) but not in the rate 
of change in mortality rates.  It is noted that variance estimates for mortality rate parameters in 
the accession countries were substantially larger than for existing countries. 
In Figure 7-1, the percent change in smoking prevalence from 1990/94 to 2000/04 is 
shown for individual countries in both country groups, where a negative percent change 
corresponds to a decrease in smoking prevalence and a positive percent change to an 
increased smoking prevalence.  While most countries, both existing and accession, showed 
decreased smoking prevalence, some countries from both groups demonstrated increased 
smoking prevalence during the study period.  Within existing countries, Belgium had increases 
in total and female smoking prevalence, Luxembourg in total and male smoking prevalence, and 
Italy, France, and Spain in female smoking prevalence.  Within accession countries, Latvia and 
Lithuania had increases in smoking prevalence in all population strata (total, female, male) with 
particularly high increases in female smoking prevalence.  Slovakia, Estonia, and Romania also 
experienced increases in total smoking prevalence (Slovakia) and female smoking prevalence 
(Estonia, Romania).   
Comparisons between existing, accession, and European-neighborhood countries are 
shown in Figure 7-2.  Existing E.U. countries had substantially larger and increasing rG.D.P. 
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compared to both accession and European-neighborhood countries; accession countries were 
indistinguishable from European-neighborhood countries during the baseline time period but 
had modestly higher rG.D.P. (but still substantially lower than existing countries) by 2005/07.  It 
is clear that the period 1990/94 to 1995/99 was a time of T.C.P. adoption for most countries, 
with existing countries, as previously discussed, having more policies (higher T.C.P.-s) in place 
during the baseline time period.  However, it appears that existing, accession, and the Ukraine 
continued to adopt T.C.P. after 1995/99, whereas Turkey did not and Russia did not adopt new 
policies after 2000/04.  Albania had the lowest T.C.P.-s and lags substantially behind all other 
countries.  Russia and Albania had similar smoking prevalence to existing and accession 
countries during the baseline period, but a trend of increasing prevalence throughout the 
remaining study time periods.  Turkey and Ukraine, while having a higher smoking prevalence 
than either existing or accession countries throughout the study time periods, had lower 
smoking prevalence during the final study time period compared to their population smoking 
prevalence during the baseline time period (though still higher than E.U. existing or accession 
countries).  Mortality rates for smoking-related causes were only available for Ukraine and 
Albania.  While smoking-related mortality rates in both existing and accession decreased during 
the study period, tobacco-related mortality increased from the baseline study period through two 
additional study time periods in both Ukraine and Albania.  While mortality rates were lower in 
Albania compared to accession countries at all study time periods (and existing countries at the 
baseline time period), mortality rates in Ukraine were higher than those in existing or accession 
countries at all study time periods.   
7.5 Discussion 
This study assessed convergence between E.U. existing and accession countries on 
measures of T.C.P. and related population health outcomes and the extent to which any 
convergence may be attributable to the E.U. accession process.  Results from this study 
support the ability of the E.U. and E.U. accession to support and accelerate T.C.P. adoption, 
with subsequent benefits to related population health outcomes.   
Accession countries, while more similar to European-neighborhood countries in rG.D.P., 
were more similar to existing than European-neighborhood countries in the other parameters 
studied here.  There was clear convergence between existing and accession countries in the 
number and type of T.C.P.; only Ukraine demonstrated a similar pattern of sustained T.C.P. 
adoption.  Consistent with a priori expectations, existing countries had more policies in place 
during the study baseline period, but there was no difference in the number of polices for the 
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remainder of the study time periods. Results suggested that baseline differences were related to 
a longer history with T.C.P. activity, especially restrictions and bans on smoking in public areas 
and direct advertising.  Also, while existing, accession, and two European-neighborhood 
countries had similar total population smoking prevalence at the baseline time period, only 
existing and accession countries demonstrated a consistent decline in smoking prevalence 
throughout the study time periods.  Evaluation of individual country results showed Latvia and 
Lithuania as consistent laggards in reductions in smoking prevalence.  Likewise, only existing 
and accession countries realized a decline in smoking-related mortality throughout all study time 
periods.   
The tendency to policy convergence across E.U. member states over time has come be 
called “Europeanization” (Radaelli, 2003), (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005) and results from this 
study support the role of the E.U. as a policy transfer platform, allowing progressive countries to 
influence E.U. policies through uploading and laggard states to catch-up (converge) through 
policy downloading. (Borzel, 2002)  Given that most accession countries had no or only very few 
T.C.P. during the baseline time period, the process of E.U. accession was a de facto mandatory 
policy diffusion (download) of the E.U. tobacco acquis communautaire to acceding countries, 
permitting these countries to at least shorten the extended periods of nascent and ineffective 
T.C.P. advocacy and implementation as predicted by the T.E.M..   
An additional important finding tentatively supported by the current study’s results is the 
ability of such “mandatory” policy adoption to influence population behavior in the unclear 
presence of considerable public support for such policies.  The trajectory of enacting restrictive 
T.C.P. in Western democracies, and the basis for predictions in the T.E.M., has historically been 
that T.C.P. are implemented in an atmosphere of permissive consensus, with politicians only 
acting when it is “safe” to do so. (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public health, political 
economy, or morality policy?, 2008)  Public support for T.C.P. has been demonstrated to be 
related to both the implementation and enforcement of restrictive and comprehensive T.C.P. 
(Hyland, et al., 2009) in Western democracies.  Further, particularly well documented and 
discussed in the United States, public support for such T.C.P. has been built primarily by the 
work of advocacy groups through a sustained effort to reframe T.C.P. partially on the basis of 
the arguments of morality policy and de-normalizing the product, act of smoking, and sometimes 
even the tobacco industry itself. (Studlar, U.S. tobacco control policy: public health, political 
economy, or morality policy?, 2008)  For many accession countries, this prolonged period of 
advocacy and de-normalization, with subsequent change in societal attitudes towards smoking 
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and T.C.P., was likely not present.  Of the twelve countries acceding to the E.U. in 2004/2007, 
ten were Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.) countries emerging from collapsed communist 
regimes and decades of social, political, and economic oppression. Thus E.U. accession 
represented a way to advance and stabilize democracy and free markets, as well as advance 
public health, standards of living, and quality of life.  In pre-collapse communist societies, the 
tobacco market was typically a monopoly of a domestic producer, and tobacco advertising was 
virtually immaterial, as was advertising for any consumer good.  The government-controlled the 
price of the cigarettes, the revenue stream from which was not insignificant, and smoking was a 
nearly ubiquitous cultural norm, especially for men.  As late as 1983 in Poland, cigarettes were 
included as rations with worker paychecks, and while early official statistics are difficult to find, 
some have estimated that 65-75 percent of men in Poland smoked. (Zatonski, 2003)  Further, 
the health care system, health information, and the public health agenda were controlled by the 
government, and while it was not forbidden for physicians or other public health or policy 
makers to discuss an alternate agenda, such groups and messages received little if any 
reinforcement, and the impact from any such campaign was minimal.  In the societal vacuum 
left by the departure of the communist regimes in C.E.E., Western-based transnational tobacco 
companies, concurrently pressured by shrinking markets in the West, saw tremendous market 
potential.  Research based on tobacco industry documents have reported the many strategies 
employed by the industry to exploit these markets, including the explosion of advertising, often 
targeted at women and children, in societies previously unaccustomed to the promotion of 
consumer goods. (Zatonski, 2003), (Lipand, A; for the World Health Organization Tobacco Free 
Initiative, 2007), (Szilagyi, 2006)  Thus, in societies where advocacy and de-normalization had 
likely not yet taken root, results from this study suggest that changes in population behavior 
patterns may have been driven by T.C.P. implementation.  This directionality (policy → social 
change) is opposite to that previously argued, that T.C.P. adoption reflects social change and a 
population willing to accept such mandated behavioral restrictions. (Nathanson, Disease 
Prevention as Social Change: The State, Society and Public Health in the United States, 
France, Great Britain, and Canada, 2007) 
The limitations of this study are threefold.  First, as this study used an epidemiologic 
approach with cross-sectional data, the reported results represent associations and not 
causality.  Second, publicly available data were used and so results are only as reliable as the 
data reported to and data compilation procedures of these sources.  Finally, the present study 
assessed only enacted policies, not policy enforcement.  While the authors acknowledge that 
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differences between enacted legislation and on-the-ground policy enforcement exist within the 
E.U. (Nathanson, Disease Prevention as Social Change: The State, Society and Public Health 
in the United States, France, Great Britain, and Canada, 2007) and that these differences 
impact the realization of policy effectiveness, it was beyond the scope of the present study to 
determine T.C.P. enforcement over time and in all the jurisdictions included in this study.  
7.6 Chapter Summary & Contribution 
This results reported in this chapter provide prima facie support for the ability of the E.U. 
and the E.U. accession process, as a de facto mandatory policy diffusion, to advance population 
health and shorten phases in the tobacco epidemic.  That is, this chapter provided quantitative 
evidence that both policy adoption and reductions in population-level tobacco use can occur 
absent substantial social changes.  This is oppositional to the findings reported in the previous 
chapter, thus highlighting the bi-directional nature of the relationship between policy adoption 
and tobacco use.  These seemingly-contradictory findings also likely highlight both the 
complexity and the importance of contextual factors in understanding the dynamic between 
tobacco use and policy adoption.   
Specifically regarding this study, results suggest that the challenge particularly for 
accession countries will be to continue to foster healthy public policy advocacy to entrench new 
normative behavior. 
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Table 7-1. Comparisons and Changes in Structural and Institutional Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession 
Countries 
 
  Existing E.U. Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Statistical Difference 
Real G.D.P. 1990-1994 15 / 17244.7±1079.1 11 / 6705.4±744.9 pF<0.0001 
1995-1999 15 / 22241.2±1388.0 11 / 8746.0±1157.9 pF<0.0001 
2000-2004 15 / 28606.24±2435.14 11 / 12227.6±1169.7 pF<0.0001 
2005-2007 15 / 32564.1±2285.1 11 / 15574.1±1283.2 pF<0.0001 
% of G.D.P. as Health Care 
Expenditure 
1990-1994 15 / 7.7±0.3 9 / 5.2±0.5 pF<0.0001 
1995-1999 15 / 8.0±0.3 10 / 6.1±0.5 pF=0.001 
2000-2004 15 / 8.6±0.3 10 / 6.4±0.5 pF<0.0001 
2005-2007 15 / 9.2±0.3 9 / 6.4±0.5 pF<0.0001 
Within Country Change  Real G.D.P. 15 / 11361.6±1627.3 / p<0.0001 11 / 5522.3±549.27 / p<0.0001 -- 
% of G.D.P. as Health Care 
Expenditure 
15 / 1.0±0.2 / p=0.001 8 / 1.0±0.3 / p=0.014 -- 
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Table 7-2. Comparisons and Changes in Price and Policy Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession Countries 
 
  Existing E.U. Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Statistical 
Difference 
P
r
i
c
e
 
Retail Price of Cheapest/Most Popular 
Domestic Brand 
USD, PPP$, 2001 15 / 4.1±0.4 11 / 2.6±0.3 pF=0.006 
Retail Price of Most Popular 
International Brand 
USD, PPP$, 2001 15 / 4.8±0.3 11 / 4.7±0.6 pF=0.81 
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T.C.P.-s Score 
( # of Policy Elements - 22 Total 
Possible) 
1990-1994 15 / 8.4±1.3 11 / 2.5±1.3 pF=0.004 
1995-1999 15 / 10.5±1.3 11 / 11.4±1.6 pF=0.67 
2000-2004 15 / 13.7±1.1 11 / 14.8±0.7 pF=0.45 
2005-2007 15 / 16.1±1.0 11 / 16.2±0.8 pF=0.95 
All Policy Areas Duration of Policy Activity (Yrs) 15 / 27.4±3.3 11 / 13.8±2.4 pF=0.005 
# Unique Legislative Events 15 / 4.9±0.5 11 / 3.6±0.5 pF=0.05 
Smoke Free Public Areas Duration  15 / 19.8±3.2 10 / 10.7±1.6 pF=0.04 
# Unique Legislative Events 15 / 2.1±0.3 10 / 1.9±0.3 pF=0.69 
Smoke Free Public Transportation Duration  15 / 17.5±3.4 11 / 12.3±2.5 pF=0.27 
# Unique Legislative Events 15 / 1.3±0.2 11 / 1.2±0.1 pF=0.75 
Direct Advertising Policies Duration  15 / 19.5±1.8 11 / 12.1±2.5 pF=0.02 
# Unique Legislative Events 15 / 2.1±0.3 11 / 1.6±0.3 pF=0.30 
Indirect Advertising Policies Duration  15 / 13.5±2.5 11 / 7.6±1.4 pF=0.08 
# Unique Legislative Events 14 / 1.6±0.2 11 / 1.4±0.2 pF=0.44 
Distribution Policies Duration  15 / 12.0±2.4 11 / 10.4±1.2 pF=0.62 
# Unique Legislative Events 15 / 2.0±0.2 11 / 1.7±0.2 pF=0.41 
 Within Country Change  # of Policy Elements 15 / 5.3±1.1 / pβ<0.0001 11 / 12.3±1.6 / pβ<0.0001 -- 
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Table 7-3. Comparisons and Changes in Population Health Outcome Metrics (1990/1994 to 2000/2004) in Existing E.U. Countries and 2004 & 2007 E.U. Accession 
Countries 
 
 Existing E.U. Countries  
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Accession Countries
(n / Mean ±Std. Error) 
Statistical 
Difference 
Annual Cigarette Consumption 
(per Capita) 
1990-1994 14 / 1753.0±74.7 6 / 1956.5±195.2 p=0.244 
1995-1999 14 / 1636.8±122.6 9 / 1951.0±124.5 p=0.101 
2000-2004 14 / 1659.3±164.1 6 / 1933.8±246.4 p=0.370 
Smoking Prevalence (Total 
Population) 
1990-1994 14 / 30.2±1.4 11 / 30.6±1.6 p=0.840 
1995-1999 15 / 29.4±1.4 10 / 30.1±1.3 p=0.723 
2000-2004 13 / 28.0±1.4 11 / 27.9±1.2 p=0.942 
2005-2007 11 / 23.3±1.1 5 / 27.4±2.1 p=0.079 
Smoking Prevalence (Female) 1990-1994 14 / 24.4±1.5 10 / 18.5±2.5 p=0.045 
1995-1999 15 / 24.3±1.6 10 / 18.4±1.4 p=0.015 
2000-2004 13 / 24.1±1.1 10 / 19.3±1.4 p=0.013 
2005-2007 11 / 19.7±1.2 5 / 18.3±1.9 p=0.544 
Smoking Prevalence (Male) 1990-1994 14 / 36.3±1.9 10 / 41.8±2.1 p=0.070 
1995-1999 15 / 34.8±1.8 10 / 41.9±2.3 p=0.025 
2000-2004 13 / 32.1±2.0 10 / 38.1±2.3 p=0.067 
2005-2007 11 / 27.2±1.6 5 / 38.5±4.1 p=0.007 
S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes 
(Total Population) 
1990-1994 15 / 300.2±16.4 11 / 514.6±43.8 p<0.0001 
1995-1999 15 / 269.4±13.3 11 / 477.7±38.7 p<0.0001 
2000-2004 14 / 232.6±10.8 11 / 429.0±33.2 p<0.0001 
2005-2007 13 / 199.8±9.0 10 / 398.0±38.4 p<0.0001 
S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes 
(Female) 
1990-1994 15 / 208.2±14.1 11 / 374.0±36.1 p<0.0001 
1995-1999 15 / 187.0±12.4 11 / 348.8±32.6 p<0.0001 
2000-2004 14 / 165.4±10.6 11 / 312.6±26.7 p<0.0001 
2005-2007 13 / 142.3±9.2 10 / 286.2±30.0 p<0.0001 
S.D.R. Smoking-Related Causes 
(Male) 
1990-1994 15 / 427.3±21.3 11 / 716.7±61.4 p<0.0001 
1995-1999 15 / 381.8±16.0 11 / 663.8±52.3 p<0.0001 
2000-2004 14 / 321.7±11.9 11 / 597.5±46.0 p<0.0001 
2005-2007 13 / 274.9±9.8 10 / 560.7±53.9 p<0.0001 
Within Country Change  Cigarette Consumption 14 / -93.7±121.5 / pt=0.454 4 / -107.0±293.8 / pt=0.74 -- 
 Prevalence (Total) 12 / -3.0±0.8 / pt=0.004 11 / -2.7±1.2 / pt=0.052 -- 
 Prevalence (Female)  12 / -1.6±1.0 / pt=0.134 9 / 0.2±1.6 / pt=0.912 -- 
 Prevalence (Male) 12 / -4.3±1.0 / pt=0.001 9 / -5.4±1.5 / pt=0.006 -- 
 Mortality (Total) 14 / -71.4±8.2 / pt<0.0001 11 / -85.6±21.7 / pt=0.003 -- 
 Mortality (Female) 14 / -47.1±5.8 / pt<0.0001 11 / -61.4±18.1 / pt=0.007 -- 
 Mortality (Male) 14 / -108.4±12.6 / pt<0.0001 11 / -119.2±29.5 / pt=0.002 -- 
  
 [163] 
 
Table 7-4. Results for Regression Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable Existing E.U. Countries Accession Countries Statistical Difference 
Real G.D.P. β=1136.2±242.7, pβ<0.0001 β=552.2±145.9, pβ=0.001 pt=0.064 
% of G.D.P. as Health Care Expenditure β=0.097±0.042, pβ=0.027 β=0.1±0.07, pβ=0.099 pt=0.793 
# of Policy Elements β=0.5±0.2, pβ=0.004 β=1.2±0.2, pβ<0.0001 pt=0.007 
Cigarette Consumption β=-9.5±17.6, pβ=0.6 β =-2.3±26.8, pβ=0.9 pt=0.780 
Prevalence (Total) β=-0.2±0.2, pβ=0.3 β=-0.3±0.2, pβ=0.2 pt=0.842 
Prevalence (Female) β=-0.02±0.2, pβ=0.9 β=0.08±0.2, pβ=0.7 pt=0.748 
Prevalence (Male) β=-0.4±0.3, pβ=0.1 β=-0.4±0.3, pβ=0.2 pt=0.919 
Mortality (Total) β=-6.8±1.9, pβ=0.001 β=-8.6±5.4, pβ=0.1 pt=0.728 
Mortality (Female) β=-4.3±1.8, pβ=0.019 β=-6.1±4.4, pβ=0.2 pt=0.670 
Mortality (Male) β=-10.5±2.4, pβ<0.0001 β=-11.9±7.5, pβ=0.1 pt=0.843 
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Figure 7-1. Range of the Percent Change in Smoking Prevalence from 1990-94 to 2000-04 in Individual Existing and Accession E.U. Countries  
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Figure 7-2. Comparison of Existing E.U., Accession E.U., and European-Neighborhood Countries on Key Indicators 
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8 CONCLUSION (AND A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING 
TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY AND TOBACCO-RELATED POPULATION 
HEALTH) 
8.1 Chapter Introduction & Purpose 
The previous chapters have presented an overview of the tobacco epidemic, a review of 
two very different literatures with very different perspectives on the tobacco epidemic (the public 
health literature and the political and policy science literature), an empirical analysis integrating 
the political and policy science viewpoint with the public health perspective on the evolution of 
the tobacco epidemic, and two quantitative analyses alternately supporting the interdependence 
and complex temporal relationship between tobacco control policy adoption and population 
health outcomes as well as the importance of societally-derived factors in the evolution of the 
tobacco epidemic.  The ultimate objective has been to identify key elements and forces in the 
tobacco epidemic and, more precisely, the processes of tobacco control policy adoption so as to 
present an integrated conceptual model based on the causal loops of tobacco control policy and 
tobacco-related population health.  This model is now presented and each element discussed, 
with suggestions for quantification and future research questions.   
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8.2 An Conceptual Model for Integrating the Social and Political Forces Affecting Policy 
Adoption and Population Health: A Causal Loop  
 
8.3 Elements of the Causal Loop Diagram 
8.3.1 Population (Social System) 
Abatement of the effects of the tobacco epidemic in society (the population) is the primary 
focus of the public health community.  The overwhelming majority of research and 
measurement efforts are directed toward quantifying tobacco use, the health effects of such 
use, and the costs, both direct and indirect, of tobacco use and tobacco-related health effects.  
However, neither the public health community nor the political or policy science community has 
comprehensively assessed the influence of factors within this sphere on tobacco control policy 
adoption.  For example, it is unclear how – or if – fundamental societal values regarding 
libertarian vs. paternalistic perspectives on the balance between individual choice and public 
health meaningfully affect the likelihood, pace, or types of tobacco control policy adoption.  A 
research agenda integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on 
the influence of this sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would include assessment 
and measurement of knowledge, attitudes, an behaviors related to not only tobacco use, but 
Figure 8-1. Causal Loop Diagram 
Government
(Policy System)
Population
(Social System)
Policy Process
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also regarding the tobacco industry, and the role of government in regulating individual 
behavior.  More specifically, suggested metrics and constructs in a comprehensive and 
integrated research framework might include: 
• Knowledge and attitudes regarding the health effects of tobacco use, including 
understanding and conception of “risk” 
• Knowledge and attitudes regarding conduct by the tobacco industry 
• Tobacco use and consumption 
• Fundamental preferences and values for private vs. public solutions to problems 
• Fundamental preferences, values, and tolerance for paternalism and protection 
vs. perceived infringement of individual rights (and the distinction between those 
2 constructs) 
Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include: 
• To what extent, if any, does social change precede policy adoption? 
• How do fundamental values affect opposition or support for tobacco control 
policies? 
• Are effects and associations uniform throughout the population or do they differ 
between specific strata? 
• What is the quantitative nature of the interaction between social structural 
variables, especially the values and expectations regarding the role of 
government, affect a) policy outcomes and b) population health outcomes? 
8.3.2 Government (Policy System) 
Understanding how government structures, functions, and aspects of the policy process 
influence tobacco control policy adoption has been the primary focus of the political and policy 
science community.  This sphere, however, has been too narrowly construed and thus 
understudied by the public health community.  Further, neither the political and policy science 
nor the public health communities have undertaken study of how policy adoption in the 
governmental sphere is affected by population-level tobacco use and vice versa.  A research 
agenda integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on the 
influence of this sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would include mechanisms to 
account for this interrelated and temporal dynamic.  Key metrics in a comprehensive and 
integrated research framework might include: 
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• Form of government (e.g., federalism) and degree of pluralism 
• Existing social and social welfare policy regimes 
• Existing tobacco control policy regime, including institutional arrangements for 
regulatory vs. prevention functions 
• Obligations or constraints as required by treaties or other forms of multi-level 
governance 
• Competition vs. coordination between different venues and “levels” in a federalist 
system 
• Responsiveness of policy system to social system or to policy system at different 
“levels” in a federalist system 
Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include: 
• What is the interaction between social and policy systems as related to tobacco 
control policy and tobacco-related health outcomes? 
• Are tobacco control policy regimes related to / affected by other aspects of social 
welfare or health regimes?  
• What are the important / most effective elements of the institutional 
arrangements for regulation and prevention?   
• Do the number of policy venues affect in any meaningful way either policy or 
population health outcomes? 
8.3.3 Judiciary 
The judiciary has had undeniable impacts on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic, 
including tobacco control policy.  However, except for the most high profile cases, usually in the 
Supreme Court, the impact of the judiciary has not been routinely or systematically studied in 
either the political and policy science or public health communities.  A research agenda 
integrating the political and policy science and public health perspectives on the influence of this 
sphere on the evolution of the tobacco epidemic would attempt to articulate and systematically 
quantify the effects of the judiciary on tobacco control policy adoption or tobacco-related 
population health outcomes.   
Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might 
include: 
• How have the courts been used, which courts, how often, and for what? 
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• What have been the rulings in the lower courts? 
• How has judicial activity (rulings, case law) quantitatively affected policy 
outcomes (at the state- or national-level)? 
• Is there a pattern or relationship between either the use of the courts (legal 
mobilization) or the rulings of the courts to tobacco control policy or tobacco-
related population health (implying a social effect of the judiciary as well)? 
8.3.4 Tobacco Control and Public Health Infrastructure vs. Tobacco Industry (Competing 
Coalitions) 
These are the “opposing forces” in the tobacco epidemic, competing for the policy 
monopoly, to control the subsystem, and to be able to define the policy image.  Both coalitions 
are institutionalized.  The Advocacy Coalition Framework or global advocacy networks would 
seem ideal theoretical frameworks with which to systematically and quantitatively assess the 
impact of these coalitions, though few studies to date have attempted to do so.  Key research 
questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework might include: 
• What are the resources and strategies of each coalition? 
• How do the structural and resource characteristics of coalitions affect their ability 
to influence the policy subsystem? 
• How do the coalitions interact with other venues or the policy or social systems?  
• What policy images are the coalitions promoting and how it being advanced? 
8.3.5 Scientific, Expert, and Epistemic Communities 
These communities have pervasive effects, interacting with all the other actors in the 
system.  While it is understood that these communities have had an effect on the tobacco 
epidemic and tobacco control policy adoption, much less is known about how these effects have 
been exerted.  Key research questions in a comprehensive and integrated research framework 
might include: 
• What is the relationship between “scientific knowledge” and “issue 
understanding” in either the policy or social systems? 
• What is the status of these communities? 
• What is their role, formal or informal, in the policy subsystem? 
8.4 Conclusions: Submissions to Political and Policy Science, and Public Health 
The primary aim of this work has been to integrate the two very different perspectives 
from the political and policy science and public health communities as regards the evolution of 
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the tobacco epidemic.  An integrated conceptual model based on the causal loops of tobacco 
control policy and tobacco-related population health has been presented that incorporates the 
realms of population, governmental, judicial, public health, tobacco industry and other 
subsystems, and scientific communities.  This framework, as well as the identification of its 
constituent elements and the dynamic interrelationship between social factors and policy 
adoption, is submitted as the novel contributions of this work.  However, while this framework 
does assimilate the key elements and forces elucidated during the course of this work and 
integrates the political and policy science with the public health perspective, in truth this 
framework likely elicits more questions than it answers.  The research questions and agendas 
and metrics proposed in this chapter highlight both the strengths and deficiencies of the two 
perspectives.  For the political and policy science community, development of a comprehensive 
and integrated research framework implies building on the existing explanatory frameworks of 
the policy process to incorporate additional spheres such as the judiciary and, in particular, 
socially-driven factors influencing policy adoption.  For the public health community, 
development of a comprehensive and integrated research framework entails building upon 
existing strengths in the measurements and assessment of tobacco use within the population 
and developing and incorporating a more sophisticated understanding of the factors affecting 
the policy adoption process.  It is likely that this more sophisticated, comprehensive, and 
integrated understanding of the tobacco epidemic, including the dynamics of tobacco use and 
tobacco control policy adoption, will be required if the goals of, for example the F.C.T.C. and 
other international efforts, are to be achieved and the tobacco epidemic in the developing world 
substantially curtailed.    
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10 APPENDIX 1:  SUMMARY OF KEY LEGAL CASES AND EVENTS 
10.1 Introduction 
Events within the judiciary, specifically the rulings and opinions on the cases and 
lawsuits within it, have alternately worked to impede and advance tobacco control policy in the 
United States.  Many of these events have taken years to come to resolution and are complex 
proceedings, with many motions, rulings on motions, appeals of these motions, certification 
followed by de-certification as class status, etc., followed by a lengthy appeal process of the 
verdict in the initial case itself.  These lawsuits have been filed in both state and federal courts 
and several have proceeded to the Supreme Court.  It is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis to provide a detailed evaluation of each case.  Rather, seminal cases and events will 
be described as they relate to the evolution of tobacco control policy.  
These events have frequently been described as having occurred in three waves: the 
first wave from 1954-1973 consisting of individuals suing tobacco companies for negligence; the 
second wave from 1983-1992 starting with the Cipollone v. Liggett Group (discussed in detail 
below); and the third wave starting in 1994-present consisting of individual plaintiffs, class action 
suits, and third-party health care cost recovery suits. (Douglas, Davis, & Beasley, 2006)  
However, because the purpose here is to better understand how activity in the judiciary has 
impacted the evolution of the tobacco epidemic generally and tobacco control policy specifically 
in the United States, the following categorizations have been developed based on the type of 
legal activity and its relationship to said epidemic and policy evolution:   
• Suits brought against tobacco companies by individuals claiming personal harm;  
• Suits brought against tobacco companies by groups of individuals (class actions) 
claiming personal harm;  
• Suits brought by individuals or groups against various parties claiming harm, or 
demanding protection from harm, from environmental tobacco smoke;  
• Suits brought by groups, including governments or those representing groups, 
against tobacco companies seeking reimbursement of expenses attributable to 
the harm caused by cigarettes; and  
• Suits disputing scope of action, including those brought by the tobacco industry 
against the government claiming action without jurisdiction and so seeking to limit 
the scope of government action, and suits pursued by government or other 
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agencies claiming actions not permitted under existing statutes, agreements, or 
case law and so seeking to limit the scope of action of the tobacco industry.   
The legal basis for the suits and the defenses against them have changed over time 
based on the evolution of the “problem” of tobacco use – of particular importance have been the 
1964, 1986, and 1988 Surgeon General’s reports (definitively establishing that smoking causes 
morbidity and mortality, exposure to secondhand smoke causes morbidity and mortality, and 
that nicotine is addictive, respectively) and the public disclosure of tobacco industry documents.  
Regardless of the type of legal action, it is superfluous to convey that the tobacco industry has 
fought all cases with any and all legal strategies and procedural tactics at its disposal.  
Frequently referred to as “scorched earth litigation tactics”, these have included filing multiple 
motions and exhausting appeals of all motions, taking extensive depositions and investigations, 
and other delaying and stalling tactics, all intended to prolong the procedures and increase the 
complexity (and cost) for plaintiffs.  This strategy has been notoriously summarized with a 
quotation taken directly from tobacco industry documents: “The way we won these cases, to 
paraphrase Gen. Patton, is not by spending all of Reynolds’ money, but by making the other son 
of a bitch spend all of his.”  (Extracted from filings as part of Haines v Liggett Group, Inc, quoted 
from (Daynard, Bates, & Francey, 2000))  An additional, important legal strategy of the tobacco 
industry has been to first fight the legitimacy of a suit filed in state courts based on central-level 
pre-emption language in existing, central-level statutes.  That is, before a case has proceeded 
to trial, such an action by tobacco companies would first require the plaintiff(s) to defend that the 
state law providing the legal basis for their claim (e.g., misleading advertising) was a legitimate 
law not preempted by a central-level statute.  These strategies and tactics have been effective 
deterrents to filing suits, particularly with individual plaintiffs and those from small jurisdictions 
(e.g., municipalities).    
10.2 Suits with Individual Plaintiffs Claiming Personal Harm 
In the first category of cases to be discussed in this analysis, individual lawsuits claiming 
personal harm began as early as the 1950s and new suits continue to be filed.  While details are 
case-dependent, typically the plaintiff has been an ill current or former smoker (or their surviving 
spouse, heir, or estate) seeking damages from a tobacco company.  Early suits of this type 
typically claimed that cigarettes were either faulty or that tobacco companies didn’t adequately 
warn consumers about the risks of smoking.  For their defense, tobacco companies have denied 
that cigarettes were harmful, claimed that the illnesses cited had other causes, or, after the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, that smokers did know the risk but in 
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deciding to smoke regardless, knowingly assumed the risks thus alleviating the tobacco 
companies of liability.  These early, individual cases were all successfully defended by the 
tobacco companies.  The legal arguments forwarded by both the plaintiffs and the defense 
(tobacco industry) evolved over time with additional scientific information and the public 
disclosure of the tobacco industry documents.  For individual smokers, evidence of nicotine’s 
addictive nature, and later that tobacco companies were fully aware but concealed this, made 
the “free will” defense by tobacco companies much more difficult.  However, prior to 2000 only a 
few verdicts were decided in favor of the plaintiffs and all were overturned on appeal (e.g., 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group; initial verdict was for the plaintiff – the first ever finding for a plaintiff 
– was overturned on appeal then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but eventually dropped 9 
years after the initial filing of the suit due in part to expenses incurred by the plaintiff).   
10.2.1 Engle and Engle Progeny Cases 
Since 2000 and the extensive study of the millions of pages of tobacco industry 
documents released as part of the Minnesota trial and then the Master Settlement Agreement, 
verdicts against tobacco companies have become more common, though trials and appeals 
remain long and complex.  Most recently, a series of cases in Florida have been making their 
way through the state court system, with the majority of the now-individual cases being decided 
in favor of the plaintiffs.  In Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al., the original case was certified as a 
class action on behalf of smokers in Florida with the initial verdict and a huge damage award – 
$145 billion in punitive damages and $2.7 million in compensatory damages – in favor of the 
plaintiffs.  However, the Florida Appeals Court threw out the verdict and decertified the class but 
importantly allowed individual cases to proceed while using the carry-over findings of the jury in 
the original case of multiple wrongdoings by the tobacco industry.  These individual cases, 
variously estimated to number at 4000-8000, are sometimes referred to as the “Engle offspring” 
or “Engle progeny” cases and are now proceeding.  Of the jury verdicts reached so far in 13 
cases, 11 have been decided for the plaintiffs, though appeals in all are pending.  A significant 
challenge in proving individually-based suits remains establishing individual smoking 
attributable, proximal causality for the plaintiff, which is different and a larger burden than 
demonstrating statistical causality and disease probability within a population.   
10.2.2 Summary 
It is unclear how these individual-plaintiff cases have directly affected the adoption of 
comprehensive tobacco control policies.  These cases have likely had secondary impacts, 
including establishing precedent and case law particularly related to liability and industry 
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wrongdoing, as well as making public previously unknown information through the discovery 
process.  Further, this category of cases may have impacted product and industry framing and 
policy images, though these possible associations have not been systematically evaluated.   
10.3 Class Action Suits Claiming Personal Harm 
The second category of cases is class action suits claiming personal harm from cigarette 
smoke.  Though class action suits filed by smokers have proceeded, the challenge of these 
suits is illustrated by the Florida case above (Engle v. R.J. Reynolds et al.).  As it is considered 
a strategic advantage for tobacco companies to require that each case be tried separately, 
tobacco companies have fought class certification vigorously.  Generally, class action lawsuits 
by smokers against tobacco companies have been unsuccessful regardless of the time period 
as courts have generally held that both causation and damage have to be demonstrated 
individually.   
10.4 Suits Claiming Harm from Exposure to Secondhand or Environmental Tobacco 
Smoke 
In the third category of cases, claims of harm from exposure to secondhand or 
environmental tobacco smoke, suits have been brought by a broad array of plaintiffs against an 
equally broad array of defendants.   
10.4.1 Individually-Based Suits 
In individually-based suits, there have been multiple cases that have upheld a 
nonsmoker’s right to a smoke-free environment and the obligations for such an environment to 
be ensured.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of a lower court which 
had ruled that a nonsmoking inmate housed with a smoker (or otherwise involuntarily subjected 
to forced exposure to secondhand smoke) had the right to petition for relief on the grounds that 
such forced exposure constituted cruel and unusual punishment, an 8th Amendment violation, 
and failure to consider such a petition showed deliberate indifference to future health 
consequences of such exposure (Helling v. McKinney, No. 91-1958).  As an example of an 
occupationally-based case, a lifelong nonsmoking railroad worker who was required to sleep in 
company-provided bunk cars with smoking co-workers contracted lung cancer for which he 
claimed his employer was liable (he subsequently died, prematurely, at aged 40 years).  After 
his death, his widow continued the case and eventually settled with the railroad company 
(Thaxton v Norfolk Southern Railroad Co., 239 Ga.).  Additionally, lawsuits have helped to 
establish the obligation of landlords, under covenants of habitability, to adequately protect 
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tenants from exposure to secondhand smoke (e.g., Gainsborough St. Realty Trust v. Haile, No. 
98-02279).   
10.4.2 Class-Action Suits 
In addition to individually-based suits, class action suits have also been filed by those 
affected by secondhand smoke.  Most prominently, nonsmoking flight attendants who were 
occupationally (and involuntarily) exposed to environmental tobacco smoke filed suit against 
several tobacco companies claiming, among other things, that tobacco companies knew about 
the harmful effects of tobacco smoke but withheld this from the public thereby preventing 
employers from protecting their workers and leading to unnecessary and involuntary harm.  In 
this particular case (Broin v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al.), and as a departure from all previous cases 
that had been vigorously contended to completion, the tobacco companies agreed to a partial 
settlement which, among other agreed-to terms, allowed claims for damages to proceed on a 
individual-case basis.   
10.4.3 Summary 
In contrast to personal-harm suits brought by smokers, these individual or class action 
suits by nonsmokers seeking relief or compensation for harm from exposure to secondhand 
smoke have had a far more direct impact on policy.  First, they have established the legal 
precedent for the harmful effects of secondhand smoke.  Second, by establishing liability for not 
protecting non-smokers from exposure to secondhand smoke, these activities have served to 
establish a requirement for employers and landlords, among others, to develop practices that 
protect nonsmokers.  That is, these activities established de facto requirements (policy) for 
smoke-free environments.  
10.5 Suits Seeking Reimbursement for Tobacco-Attributable Expenses 
In the fourth category of cases, a creative and novel approach to litigation against the 
tobacco companies emerged beginning in the 1990s.  To avoid the need to prove, as was 
required in individually-based suits, that the proximal, causal mechanism for illness was 
smoking, lawsuits emerged seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred attributable to 
smoking within a population.  These lawsuits were able to capitalize on both the additional 
scientific evidence that had emerged since the early, individual-based lawsuits, additional 
release of tobacco industry documents revealing their awareness and concealment of the 
dangers of smoking and more sophisticated epidemiologic methods that could much more 
accurately identify smoking-attributable morbidity, mortality, and expense in a population than in 
an individual.  That is, these suits sued not for punitive damages for harm caused by tobacco 
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products (and thus did not have to prove that the harm in an individual was caused by tobacco 
products) but rather sued for the statistically-determined expense of treating that harm within a 
given population.  
10.5.1 The States Attorneys’ General and the Master Settlement Agreement 
In 1994, the first of these cases was filed by the Attorney General for the State of 
Mississippi (Michael Moore) suing on behalf of the taxpayers of Mississippi seeking restitution 
for the costs to the state Medicaid fund for treating smoking-related illnesses (Moore v. 
American Tobacco, et al. Case No. 94-1429).  The states of Florida, Minnesota (with Minnesota 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield as co-plaintiff), and Texas followed, and eventually the Attorneys 
General for the remaining 46 states had filed similar suits.  Rather than defend lawsuits in all 50 
states, the tobacco companies sought to enter into an agreement with the Attorneys General 
and thus began a long, complex, and contentious negotiation process which is beyond the 
scope of the present analysis to describe in detail save three key milestones:  the 1997 
proposed agreement (sometimes referred to as the national settlement agreement, the global 
settlement agreement, or the 1997 national settlement proposal); the McCain Bill; and the 
Table 10-1. Summary of Key Components of the Master Settlement Agreement 
Topic Description
Type of Agreement • Contractual agreement between tobacco companies and States 
Advertising • Some limits, especially targeting youth 
• Bans: use of cartoons; advertising in public transit and some public venues (e.g., 
malls); media payments for tobacco promotion; non-tobacco merchandise with logo 
except at sponsored events; gifts in exchange for tobacco products 
• Limits but still permits: corporate sponsorship at sporting and cultural events; 
billboard advertising for sponsored events; advertising outside retail stores; restricts 
use of non-tobacco brand names for tobacco products 
Youth Access • Free samples in adult-only facilities 
• Requires packs of ≥20 sticks through 12/2001 
Corporate Culture • Companies must commit to reducing youth access and consumption 
• Companies cannot suppress health research 
• Dissolves existing tobacco industry trade associations and regulates the formation 
of new ones 
• Companies cannot lobby against certain types of legislation but can oppose 
increases in excise taxes and attempts to restrict environmental tobacco smoke 
Release of Industry Documents • Industry will release and create a website for specified documents (excluding 
documents where companies claim privilege or trade secret)  
• Expires June 2010 
Annual Payments • Up-front and annual payments of $204.5 billion through 2025, subject to inflation, 
volume of sales, and federal legislation adjustments 
• No restrictions on how states can spend money 
Anti-tobacco Research and Education • Creates national foundation to fund research and surveillance to reduce underage 
tobacco use and substance abuse 
• Required industry payments to the foundation of $250 million over 10 years 
• Required industry payment of $1.45 billion over 5 years to fund anti-tobacco 
education program 
• Payments subject to inflation and volume of sales adjustment 
Civil Liability • Agreement serves to settle all state and local medical-cost reimbursement lawsuits 
• Protects tobacco companies from all future state and local tobacco-related lawsuits 
• Permits dollar-per-dollar reduction in state’s reimbursements of tobacco company is 
found guilty in a local government lawsuit 
Source: (Redhead, 1999) 
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Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 (also known as the Multi-State Agreement or M.S.A.).   
The first settlement proposal was forwarded in 1997 and required legislation in order to 
be enacted.  In November 1997, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced the Universal 
Tobacco Settlement Act (the “McCain Bill) which incorporated terms of the 1997 settlement 
proposal but increased the sum of the annual payments, payments for research, and included 
stricter tobacco company reporting requirements.  After revision by the Commerce Committee, 
the McCain Bill was introduced to the Senate where it was eventually defeated in June 1998.  
Negotiations after the defeat of the McCain Bill resulted in a settlement agreement that did not 
require Congressional action.  The M.S.A., signed in November 1998, was a series of 
contractual agreements between the signatory tobacco companies and 46 individual states.  A 
summary of the main components of the M.S.A. are shown in Table 10-1.  There were important 
differences between the M.S.A. and the original 1997 proposed national settlement agreement 
and the McCain Bill.  Importantly, the M.S.A. was structured as a contractual agreement to be 
managed by the National Association of Attorneys General and not the legislative framework for 
comprehensive tobacco control policy as was provided in the McCain Bill.  Additional 
differences included: fewer restrictions on advertising (the McCain Bill, for example, also 
restricted print and internet advertising); fewer and weaker restrictions to prevent youth access 
to tobacco products (e.g., the M.S.A. did not include the restriction on vending machines and 
mail order sales that were part of the McCain Bill); no enforcement of minimum-age sales 
through retailer licensing (these provisions were included in the McCain Bill); no provisions or 
restrictions on how states could use settlement funds; and finally, no provision for the F.D.A. to 
regulate tobacco products, stipulations included in both the original 1997 proposed national 
settlement and the McCain Bill.  The four states that were not party to the M.S.A. – Minnesota, 
Texas, Florida, and Mississippi – negotiated separate, individual-state settlements with the 
tobacco companies that were similar in content and implementation date to the M.S.A..   
The most important difference between these separately negotiated state settlements 
and the M.S.A. was the Minnesota agreement, specifically the document warehouse created as 
part of the Minnesota settlement.  In particular, Minnesota requested and eventually obtained, 
after multiple appeals of trial orders, access to thousands of pages of supplementary pages of 
internal documents that the tobacco industry had been previously shielding under the auspices 
of attorney-client privilege. (Hurt, Ebbert, Muggli, Lockhart, & Robertson, 2009)  The Minnesota 
depository contains more than 60 million pages of documents and more than 20,000 other 
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materials.  Combined with the materials released as part of the M.S.A., these documents have 
transformed the legal landscape for tobacco companies.   
Within a similar timeframe as the states filed suits and the M.S.A. settlement, other 
groups filed similar reimbursements lawsuits.  Specifically, third-party payor insurance 
companies (e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris U.S.A Inc.), tribal health 
funds from a variety of Native American tribes (e.g., Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas v. 
American Tobacco Co.), and labor union health funds (e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 
Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc.) filed suits against tobacco companies to recover the costs 
expended to treat smokers.  In general, these lawsuits were either unsuccessful or dismissed on 
the grounds that third-party claims are too remote for the relief sought.   
10.5.2 Master Settlement-Emulating Suits 
Additionally related to the M.S.A., the Agreement has spawned a series of derivative 
lawsuits.  In the first type, lawsuits have been filed designed to capture part of the settlement 
funds for a particular group (e.g., Brown v. Philip Morris, et.al; Table Bluff Reservation (Wiyot 
Tribe) et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al.).  These suits have been unsuccessful and the National 
Association of Attorneys General has retained control of the administration of the M.S.A. funds.  
In the second type, a series of lawsuits have been filed, either by governments or tobacco 
companies contesting the terms or interpretation of the terms of the M.S.A.   
10.5.3 Master-Settlement Agreement Interpretation and Enforcement Suits 
There have also been a series of legal cases pursuant to the M.S.A. as a mechanism to 
either determine the limits or interpretation of or enforce the terms of the M.S.A.  In accordance 
with the M.S.A., the Attorneys General, collectively and within their own state, are responsible 
for enforcing the terms of the M.S.A.  Within in a year of the completion of the M.S.A., the 
National Association of Attorneys General established the Tobacco Enforcement Committee in 
order to coordinate M.S.A. enforcement activities within and between the M.S.A. states. 
(Eckhart, 2004)  Within the first four years of the M.S.A., this national-level committee has 
reported initiating more than twenty actions related to reported tobacco company M.S.A. 
violations including tobacco company activities related to misrepresenting the health effects of 
smoking, targeting youth in magazine advertising, providing samples and substantial advertising 
at N.A.S.C.A.R. and N.H.R.A. auto racing events, and providing free samples by mail. (Eckhart, 
2004)  Many issues brought to the attention of the Attorneys General have also reached 
litigation.  For example, the Office of the California Attorney General lists dozens of government-
initiated cases within the State of California and beyond, many of which reached adjudication in 
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the state’s Supreme Court on issues ranging from the use of cartoons, health claims, brand 
name sponsorship, distribution of free samples, action against retailers for selling tobacco to 
minors, and enforcement of M.S.A. settlement payments. (State of California Department of 
Justice, Attorney General's Office, 2010)  Tobacco companies have also filed suit against state 
governments based on the terms of the M.S.A.  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. American Legacy 
Foundation, the plaintiffs filed suit in Delaware claiming that the M.S.A.-created advocacy group 
violated the terms of the M.S.A. with their series of “edgy” anti-tobacco ads.  In July 2006, the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the ruing of a lower which stated that the ads had not violated 
the terms of the M.S.A. and the ads could proceed (Lorillard Tobacco Company v. American 
Legacy Foundation, No. 579, 2005).   
10.5.4 Summary 
The impact of these reimbursement-seeking suits on tobacco control policy is not 
straightforward.  As a contractual agreement, the M.S.A. did impose de facto policy but not 
through traditional legislative means (the contractual agreement was necessary due to a failure 
in traditional legislative mechanisms).  Components of the M.S.A. were clearly based upon 
evidence-based tobacco control policy instruments, but enforcement of the agreement is 
dependent upon the resolution of contractual law disputes between the settling parties.  Likely 
the components of the M.S.A. with the most enduring impact on tobacco control policy, though 
indirect, was the establishment, building on the achievement in the Minnesota trial, of the 
tobacco industry document library and the creation of the American Legacy Foundation, a 
national tobacco control advocacy organization which, with the Campaign for Tobacco Free 
Kids, are two of the most nationally prominent and active anti-tobacco interest groups.  One of 
the most controversial legacies of the M.S.A. has been the settlement payments and how states 
have an have not used these funds, with most states not allocating recommended proportions of 
their Settlement funds to tobacco control activities. 
10.6 Suits Disputing Scope of Action  
 In the final category of legal activities to be described in the current analysis, are suits 
brought by either governments (federal or state) or the tobacco industry itself claiming violation 
of existing statutes or procedural rules, case law, or the constitution and so seeking to limit the 
scope of action of the other.  For suits of this kind brought by tobacco companies, four are 
seminal:  
• A libel suit brought against a broadcasting company based on the contents of a 
documentary on the tobacco industry;  
 [Appendix 1: 215] 
 
• The action brought against the government’s planned regulation of tobacco by 
the F.D.A.;  
• Action brought against the government and the E.P.A. regarding the E.P.A.’s risk 
assessment report on environmental tobacco smoke;  
• Various actions brought against the government(s) claiming advertising 
restriction violation of First Amendment rights;  
• Action already filed by tobacco companies and non-tobacco companies seeking 
to limit the actions of the F.D.A. under the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control of 2009.   
For suits of this kind brought by the government against tobacco companies, two are seminal:  
• Suits claiming faulty use of the term “light” cigarettes; f 
• The Department of Justice’s civil claim seeking relief under the federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (R.I.C.O.).  These cases are described 
below. 
10.6.1 Suits Brought by Tobacco Companies 
10.6.1.1 Suit Against A.B.C.’s “Day One” Documentary  
In February 1994, A.B.C. in its T.V. news-magazine documentary program “Day One” 
aired a feature titled “Smoke Screen”, which focused on tobacco industry practices as related to 
the nicotine content of cigarettes.  Specifically, the program investigated the industry practice of 
using re-constituted tobacco to make cigarettes, a process wherein parts from tobacco plants 
are homogenized using water and the ingredients removed during this process, nicotine among 
them, are later sprayed back onto the homogenate using a liquid syrup or extract.  The 
implication in part, from the perspective of industry regulation, was whether this practice 
constituted intentional manipulation of a drug (nicotine) content of a product which could then be 
interpreted as being within the jurisdiction of the F.D.A.  Whether the A.B.C. program used faulty 
investigative techniques or whether they reported incorrect facts or facts incorrectly has been 
the subject of debate, but the controversy over the approximately 20-minute story seems to 
have revolved around sensationalized promotion of the program, the creative editing of clips of 
“Deep Cough” (a former R.J. Reynolds employee that, in disguise, detailed on-camera these 
industry practices but did not agree that they industry was “boosting” nicotine content merely 
keeping it consistent; A.B.C. included the former clips in the aired version of the program but not 
the latter), and the use of the word “spiking” to describe the industry’s practices. (Shepard, 
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1995)  Philip Morris, Inc. filed a $10 billion libel and defamation suit against A.B.C., the “Day 
One” reporter (Walter Bogdanich) and the “Day One” producer (John Martin) in March 1994.. 
(Variety Wire Serivces, 1994)  A.B.C. agreed to a pre-trial settlement the terms of which 
included, among other things, a financial settlement (estimated to be $15 million in legal fees) 
and that A.B.C. issue an apology, which it did, and while the apology was narrowly construed 
and technical, the typical approach to reporting the episode in the media was along the lines of 
‘A.B.C. admits wrongdoing and apologizes to Philip Morris’. (Editorial, New York Daily News, 
1995), (Shepard, 1995)  The consequences of this episode, either short-term or long-term, are 
likely mixed.  In the short-term, Philip Morris capitalized on the publicity and the aftermath, 
particularly the financial settlement, allegedly intimidated at least one other broadcaster from 
airing an industry exposé-type documentary. (Shepard, 1995), (Kaplan & Isikoff, 1995), (Kurtz, 
1995)  The long-term effects of this episode have been conjectured to be more detrimental to 
the tobacco industry.  The documentary itself won the 1994 George Polk award for network 
television reporting and the award committee, in a post-apology review of the award, upheld its 
decision based on the substantial truth and importance of the documentary’s contents. 
(Shepard, 1995)  Further, others have cited the prominence of both the original documentary 
and the aftermath as being critical from an agenda-setting perspective and it is difficult to 
overlook that within a year of the settlement (two years from the airing of the documentary), 
President Clinton and David Kessler had announced their intention for the F.D.A. to regulate 
cigarettes (discussed further below). (Shepard, 1995), (Editorial, New York Daily News, 1995)   
10.6.1.2 Suit Against F.D.A.’s Assertion Over Regulation of Tobacco 
The tobacco companies have also used the legal system to prevent, delay, discredit, or 
deter government activity intended to expand tobacco control policy activities, regulations, or 
bureaucratic jurisdiction thereof.  In February 1994, the same month as the airing of A.B.C.’s 
“Smoke Screen”, then-President Clinton and then-F.D.A. Commissioner Dr. David Kessler 
announced that the government, through the F.D.A., was considering the regulation of tobacco 
products with the rationale that nicotine was a drug already tightly regulated by the F.D.A. when 
occurring in products such as trans-dermal patches and gum and, thus, cigarettes were merely 
drug-delivery devices. (Kessler, et al., 1996)  The F.D.A. then undertook an extensive study and 
review of existing evidence on the physiologic effects of nicotine, among other things, and in 
August 1995 issued a report for public comment on the findings of their review. (Department of 
Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, 1995)  The F.D.A. issued their 
Final Rule in August 1996, with the first provisions taking effect in February 1997. (U.S. Food 
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and Drug Administration, 1996), (Anonymous, 1996)  The logical argument (and subsequent 
legal arguments) for F.D.A. regulation of cigarettes was developed around several premises: a) 
the physiologic and psychoactive properties of nicotine, including its addictive properties, met 
existing, internal F.D.A. standards for the definition of a drug; b) cigarettes and other tobacco 
products were intended by the industry to be simply the mechanisms for delivery of that drug; c) 
that smoking caused substantial public harm; and d) the best strategy to reducing this public 
harm was to break the cycle of tobacco use by designing policies that focused on the reduction 
of use initiation in children and adolescents. (Kessler, et al., 1996)  The Final Rule forwarded a 
series of policies designed to restrict access of tobacco products from those <18 years of age, 
including requiring photo identification to purchase tobacco (for those <26 years of age), 
substantial restrictions on vending machines, promotional materials, and advertising. (Kessler, 
et al., 1996)   
The 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule has had a profound impact on the trajectory of tobacco 
control policy in the United States that remains detectable still.  Between the 1995 interim report 
and the August 1996 announcement of the Final Rule, the F.D.A. published a series of carefully 
constructed peer-reviewed articles, augmented by the final report from the Advisory Committee 
on Tobacco Policy and Public Health, which served to outline the scientific basis for the 
components of the Final Rule. (Kessler, et al., 1997), (Kessler, Nicotine addiction in young 
people, 1995), (Kessler, Wilkenfeld, & Thompson, The Food and Drug Administration's Rule on 
tobacco: blending science and the law, 1997), (Kessler, et al., 1996), (Koop & Kessler, 1997)  
Of particular import has been the framing of smoking and nicotine addiction as a “pediatric 
disease”.  The F.D.A. used as the scientific and logical justification for this focus, as outlined in 
the peer-reviewed articles accompanying the Final Rule, the evidence of susceptibility and 
special need for protection in this population based on epidemiologic evidence for tobacco use 
experimentation and development of addiction in this age group, and because of its target for 
such initiation through the advertising and promotional practices of the tobacco industry itself.  
The F.D.A. also rationalized that, given the level of addiction existing within the population, an 
outright ban would not be reasonable and create too much hardship on those already addicted, 
thus policy should aim to reduce and eliminate future addiction.  It is also reasonable to 
presume that the F.D.A. was not unaware of the political and practical barriers to imposing a 
complete ban on all tobacco products, the more favorable social construction of children as 
needing – and deserving – protection (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) and thus the greater 
likelihood for the acceptance of policies based in “soft paternalism” (discussed previously) to 
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protect this population, nor is it possible to overlook the not unlikely coincidence that Dr. Kessler 
is, by training, a pediatrician.   
For support of the other critical premises for F.D.A.’s assertion of its jurisdiction over the 
regulation of tobacco, namely the addictive nature of nicotine and the intentional manipulation of 
these addictive properties by the tobacco companies, the series of peer-reviewed articles (and 
the text of the Final Rule itself) carefully detailed the scientific evidence for the addictive 
properties of nicotine, and that tobacco companies were manipulating the nicotine content of 
both cigarettes and other tobacco products fully aware of the role of cigarettes as the vehicle to 
deliver a tightly controlled dose of nicotine, an addictive drug.  In making the case for the latter, 
the tobacco companies’ knowledge and intention with regard to using cigarettes to deliver a 
dose of nicotine, the F.D.A.’s burden was greatly lessened by a series of events that happened 
in a very similar timeframe as the F.D.A.’s activities.  In 1994, Rep. Henry Waxman, (D-CA) as 
the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, conducted a series of 
hearings on the health effects of smoking.  In early April 1994, the Presidents/CEOs for seven 
American tobacco companies infamously testified under oath to this committee that smoking 
was neither addictive nor did it cause disease.  Less than two weeks after this testimony, two 
former Philip Morris scientists (Drs. Victor DeNoble and Paul C. Mele) testified to this same 
committee that Philip Morris suppressed, through threat of legal action, the publication of their 
work on the addictive properties of nicotine.  Further, these scientists testified that some of their 
additional research projects for the company included the development or identification of a 
substitute for nicotine that had the same psychoactive but not cardio-active properties.  
Additionally, in a separate incident in May 1994, a mailing received by a tobacco researcher (Dr. 
Stanton A. Glantz) with the return service address of “Mr. Butts” contained several thousand 
pages of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company internal documents. (Cummings & Pollay, 
2002)  While the identity of “Mr. Butts”, the original source of the documents, was the subject of 
litigation surrounding the unauthorized copying of the documents (Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. Williams, Maddox v. Williams), the damaging effect of the documents to the tobacco 
industry could not be undone (among other things, the documents revealed that, as early as 
1963, tobacco companies were aware of the harmful health effects of cigarettes).  The 
researcher and his team subsequently published summary findings of these documents first in 
the scientific literature and then in book-form. (Glantz, Barnes, Bero, Hanauer, & Slade, 1995), 
(Barnes, Hanauer, Slade, Bero, & Glantz, 1995), (Bero, Barnes, Hanauer, Slade, & Glantz, 
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1995), (Hanauer, Slade, Barnes, Bero, & Glantz, 1995), (Slade, Bero, Hanauer, Barnes, & 
Glantz, 1995), (Glantz, Slade, Bero, Hanauer, & Barnes, 1996)   
While the testimony from the former Philip Morris scientists and evidence from released 
internal tobacco industry documents substantially supported the F.D.A.’s quest to demonstrate 
both industry knowledge and intent in the dosage manipulation and delivery of nicotine, and the 
targeting of children and adolescents, the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule would ultimately fail.  The 
tobacco companies objected to both the regulations and the expansion of the F.D.A.’s 
jurisdiction and filed suit against the F.D.A. on the basis that Congress had not authorized the 
F.D.A. to regulate tobacco products (F.D.A. et al. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.).  The 
F.D.A.’s authority to regulate tobacco was upheld by the District Court but overturned by the 
Circuit Court.  On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, in a famous 5-4 decision in 2000, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court’s ruling that Congress had not so authorized or 
intended the F.D.A.’s jurisdiction over tobacco under the existing Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
citing as support internal F.D.A. stating that it did not have authority to regulate tobacco, that 
Congress had developed a regulatory scheme for tobacco outside the F.D.A., and that despite 
repeated opportunities to do so, Congress had not explicitly authorized the F.D.A. to regulate 
tobacco.  It was almost 10 years after this Supreme Court decision that Congress legislated this 
jurisdiction to the F.D.A. under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 
2009. (Curfman, Morrissey, & Drazen, 2009)   
10.6.1.3 Suit Against E.P.A. for Report on Environmental Tobacco Smoke Risk Assessment  
The tobacco industry’s legal action against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(E.P.A.) is another occurrence wherein the court system was employed as a strategy to prevent, 
delay, discredit, or deter government activity in tobacco control activities.  In the late 1970s and 
into the 1980s, increasing scientific evidence emerged implicating exposure to secondhand 
smoke as part of the causal mechanism for multiple morbidities and mortalities.  These scientific 
studies culminated in the reports from both the National Academy of Sciences and the Surgeon 
General’s Office that reviewed and synthesized the existing evidence linking exposure to 
secondhand smoke to disease and mortality in nonsmokers. (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 1986), (National Research Council, National 
Academy of Sciences, 1986)  In particular, the Surgeon General’s report had as a primary 
conclusion that involuntary smoking causes disease, including lung cancer, in nonsmokers.  
Under the authority of the 1986 “Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act” in which 
Congress directed the E.P.A. to develop a comprehensive indoor air quality research and 
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information dissemination program, in 1988 the E.P.A. began studying the implications for 
indoor air quality of environmental, or secondhand, smoke. (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2009)  An environmental tobacco smoke risk assessment report was drafted in June 1990 which 
then, per internal E.P.A. regulations, was required to be reviewed by the E.P.A. Science 
Advisory Board, an internal independent board that reported directly to the E.P.A. Administrator 
(then William Reilly) comprised of nine standing members and nine members selected from 
consultants and scientists based on content-expertise appointed on a report-specific basis. 
(Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004)  The tobacco industry employed both political strategies to delay 
or prevent the release of the report, dubbed “sand in the gears” (Muggli, Hurt, & Repace, 2004) 
as well as scientific strategies, dubbed “keep the controversy alive”, which included sponsoring 
scientific studies with “neutral” results and sponsoring scientists to attend national and 
international meetings and conduct symposia highlighting “neutral” or “confounding” study 
results. (Muggli, Forster, Hurt, & Repace, 2001)  However, for a variety of reasons and 
circumstances, these efforts were largely unsuccessful.  The E.P.A., after review by the 
Scientific Advisory Board, released a draft report for public comment in May 1992 and the final 
report in December 1992 (“signed” in January 1993, thus the sometimes conflicting dates for the 
report).  The final report, a total of 530 pages, concluded that environmental tobacco smoke is a 
known human carcinogen in adults, responsible for an estimated 3,000 adult deaths annually, 
and increases the risk for lower respiratory tract and ear infections, among others, and asthma 
in children. (Anonymous, 1993), (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1992)  In June 1993, 
the major tobacco companies filed suit against the E.P.A. in Federal District Court in 
Greensboro, NC seeking injunctive relief and that the court declare the E.P.A.’s risk assessment 
report “wrong as a matter of law and science”. (Janofsky, 1993), (Kenworthy & Brown, 1993)  
The industry’s complaint against the E.P.A. alleged that the E.P.A. had violated the Radon Act 
by not properly constituting its Scientific Advisory Board, had not complied with its own risk 
assessment guidelines, and that the classification of secondhand smoke was “capricious” based 
on the decision to use a 90% confidence interval as the standard for establishing association 
between exposure and disease rather than the more customary 95% confidence interval (Flue-
Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et al. v. the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency No. 98-2407).  In July 1998, District Judge William Osteen Jr. cited multiple 
procedural and scientific mistakes, including that the E.P.A. was “committed to a conclusion 
before the research had begun”, and vacated most of the conclusions in the E.P.A.’s report, 
which created concern for both municipalities citing the report as support for pending anti-
smoking bylaws as well as for pending environmental tobacco smoke lawsuits. (Meier, 1998), 
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(Koch, 1998)  The E.P.A. appealed the decision and it was later reported that Judge Osteen had 
previous experience as a tobacco industry lobbyist (Associated Press, 1995), though this had 
little impact on the legal proceedings.  In June 1999 the appeal was argued before the U.S. 4th 
Circuit Court of Appeals and, in December 2002, the court ruled unanimously to overturn Judge 
Osteen’s ruling.  In their decision, the Circuit Court cited that the E.P.A.’s report carried no legal 
or regulatory authority and that the report was not a reviewable agency action; the Circuit Court 
did not rule on the other elements of either the initial complaint or Judge Osteen’s ruling (Flue-
Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation et al. v. the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency No. 98-2407).  The tobacco industry did not appeal the Circuit Court’s ruling.  
While pioneering in 1992/1993, by 2002 there had been substantial additional scientific studies 
conducted adding to the body of evidence causally linking exposure to tobacco smoke to a 
multitude of diseases and mortality.  Thus, a single E.P.A. report was no longer material; the 
tobacco industry had to concede this battle.   
10.6.1.4 Suits Claiming Infringement of First Amendment Rights 
Unlike the tobacco industry’s legal actions against the F.D.A. and E.P.A., which 
appealed to technical and procedural standards to challenge agency authority to act or regulate, 
tobacco industry suits fighting advertising bans have been based on appeals of direct violation 
of existing case law and / or violation of Constitutional protections, specifically First Amendment 
rights to free speech.  Federal regulation of tobacco advertising started in 1965, the year after 
the seminal Surgeon General’s report asserting a causal association between tobacco use and 
morbidity and mortality, with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (P.L. 
89-92) which required a warning label on cigarette packages but not on advertising.  The Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 strengthened the language of the package warning label 
and banned tobacco advertising on radio and television.  The package warning label was 
changed to a set of four rotating labels and the requirement was extended to print advertising in 
the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984.  These early statutes received no legal 
challenges because it was not until 1975 that the Court ruled, in a non-tobacco case, that First 
Amendment protections extended to commercial speech. (Gostin, 2002)  In the 1980 ruling in 
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, also a non-tobacco case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court created a 4-part standard by which to assess constitutional constraint of First Amendment 
commercial free speech and which remains the precedent case law standard. (Bayer, Gostin, 
Jarvin, & Brandt, 2002)  Known as the Central Hudson test, the four components are: a) only 
advertising for lawful products or activities that are truthful and not deceptive or misleading are 
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extended protection; b) the government’s interest in curtailing the commercial speech must be 
substantial; c) the regulation (curtailment of commercial free speech) must materially and 
directly advance the public’s interest; and d) the restriction is only as extensive as necessary to 
advance the public’s interest.  The 1996 Final Rule from the F.D.A. included substantial 
regulations limiting tobacco product promotion and advertising including: prohibition on billboard 
advertisement within 1,000 feet of an elementary or secondary or a playgroups; requirement 
that all advertising be limited to black text on a white background (the so-called “tombstone” 
format); prohibition of the sales and / or distribution of non-tobacco items with tobacco product 
branding of any form; and prohibition of tobacco company sponsorship of sporting and cultural 
events, race cars or other teams or entries into sporting or other events, or any other event 
wherein the brand name of a tobacco company or product would appear. (Anonymous, 1996) 
While the F.D.A. anticipated First Amendment challenges (unfair restriction of commercial 
speech) for these advertising and promotion regulations and included justification and support 
addressing the four Central-Hudson tenets in the Final Rule (Anonymous, 1996), the Court 
never actually reviewed these regulations as the Final Rule was challenged on, and the Court 
ruled on, the jurisdiction of the F.D.A. to regulate tobacco (FDA et al. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.).  In 2000 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled to overturn the 1996 F.D.A. Final 
Rule judging that Congress never intended the F.D.A. to have jurisdiction over tobacco, the 
advertising regulations within the Final Rule became immaterial.  The Master Settlement 
Agreement of 1998, a substantially less-restrictive version of the failed original 1997 national 
settlement agreement and the McCain Bill, did contain some advertising restrictions including 
(from Table 10-1 above): limits in advertising to youth; prohibition of the use of cartoons, 
advertising in certain public areas (malls, public transit), and payments to media for product 
promotion; and limits but not prohibition of sponsorship (and advertising at) sporting and cultural 
events.  However, because the M.S.A. was a contractual agreement between the settling 
parties and not a legislated restriction, these advertising and promotion restrictions were also 
not subject to First Amendment challenges though, as discussed above, there has been 
litigation to determine the interpretation of these M.S.A. advertising restrictions.   
 Massachusetts was signatory to the 1998 M.S.A.  However, in January 1999 then-state 
Attorney General Scott Harshbarger forwarded a series of additional regulations, as part of the 
consumer protection statute Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A §2, with the intent to 
eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in the marketing and distribution of cigarettes so as to 
prevent the recruitment of new customers from among the minors in the state.  These 
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regulations were broader and more restrictive than the regulations agreed upon in the M.S.A., 
and were instead more similar to those included in the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule.  Before the 
regulations took effect, four tobacco companies sued the Attorney General on multiple grounds 
including that the regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965 and that the regulations violated their First Amendment protections of commercial 
free speech (Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No. 
00-0596).  After mixed rulings in federal Circuit and Appellate Courts, the case was appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  In a complex and split ruling in June 2001, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the state’s regulations were preempted by the Federal statute and, in applying the Central-
Hudson four part test, that the regulations, particularly those banning advertising within 1,000 
feet of schools and in-store displays below the height of 5 feet, met three but failed the fourth 
standard (the restrictions were more extensive than necessary) (Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al. v. 
Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al, No. 00-0596).  So, while the Court 
acknowledged the legitimacy of the state’s interest in preventing smoking initiation by minors, 
the ruling was widely regarded as a victory for the tobacco industry and placed doubt on the 
future of similar local statutes in effect in New York, Chicago, and Baltimore. (Greenhouse, 
2001), (Kane, 2001)   
10.6.1.5 Suit Seeking to Limit the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009  
As discussed previously, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 
2009 that legislated the regulation of tobacco to the jurisdiction the F.D.A. included multiple 
provisions for package labeling and also required that the F.D.A. reissue the 1996 Final Rule 
that was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
(Gostin L. O., 2009), (U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
2009), (Redhead & Burrows, FDA Tobacco Regulation: The Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 2009)  Issued in March 2010 and to take effect on June 22, 2010 
(one year after the bill was signed by President Obama), the reinstated advertising regulations 
include: a ban on sporting and all cultural event sponsorship; a ban of free samples or non-
tobacco product giveaways or promotions linked to the purchase of a tobacco product; a ban on 
small-sized packs (usually <20 sticks); a ban on music and sound effects in audio advertising; a 
ban on color and graphics in video ads, which become restricted to static black text on a white 
background; and the “tombstone provision”, which requires package labels and advertising be 
limited to black text on a white background. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010)  
Additionally, the 2009 Act provided that package and warning labels become one of nine 
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rotating text warnings to appear on the upper 50% of the top front and rear panels of packages 
and occupy 20% of the total area of an advertisement (Public Law 111-31-June 22, 2009 Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §201), with the provision that the F.D.A. has the 
authority to adjust the nature and content of the warnings to, for example, graphic color 
warnings (Public Law 111-31-June 22, 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act §202).  Given recent case law development, the F.D.A. has deferred implementation of the 
regulations on outdoor advertising, instead initiating a period of further review, including formal 
public comment, before issuing a Final Rule on this provision. (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2010)   
In light of previous legal challenges and Court rulings, both Congress and the F.D.A. 
expected legal challenges to any new regulations and the text of the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 and the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule were drafted to reflect this.  
Both included extensive sections detailing the scientific evidence, particularly that which has 
emerged since the 1996 Final Rule, that materially supports the articles and regulations.  As 
anticipated, multiple tobacco companies filed suit in District Court in Kentucky in 2009.  The 
Plaintiffs in this still-ongoing case include a series of tobacco companies and retailers, though 
not Philip Morris or its parent company Altria.  As discussed previously, Philip Morris has 
declared its support for the 2009 Act and F.D.A. regulation of cigarettes.  Thus while it has been 
reported that the company feels the regulations are a violation of First Amendment protected 
commercial free speech, Philip Morris did not enlist as a plaintiff in this lawsuit. (Wilson, 
Tobacco regulation is expected to face free-speech challenge, 2009)  The suit challenged 
almost all aspects of the 2009 Act (the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule had not yet been issued at the 
time the suit was filed), including the component of the 1996 F.D.A. Final Rule banning outdoor 
advertising and billboards, as violating their First Amendment rights of commercial free speech 
and their Fifth Amendment rights of due process (Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et al. v. FDA et 
al. No. 1:09-CV-117-M).  In his January 5, 2010 opinion, Judge J.H. McKinley, Jr. refused to rule 
on the ban on outdoor and billboard advertising declaring it “unripe” in light of the fact that this 
component was not included in the 2010 F.D.A. Final Rule and the F.D.A.’s active “Request for 
Comment” on this stipulation of the 2009 Act. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010)  
Further, the court overturned all aspects of the challenge except the black-and-white-text only 
(“tombstone”) package label requirement and a provision disallowing tobacco companies 
claiming “safer” products in light of F.D.A. regulation; all other aspects of the 2009 Act, including 
the graphic warning label provisions, sponsorship bans, bans on promotional materials, and the 
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removal of advertising preemption, were upheld by the Court. (Commonwealth Brands, Inc., et 
al. v. FDA et al. No. 1:09-CV-117-M), (Wilson, 2010), (Blackwell, 2010)  The Court did grant 
injunctive relief to the tobacco companies as regards the “tombstone” labeling requirements, 
meaning that the F.D.A. cannot implement these provisions.  The F.D.A. filed an appeal on 
March 8, 2010, and the tobacco companies have also filed an appeal of the decision.  As this 
litigation is not yet complete, the final impact on tobacco control policy is not yet known.   
The F.D.A., including the 2009 Act, is also currently being challenged by companies 
outside the traditional tobacco industry: Smoking Everywhere, Inc. and NJOY, makers of 
electronic cigarettes.  In September and October 2008, the F.D.A. first held then detained two 
shipments of electronic cigarettes being imported by Smoking Everywhere, Inc.  Between fall 
2008 and spring 2009, the F.D.A. undertook a series of regulatory procedures and actions to list 
electronic cigarettes from a series of manufacturers, mostly based in China, as unapproved or 
misbranded drugs and so subject to immediate seizure.  As series of shipments of NJOY 
products were seized in April 2009.  In April 2009, Smoking Everywhere, Inc. (NJOY 
subsequently joined as a plaintiff) filed suit and a request for injunctive relief in the U.S. District 
Court in the District of Columbia. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v. 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. Civil Case No. 09-771 (RJL))  At the onset of the suit, 
the 2009 Act had not yet been implemented, though the FDA did file a supplemental brief on 
July 10, 2009. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2009)  On January 14, 2010, District Judge 
Richard J. Leon granted the Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, meaning that the F.D.A. must 
allow these companies to import and sell their products. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and 
Sottera, Inc., d/b/a NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. Civil Case No. 09-771 
(RJL))  However, the F.D.A. filed an appeal of this ruling and a request for an immediate stay of 
the order for injunctive relief in February 2010, which was granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in March 2010. (Smoking Everywhere, Inc., and Sottera, Inc., d/b/a 
NJOY v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. No. 10-5032, 1:09-cv-00771-RJL)  Thus, the 
current status of this case is that the F.D.A. may, at least temporarily, block the importation and 
sale of the electronic cigarettes.  As this case proceeds, it is unclear whether the F.D.A. will 
ultimately seek to regulate electronic cigarettes as “reduced harm” tobacco products under the 
scope and authority of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control of 2009 or as a 
drug / drug delivery device under the scope and authority of the broader Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act as other nicotine-replacement products currently are regulated (News Staff, 
American Academy of Family Practitioners, 2010), or how the current product testing and 
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analysis activities in which the F.D.A. is currently engaged will affect the final outcome of this 
case. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2009)  
10.6.2 Suits Brought by the Government Against Tobacco Companies 
10.6.2.1 Suits Challenging “Light” Cigarette Claims  
In contrast to cases where industry is seeking to limit the scope of government action 
through the courts, there are also cases in which individuals or governments are seeking to limit 
the scope of industry action through the courts.  In a set of legal cases that involve package and 
advertising claims, are cases brought against tobacco companies based on the use of the terms 
“light” and “low tar” in the marketing and packaging of cigarettes.  At issue has been “light”, “low 
tar”, and “ultralight” cigarettes, available since the late 1960s, that yield lower tar (7-14 mg and 
<7 mg, respectively, compared to 22 mg of tar per stick) per Federal Trade Commission 
mechanical smoking machine tests (under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965, the Federal Trade Commission is the federal agency responsible for package labeling 
standards) and which tobacco companies have implicitly marketed as being safer and assisting 
in cessation. (Rigotti & Tindle, 2004)  However, substantial scientific evidence has emerged 
identifying that the lower tar yield in “light” cigarettes is a function of the physical characteristics 
of these cigarettes (esp. position of microholes in the filter paper) that affect test results from 
mechanical smoking machine tests but are far less relevant in human use because smoker 
compensation (the statistically significant tendency of smokers of “light” cigarettes to inhale 
more deeply, puff more frequently, and smoke more often) results in the tendency of smokers of 
“light” cigarettes to have exposure to a higher – not lower – dose of tobacco-related carcinogens 
(Rigotti & Tindle, 2004), (National Cancer Institute, 2004) despite the widespread belief by 
smokers of these products were reducing their risk.  (Wilson, Weerasakera, Peace, Edwards, 
Thomson, & Delvin, 2009), (Borland, et al., 2004), (Cummings, Hyland, Bansal, & Giovino, 
2004)  Further, testimony during a recent Senate committee hearing highlighted an internal 
tobacco company memo from 1975 that discussed the inaccurate tar estimates from smoking 
machine tests and the understanding that smokers of “light” cigarettes were receiving the same 
if not higher dose of tar and nicotine. (Niemantsverdriet, 2007)  Individual and class suits 
brought against tobacco companies for medical harm done based on the health claims of “light” 
cigarettes have typically been unsuccessful as tobacco companies have defended themselves 
against liability based primarily on the presence of package warning labels.  However, a class 
suit filed in federal district court in Maine, Altria Group, In., et al. v. Good et al., sought economic 
damages (refund for products purchased plus putative damages and attorneys’ fees) based on 
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fraudulent advertising claims, not medical damages, under a state Unfair Trade Practices law.  
The tobacco companies sought to have the case dismissed, claiming that the state law was pre-
empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and, as the companies 
had complied with relevant federal regulations, were thus protected from any claims based on 
state law.  In December 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that the state 
Unfair Trade Practices law was not expressly preempted by the federal law and remanded the 
case to lower court for trial.  The full impact of this case on tobacco control policy remains 
unclear as Altria v. Good is not yet complete.  However, the Supreme Court ruling is expected to 
result in multiple, subsequent suits seeking restitution for the economic – not health – damages 
of the fraudulent packaging claims of “light” cigarettes. 
10.6.2.2 Suit Brought by the Department of Justice  
The final case to be discussed is the very complex Department of Justice suit against 
the tobacco industry, United States of America v. Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., et al., is the largest 
civil action in U.S. history.  Originally filed in 1999 and supported by then-President Clinton, the 
suit lasted ten years including nine months of direct trial, hundreds of motions, multiple related 
rulings, thousands of orders, dozens of appeals, testimony from hundreds of expert witnesses, 
and countless millions of pages of filings, discovery documents, and supporting evidence.  With 
such length and complexity, the details and case proscribe succinct summary.  However, there 
were five critical aspects and rulings in the case (summarized from: United States of America v. 
Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., et al., and (Fiore, Keller, & Baker, 2005), (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Civil Division, 2007), (Public Health Law Center, 2010)).  First, the main case was heard by a 
single Federal Judge, Judge Gladys Kessler.  Second, the original suit was filed to seek 
restitution for tobacco-related Medicare expenses but, in an early ruling, the medical-expenses 
restitution component was disallowed though the Department of Justice was allowed to proceed 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.  Third, the Department 
of Justice proceeded with the case constructed around the “seven pillars of fraud” enumerated 
as: a) Denying adverse health effects of cigarettes and exposure to environmental tobacco 
smoke; b) Perpetrating the deception that tobacco-industry sponsored research was 
independent; c) Denying that nicotine is addictive; d) Intentionally manipulating cigarette 
contents in order to maximize the delivery of a nicotine dose in order to create and sustain 
addiction; e) Intentionally marketing “light” cigarettes with knowing deception; f) Intentionally 
marketing to young people despite assertions and agreements to the contrary; and g) 
Intentionally refusing to acknowledge or release knowledge about the health hazards of 
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smoking.  Fourth, in 2006 in an almost-1700 page opinion, Judge Kessler ruled that the 
Government had made its case, namely that the tobacco companies were guilty of knowingly 
perpetuating a 50-year fraud including the frauds outlined in the government’s “seven pillars”.  
Judge Kessler’s ruling was unanimously upheld in May 2009 by a three-judge appeal panel.  
Fifth, despite a finding of guilt, Judge Kessler did not award any monetary damages to the 
government in light of an intermediary ruling that the R.I.C.O. statute only permits forward-
looking (to prevent and restrain future violations of the Act) and not backward-looking (putative 
damages or forfeit of ill-gotten gains) remedies.  Thus, the only sanction imposed by Judge 
Kessler was the prohibition of any further use of deceptive marketing practices, including the 
use of the term “light”, “low-tar”, and to issue a series of public statements acknowledging their 
fraud and the health hazards of smoking.  Finally, while both sides appealed both the verdict 
(tobacco companies) and penalties (government) to the U.S. Supreme Court, in June 2010 the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case functionally signifying the end of the case. 
(Wilson D. , Supreme Court Rejects Appeals of Tobacco Ruling, 2010) 
The case has not been without controversy, including accusations and suppositions that 
the Department of Justice’s strategies and vigor were, at times, influenced by unclear political 
pressures. (Fiore, Keller, & Baker, 2005)  And, in the end, it is entirely unclear the effects that 
the ruling will have on either tobacco companies or tobacco control policy.  Other than a tersely 
worded opinion, a Court record-of-facts, and the ruling that the First Amendment does not 
protect fraudulent claims, the inability of the Court to impose sanction other than something 
tantamount to a public apology has left some to question if the government’s victory might be 
limited to a moral one. (Opinion, New York Times, 2006)   
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STEPHANIE J FRISBEE, MSc, MA, PhD (Cand.) 
 
ADDRESS West Virginia University School of Medicine 
 Robert C. Byrd Health Sciences Center 
 1 Medical Center Drive ? PO Box 9105 
 Morgantown, WV     26506-9105 
 Phone: 304-293-6552 ? FAX: 304-293-5513 ? E-Mail: sfrisbee@hsc.wvu.edu 
 
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL POSITION 
Primary Appointment 
2010 – Present Research Instructor 
Department of Community Medicine, West Virginia University School of Medicine 
Adjunct Appointment 
2007 – Present Clinical Assistant Professor 
Department of Dental Practice & Rural Health, West Virginia University School of 
Dentistry 
Additional Affiliation 
2004 – Present  Center for Cardiovascular and Respiratory Sciences 
 
Additional Duties 
2010 – Present Assistant Copy Editor 
 Microcirculation (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 
 
PREVIOUS PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS 
2006 – 2010 Research Instructor 
Department of Community Medicine, West Virginia University School of Medicine 
Morgantown, WV 
  
2004 – 2006 Research Instructor 
Department of Pediatrics, West Virginia University School of Medicine 
Morgantown, WV 
  
2002 – 2004 Outcomes Manager 
Outcomes Department, Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin & 
National Outcomes Center, Inc., Children's Hospital and Health System 
Milwaukee, WI 
  
2000 – 2002 Outcomes Coordinator 
Quality and Outcomes Management, Children's Hospital of Wisconsin 
Milwaukee, WI 
  
1999 – 2000 Outcomes Research Analyst 
Center for Outcomes Research and Quality Management, Children's Hospital of 
Wisconsin 
Milwaukee, WI 
  
1997 – 1999 Research & Administrative Assistant 
Department of Pediatrics (Emergency Medicine), Medical College of Wisconsin 
Milwaukee, WI 
 
1997   Program Manager 
Department of Bioengineering, University of Washington 
Seattle, WA 
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EDUCATION 
2006 – Present  Doctorate in Philosophy, Public Policy Analysis  
Policy Field of Emphasis: Health Policy 
Dissertation Title: “Comprehensive Tobacco Control Policy Regimes and 
Population Health: Assessing Causal Loops” 
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 
 (Candidate 2009; Anticipated Graduation 2010) 
 
2009   Master of Arts, American Public Policy & Politics 
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 
 
1996   Master of Science, Consumer Policy & Affairs 
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario 
Thesis Title: “An Economic Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Demand for 
Skiing by Two Adult Canadian Households” 
 
1994 Bachelor of Science, Honors Biomedical Sciences 
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario 
 
CONTINUING EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
2007 American Heart Association 
33rd 10-Day Seminar on the Epidemiology and Prevention of Cardiovascular 
Disease 
July 29 – August 10, 2007 
Tahoe City, CA 
  
2004 MRA Management Association, Waukesha, WI 
• Principles of Management Certificate Series (Managing Relationships and 
Building Trust; Delegation and Motivation Techniques; Effective 
Communication and Performance Management; Dealing with Difficult People 
and Discipline; Problem Solving Skills, Training and Coaching) 
• Effective Hiring and Interviewing Techniques 
• Facilitation Skills 
• Project Management: The Human and Technical View 
• Emotional Leadership: The Overlooked Element 
 
2003 MRA Management Association, Waukesha, WI 
• Leading Effective Teams Certificate Series (Foundation for Leading Teams; 
Communicating with Your Teammates; Keeping Your Teammates on Track; 
Managing Conflict in Your Team) 
• Supervisor and the Law 
 
Franklin Covey Training Seminars 
• FOCUS Time Management Seminar 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
2009 – Present American Political Science Association 
• Section on Health Politics and Policy, Section on Public Administration, 
Section on Comparative Politics, Section on Canadian Politics 
 
2004 – Present American Heart Association (Professional) 
• Council on Epidemiology and Prevention, Council on Quality of Care & 
Outcomes Research 
 
2004 – 2006 North American Society for the Study of Obesity (Professional) 
 
AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS  
2010 Five Year Service Award 
 West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 
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2004 Key Contribution Award 
Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 
 
 2002 Award of Merit for “Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin Heart Center Outcomes 
Report” 
 Wisconsin Healthcare Public Relations and Marketing Society 
 
2002 Key Contribution Award 
Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 
  
1998 Best Paper Award for: “Frisbee SJ and Frisbee WR. The demand for skiing 
among working two–adult households.” 
 Tourism and Hospitality Management Division, Administrative Sciences 
Association of Canada Annual Meeting, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1998 
  
1994 – 1996 University of Guelph Dorothy Britton Memorial Graduate Scholarship 
  
1994 – 1996 University of Guelph Graduate Student Assistantship 
  
1991 Natural Science and Engineering Research Council Summer Research 
Scholarship 
  
1990 – 1993 Natural Science and Engineering Research Council Canada Scholarship 
  
1990 Easter Seals Research Institute Summer Research Studentship 
  
1990 – 1994 University of Guelph President’s Scholarship 
 
TEACHING 
  2010   PUBH691 Bioinformatics and Personalized Medicine 
      Fall 2010 
      West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine 
• Lecturer (2-lecture series “Biomarkers for Risk Assessment of Environmental 
Exposure”); Lan Guo, PhD, Instructor of Record and Course Coordinator 
 
  2010   PUBH7062 Current Research Issues 
      Fall 2010 
      West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine 
• Lecturer (1 lecture “Overview of Ongoing Research Foci”); Rachel Abraham, 
MD, MPH, Instructor of Record and Course Coordinator 
 
  2010   PUBH630 Policy & the Health System 
      Spring 2010  
      West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine 
• Instructor (Instructor of Record, sole & lead instructor), curriculum 
development 
 
SERVICE 
Students Supervised 
2007 – 2008 Babina Gosinga MBBS 
• Member, MPH Practicum Committee 
 
2007 – 2008 Miriam Mutambudzi, BA 
• Ad Hoc Advisor, MPH Practicum 
Editorial Duties 
2010 – Present  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Hematology Journals Group (British Journal of Hematology, International Journal 
of Laboratory Hematology, Haemophilia, Vox Sanguinis, Microcirculation, 
Transfusion Medicine) 
• Statistical Review Editor 
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2010 – Present  Microcirculation 
• Member, Editorial Board 
Manuscript Reviewer 
2010 Journal of Primary Care and Community Health 
 
2010 Diabetes / Metabolism Research and Reviews  
 
2010 Environmental Science and Technology 
 
2010 European Journal of Public Health 
 
2009 – Present Metabolism Clinical and Experimental 
  
2009 – Present Journal of Dental Research 
 
2009 – Present Diabetic Medicine 
  
2007 – Present Microcirculation 
  
2006 – Present Diabetes Care 
  
2004 – Present Injury Prevention 
Institutional 
2008 2008 WVU Health Sciences Center E. J. Van Liere Research Day 
• Judge, Poster Presentations 
 
2007 2007 WVU Health Sciences Center E. J. Van Liere Research Day 
• Judge, Poster Presentations 
 
2005 Health Sciences and Technology Academy (HSTA) 11th Annual Science 
Symposium 
• Presider, Oral Presentations 
 
1998 Medical College of Wisconsin, Department of Pediatrics Website Development 
Committee 
• Programmer, Emergency Medicine Section Website 
Community 
2001 – 2004 Fight Asthma Milwaukee – Allies Coalition 
• Co-Chair, Surveillance and Evaluation Committee 
 
FUNDED GRANTS AND CONTRACTS 
Grants 
2010-2012 National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, 
Centers for Children’s Environmental Health & Disease Prevention Research  
1R21ES019236 “Associations between Non-8-Carbon-Chain Perfuoroalkyl Acids 
and Serum Lipid, Liver, and Kidney Parameters in Children” 
• Principal Investigator 
  
2009 West Virginia University School of Dentistry Seed Grant 
 “Analyses of Inflammatory Markers Among Older Adults in West Virginia” 
 Bei Wu, PhD, Principal Investigator 
• Co-Investigator 
  
2008 – 2010 West Virginia University 
 Faculty Senate Award R-08-004 
 “Does the Perceived Quality of Life and Health State Utility Predict Treatment 
Adherence and Outcome in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease?” 
 Maurice Moffett, PhD, Principal Investigator 
• Co-Investigator  
 [Note: Grant relinquished 8-2008 when PI relocated another institution.] 
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2007 – 2011 American Heart Association 
 National Center Established Investigator Award 0740129N 
 "Hypercholesterolemia and Microvascular Rarefaction: Translational Initiative 
from Mice to Humans" 
 Jefferson C. Frisbee, PhD, Principal Investigator 
• Co-Investigator 
     
2005 – 2006   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 Special Interest Project Competitive Supplement “9-2005: Network for 
Cardiovascular Health Intervention Research and Translation Network–
Collaborating Center” 
• Project Director 
 
2003 – 2004 Commonwealth Fund & Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
“Parent Mentors and Reducing Childhood Asthma Morbidity” 
Glenn Flores, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director 
• Sub-contract: cost analysis 
 
2003 – 2004 Agency for Health Care Research and Quality 
“Bar Coding Technology and Patient and Employee Safety” 
Ben-Tzion Karsh, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director 
• Sub-contract: data collection 
 
2003 – 2004 Children’s Hospital and Health System Foundation Grants 
• “Quality of Life After Pediatric Trauma” (Andrea Winthrop, MD, Project 
Director) 
• “Acupuncture Treatment for Fibromyalgia” (Lynn Rusy, MD, Project Director) 
• “Extubation in Patients with Altered Mental Status” (Kelly Tieves, MD, 
Project Director) 
• Sub-contracts for all projects: data collection, management, and statistical 
analysis 
 
2002 – 2004 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and American Academy of Allergy, Asthma 
and Immunology 
"Emergency Department Allies: Managing Pediatric Asthma" 
Kevin J. Kelly, MD, Principal Investigator and Project Director 
• Sub-contract: study design, quality control, and analysis 
 
2001 – 2004 Robert Wood Johnson 
"Milwaukee Allies Against Asthma" 
John R. Meurer, MD, MM, Principal Investigator and Project Director 
• Sub-contract: study design, data quality control and analysis, community 
disease burden surveillance 
 
2000 – 2003 Department of Health and Human Services Maternal Child Health Bureau 
"An EMSC-Based Violence Intervention/Prevention Program Evaluation with 
Cost-Benefit Implications" 
Marlene Melzer, MD, Principal Investigator 
• Sub-contract: biostatistician, study design, quality control, and analysis 
Contracts 
2006 – 2008 Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund 
“WVU C8 Health Project Data Hosting” 
• Project Manager, Scientist 
 
2006 – 2007 Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund 
“Chronicle and Public Opinion Services for Brookmar C8 Health Project” 
• Project Coordinator, Analyst 
 
2006 – 2007 Brookmar Inc., C8 Health Project Settlement Fund 
“Description and Estimated Population Health Impact of Medical Surveillance” 
• Project Coordinator, Analyst 
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2003 – 2004  Food and Drug Administration  
“Feasibility of a Projection Methodology to Assess Pediatric Drug Use in the 
United States” 
• Sub-contract (data management, statistical analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation) 
 
2003 – 2004 Johnson Controls, Inc. 
“Evaluation of the Clinical Impact of a UV Light Filtration Unit” 
• Project design, implementation, data management, statistical analysis 
 
2003   Medical College of Wisconsin Department of Dermatology  
“Multi-Site Study of Hemangioma of Infancy” 
Beth A. Drolet, MD, Project Director 
• Sub-contract (project design, project & data management, statistical 
analysis) 
 
2001 – 2004 NACHRI 
“Virtual Pediatric Intensive Care Unit Software Initiative” 
• Quality control, statistical and analytic processes 
 
2001 Child Health Corporation of America – Child Health Accountability Initiative 
(CHAI) 
“Pain Management Project Multi-Center Study” 
• Quality control, analysis, and reporting 
 
“Adverse Event Trigger Methodology Project Multi-Center Study” 
• Quality control, analysis, and reporting 
 
“Bronchiolitis Initiative Phase 3 Project Multi-Center Study” 
• Quality control, analysis, and reporting 
 
2000 – 2001 National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions (NACHRI) 
“Failed Extubations in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit Multi-center Study” 
• Study design and quality control 
 
INVITED PRESENTATIONS 
External 
2010  “Correlations between chronic depression and peripheral vascular function: a 
translational approach” with Beckett JAL [Presenter], Stapleton PA, Goodwill AG, 
d’Audiffret AC, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC.  
June 16-18, 2010, Bethesda, MD 
NIH, NCRR 3rd Biennial National IDeA Symposium of Biomedical Research 
Excellence (NISBRE) 
 
2009 “Health Care Policy Forum” 
    October 21, 2009, Morgantown, WV 
WVU Young Democrats and WVU Student Government Association; Forum 
Panelist & Speaker 
  
2009 “Misconceptions about the US and Canadian Health Care Systems” 
    September 25, 2009, Morgantown, WV 
2009 Conference of the West Virginia Political Science Association, West 
Virginia Chapter of the APSA, and the West Virginia University MPA Students; 
Panel on “The National Healthcare Dilemma”; Forum Panelist & Speaker 
 
2008 “The C8 Health Project: How a Class Action Law Suit Can Interact with Public 
Health – History of Events” 
 May 7, 2008, Morgantown, WV 
 Community Medicine Public Health Grand Rounds; Speaker 
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2006 “The Epidemiology of Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors in West Virginia 
School Children: Results from the CARDIAC Project” 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Morgantown, WV 
Invited Presentation Speaker 
  
 
2005 “Relationship between economic conditions and cardiovascular disease risk 
factors in West Virginia school children: Results from the CARDIAC Project” with 
Frisbee SJ [Presenter], Cottrell L, Elliott E, Minor V, Spangler-Murphy E, Neal 
WA. 
American Heart Association 2005 Scientific Sessions Meeting Dallas, TX 
Special Emphasis Panel – “Measures and Models: Health Policy and Outcomes 
Research” 
Internal 
2010 “Correlations Between Peripheral Vascular Function, Inflammation, and 
Depression in Human Subjects” with Stapleton PA [Presenter], d’Audiffret AC, 
Goodwill AG, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC. 
West Virginia University School of Dentistry / West Virginia Association of 
Academic Dental Research Sixteenth Annual Research Day; Invited Poster 
Presentation 
 
2009 “Peripheral Vascular Dysfunction, Systemic Inflammation and Markers of Clinical 
Depression in Human Subjects” with Stapleton PA [Presenter], d’Auddifret AC, 
Goodwill AG, James ME, Frisbee SJ, Frisbee JC.  
West Virginia University School of Medicine van Liere Research Day 2009; 
Invited Poster Presentation 
 
2009 “Social Choices in Health & Health Care: Comparing Canada and the United 
States” 
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Department of Community Medicine 
– PUBH617 Ethical & Legal Issues in Public Health, Section on Justice & Health 
Care; Invited Lecturer & Panel Discussant 
     
2006 “Chronic Inflammation, Cardiovascular Disease, and Dental Health: Developing 
Community–Based Translational Research Projects” 
West Virginia University School of Dentistry / West Virginia Association of 
Academic Dental Research Twelfth Annual Research Day; Invited Presentation  
 
2005 “Factors Influencing the Development of Cardiovascular Disease in West Virginia 
Children” 
West Virginia University School of Medicine, Center for Interdisciplinary 
Research in Cardiovascular Sciences; Monthly Seminar Series 
 
2004 “Outcomes Measurement, Evaluation and Research at Children’s Hospital of 
Wisconsin” 
Medical College of Wisconsin, Department of Pediatrics (Urology); Invited 
Presentation Speaker 
 
2001 "Designing a Clinical Research Study" 
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Cardiovascular Research Focus Meeting; 
Invited Presentation Speaker 
 
"Statistical Design and Analysis" 
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Nursing Research Interest Group; Invited 
Presentation Speaker 
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PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS 
Conference Abstracts, Posters, and Oral & Paper Presentations 
Kini NM, Meurer J, Malloy ME, Frisbee SJ, Siewert J. After hours nurse triage system identifies inner-city children 
who are in need of a medical home. Pediatric Academic Societies' 1998 Annual Meeting. New Orleans, LA: 
May 1998. [Poster] 
Kini NM, Robbins JM, Kotagal RU, Kirschbaum MS, Frisbee SJ, for the Child Health Accountability Initiative. 
Inpatient care for uncomplicated bronchiolitis: comparison to Milliman & Robertson recommendations. Year 
2000 Pediatric Academic Societies and American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Meeting. Boston, MA: May 
2000. [Poster] 
Sachdeva RC, Tweddell JS, Mussatto KA, Frisbee SJ, Otto M, Pelech AN, Litwin SB. The use of PRISM score to 
predict outcomes for pediatric patients with right ventricular outflow tract homograft valve replacement. 
Midwest Pediatric Cardiology Society Meeting. Milwaukee, WI: June 2000. [Poster] 
Sachdeva RC, Frisbee SJ, Stahovic LL, Wegner C, Rice TB. Quality of life measurements in technologically 
dependent children with special health care needs. 22nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Medical Decision 
Making. Cincinnati, OH: September 2000. [Poster] 
Rice TB, Frisbee SJ, Wegner C, Stahovic LL, Sachdeva RC. Risk factors for long-term outcomes in pediatric patients 
with tracheostomy. CHEST 2000 Annual Meeting. San Francisco, CA: October 2000. [Poster] 
Fedderly RT, Whitstone BN, Frisbee SJ, Tweddell JS, Litwin SB. Factors related to pleural effusions after the Fontan 
procedure in the era of fenestration. American Heart Association 73rd Scientific Sessions. New Orleans, LA: 
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